In the wake of a military attack by “Hamas militants” against Israelis on an unprecedented scale, Israel has declared war on Hamas. James Joyner summarized the situation reasonably well:

I’ve disliked Netanyahu, thinking him a thug and a bully, going back to his first stint as prime minister in the 1990s. His illegal and immoral occupation policies have certainly contributed to this crisis.

That said, this attack by Palestinian militants was stupid. Attacking Israeli civilians was obviously going to result in a massively disproportional response. And, while there are no good guys here, I don’t see how the United States could have done other than side with an ally whose territory has been attacked.

The horror of the situation is not merely in the indiscriminate nature of the attacks, killing mostly civilians but in the considerable possibility that the conflict may expand. Israel only has a limited number of alternatives:

• Make a token response
• Create a larger buffer between Gaza and Israel. Since Gaza is only 25 miles long, that wouldn’t leave a lot. Israel might just eject (or destroy) the whole population. Unpopular as the Palestinians are, that could result in some level of involvement by other Arab countries or Iran.
• The weapons Hamas is using are coming through Egypt. Attempting to cut that off might involve Egypt.

While I agree with James that we have little choice but to side with Israel, I think that it should be observed that circumstances are considerably different now than they were in the Yom Kippur War 50 years ago. Then a substantial proportion of the Arabs in the United States were Maronite Christians; now they are predominantly Muslims. Then there was an order of magnitude more Jewish-Americans than Arab-Americans; now they’re roughly equal in number. Then nearly all Jewish Americans supported Israel; now Israel’s support among American Jews has decreased somewhat—many Reform Jews don’t support Israel at all. Israel’s government and the Israelis themselves have become much more conservative. Then support for the Palestinians among Americans was rare; among young Americans now support for Israel and the Palestinians is about the same.

I honestly don’t think I’ve read an article recently that was as unmoored from reality as this one at Modern Diplomacy by Arne Tulner, Here’s his proposal for ending the war in Ukraine:

The fundamental cause of the conflict in Ukraine lies in the geopolitical division of Europe between NATO and Russia, which has persisted after the Cold War. After Germany in the past, Ukraine now threatens to be torn apart between the two superpowers.

To restore peace in Ukraine, this geopolitical division must first come to an end. Therefore Russia’s pretense as a superpower must be tempered, something that US President Obama already advocated in 2014.[1] Not to humiliate Russia, but to integrate it safely into Europe.

The Hague Peace Proposal is aimed at compensating Russia for this loss of power with Western security guarantees. Not as a ‘privileged’ partner within the current NATO-Russia Council (NRC), as this has proven to be too non-binding. Only if Russia is fully integrated into a European security structure, the security of both Russia and the rest of Europe can be guaranteed.

Due to Russia’s enormous power potential, this can only be achieved safely by committing Russia to transatlantic cooperation, as it takes place within NATO. Russian dominance can be neutralized by American counterbalancing. To resolve the war in Ukraine, it will therefore be necessary that Russia joins NATO.

If Russia commits to the NATO treaty, it will indeed be geopolitically downgraded to the level of France or the United Kingdom. But as a regional partner it will benefit from European strategic, political and economic cooperation. This changes Russia from pariah to partner.

NATO will also lose its superpower status if Russia joins in. However, it can thus evolve into a fully-fledged European security structure that guarantees peace and justice for the entire continent. Dutch professor Rob de Wijk previously spoke out in favor of such a NATO as an ‘armed branch’ of the European security organization (OSCE).[2] This keeps NATO relevant, even in times of peace.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Russia’s membership of NATO requires American commitment to the Alliance and is therefore, paradoxically the best assurance for the United States to remain permanently involved in Europe.

Russia’s membership in NATO will make the alliance neutral, which will also allow Ukrainian NATO membership, as this gives Russia the best guarantee of Ukrainian neutrality. This will reduce Russian influence on Ukraine, leading to a full restoration of its sovereignty; and without Russian dominance, Ukraine will be able to give autonomy to its minorities. As a result Russia will have to return annexed territory. This sequence will ultimately lead to peace.

That was a perfectly reasonable plan 25 years ago. I’ve supported it myself. IMO the main impediment to it then was U. S. opposition. Now too much bad blood has been let, there are too many fresh grievances, and none of the old impediments are gone.

Additionally, Mr. Tulner seems to have forgotten that what makes Russia a superpower rather than just a regional one is nuclear weapons. I don’t see Russia giving up its nuclear arsenal.

I don’t think there is any practical, benign resolution to the war in Ukraine. At this point any resolution will require the deaths of tens of millions of people. Or more.

Philip Cunliffe predicts the collapse of the European Union in a piece at UnHerd:

In advance of the summit, France and Germany, the bloc’s two most powerful member-states, have staked out their vision for institutional reform of the EU with a report titled “Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st Century”. And what has been overlooked in the extensive discussion of the report is that it effectively consigns the EU to the same slow oblivion as the Holy Roman Empire — to be corroded from within by centrifugal dissolution. This is quite different from the end of the EU that had been envisaged in recent years. For a brief period across 2015-2019, it seemed at least possible (if still unlikely) that the EU might have been blown apart by a series of populist explosions en-chaîne across its territory. But the Union survived this sequence of ballot box revolts, with its core structures long since insulated from any popular incursions.

Since that abortive period of uncertain and confused national revolt, and with the sole exception of Brexit Britain, national-populists around the continent have all surrendered to Brussels. This began with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s ignominious capitulation to the Troika, in 2015, in defiance of his own voters, and has continued to the present day with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s calm acceptance of the strictures of the eurozone. National-populist leaders continue to bleat about the threat of a federal Europe, but this is only to disguise how much sovereignty they themselves have already surrendered as member-states.

Nonetheless, despite the dismal failure of the populists, the Franco-German report makes clear that it is politically impossible for the Union to survive in its current form. If its recommendations are implemented, their logic will inevitably corrode the Union from within, allowing it to disperse itself into a more diffuse entity. It will gradually lose its coherence and purpose over time, and its eventual demise might well be an afterthought — akin to Francis II’s dissolution of the Reich in 1806.

I don’t know if the EU and, presumably, the euro will cease to exist and, honestly, I don’t care. We have greater interests in the countries of this hemisphere, in the countries of the Pacific Rim, and India than we do in the European Union. The EU is, was, and always has been a vehicle for protecting and subsidizing German manufacturing and French farming. I said more than 20 years ago I didn’t see how French agricultural subsidies could survive adding Romania to the EU let alone adding Ukraine. The euro is, was, and always has been an attack vehicle against the dollar as the global reserve currency. Why are we interested in protecting German manufacturing, preserving French farm subsidies, or the euro?

At Financial Times Mohammed El-Erian interprets the market signals as suggesting that the likelihood of U. S. recession is rising:

An intense period of rising interest rates, high oil prices and a stronger dollar is pushing the financial market consensus on US economic growth away from the comforting notion of a soft landing.

By my count, this will be the sixth time in the past 15 months that conventional wisdom shifts for the world’s most influential economy. It is a pivot that, unfortunately, is likely to stick for longer this time around, threatening what has been an impressively strong US economy, undermining genuine financial stability and exporting volatility to the rest of the world.

concluding:

If congressional dysfunction spreads further, and if the Fed continues to drag its feet on changing key underpinnings of its policy formulation, the turn in US economic surprises will not be pleasant for either the domestic economy or the rest of the world.

I would think that the market had priced in Congressional dysfunction at this point. At this point home mortgage interest rates are the highest they’ve been since 2000, heading higher. If that persists for any substantial length of time, it’s hard to imagine what would happen.

The editors of the Tampa Bay Times identify the solution to our polarized politics as ranked-choice voting:

As this Editorial Board argued last year, Florida should consider ranked choice voting, perhaps modeled on Alaska’s system, where primary elections are open to all candidates regardless of party affiliation. The top four vote-getters go through to the general election, held weeks later. Voters then use ranked choice voting to select a winner from the final four. The basic idea is that voters don’t have to select only their top candidate — they can rank some or all of the candidates if they want. Either way, if no candidate receives a majority of the first-place votes on the initial tally, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated. When a voter’s first-choice vote is eliminated, then their second-choice vote is counted. It goes on until there is a winner with the majority of the votes.

Frankly, I’m skeptical. I doubt it’s that simple. I think that gerrymandering, too few representatives, and too much power being placed in the hands of party leaders all play roles in how undemocratic our system is. For one thing what good would representatives who espouse more moderate views when running do when they follow the party line in Washington?

Maybe ranked-choice voting would be a good step. I think we need to ban gerrymandering outright, increase the size of the House by at least 50%, and impose term limits or some other strategy for reducing the power of party leaders to have notionally more moderate representatives mean anything. That could only happen through a Constitutional Convention which is a risky strategy.

At, appropriately, Bloomberg Michael Bloomberg observes that House Democrats are to blame as well as what’s referred to as the “Chaos Caucus”, the eight Republicans who voted to oust House Speaker Kevin McCarthy:

Kevin McCarthy’s ejection from his seat as speaker of the US House of Representatives — an ignominy that hadn’t been attempted in more than a century — is a national embarrassment that deepens the Republican Party’s descent into dysfunction and extremism. But the fact is: The blame rests not just with the eight Republicans who voted to oust him, but also with both parties’ leaders — McCarthy and Democratic Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries — for failing to reach across the aisle to save the country from this mess.

Over the past several election cycles, I have strongly supported Democratic efforts to win the House, largely to save the country from the dysfunction and craziness of a party that has fallen captive to its extreme right wing. I disagree with McCarthy on virtually every issue, but in some critical moments this year, he showed that he was willing to stand up to his party’s right-wing extremists and take the heat.

Jeffries should’ve been willing to take the same risk, by rising above partisanship to save McCarthy’s job — if not for the good of the country, then for the good of the Democratic Party.

The numbers make that clear. Eight Republicans voted to remove McCarthy from the Speakership and 200 Democrats voted for it.

That wasn’t their only alternative. Minority Leader Jeffries might have negotiated a deal with Speaker McCarthy and allowed Democrats to vote against removing McCarthy. Democrats might have voted “Present”. There are other alternatives.

The eight Republicans who voted to remove McCarthy are objectively anti-government. Now, apparently, so are Democrats.

James Carville, political consultant to the Clinton campaign in 1992’s victory, is a walking sound-byte machine. One of his most famous: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Here’s another one:

If there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.

Keep that in mind if you read former Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal about what the bond market is telling us. Here’s a snippet from his opening:

Hold short-term interest rates at current levels, and threaten to raise them if inflation morale doesn’t improve. That’s current Federal Reserve policy. The trouble is that the central bank doesn’t set interest rates anymore. The bond market does.

and here’s its kernel:

The coming supply of Treasury securities required to fund U.S. government deficits will likely be substantially larger than official estimates. And purchasers of Treasury debt will demand higher yields, at least until something breaks in the economy.

First, on the supply side. The government currently funds $33 trillion of outstanding debt at an average interest rate of about 2.9%. Funding costs on the growing debt burden are forecast to average only a fraction of a percentage point higher over the next 10 years, according to the Congressional Budget Office. I’ll take the over.

The bond market is signaling heightened uncertainty about the range of possible outcomes. If the Fed’s recent rosy economic forecasts for growth and inflation are wrong and a recession ensues, there will be a gusher of new debt. Every additional 1-point increase in interest rates will add more than $2.5 trillion of expense in the next decade.

Next, on the demand side. After the global financial crisis, four of the largest purchasers of Treasury debt were price-insensitive. That is, they were buying Treasury debt for policy reasons—economic, geopolitical or regulatory. Price didn’t matter. How fortunate. These buyers, however, have largely exited the market. The Fed bought about a quarter of all Treasury debt in the past decade but warns that its Treasury holdings will shrink for at least another year.

China, another massive buyer in recent years, is unlikely to sell its existing holdings at a loss. But don’t expect Chinese leadership to do the U.S. any favors by showing up in size at the next Treasury auction. Japan’s domestic growth profile is the most robust in decades. The lion’s share of its excess savings will stay closer to home. And after the banking debacle in March catalyzed by Silicon Valley Bank, the largest banks—firmly overseen by their regulators—are no longer keen to load up on “risk-free” long-dated Treasury bonds.

He says pay more attention to the bond market than to what the Fed is doing.

I think that China’s “massive buying in recent years” depends on what you mean by recent and what you mean by massive:

and here’s Japan’s:

Were those adjusted to constant dollars they would look even worse.

Will much higher yields, as the bond market seems to be telling us, lead to the Chinese and Japanese resuming their purchases of U. S. Treasuries? Frankly, I doubt it.

Source of data: UN World Population Prospects Data Portal

I’m puzzled by Thomas Fazi’s latest piece at UnHerd. It purports to claim that NATO and Ukraine cannot win a prolonged war of attrition and simultaneously to assume that it will. Here’s what I think is the kernel of the piece:

The prospect of an Afghanistan-style war of attrition is worrying for a number of reasons. Firstly, because, if Ukraine had little chance of winning a blitzkrieg-style counteroffensive, it has even less chance of winning a long-term war of attrition, given Russia’s advantage in manpower and its ability to produce more artillery and ammunitions than Ukraine and the West combined (Russia’s current ammunition production is seven times greater than that of the West). “If the war goes on for long enough with this intensity, Ukraine’s losses will become unbearable,” a senior French official told the Wall Street Journal in February.

And second, because as the conflict drags on, and potentially escalates, direct Nato involvement in the conflict — and thus the risk of an all-out war between Nato and Russia — will inevitably increase. Europeans should be especially worried by the prospect of a long war: if American military assistance starts to wane, Europe will need to carry more of the burden. Indeed, it would appear that the EU has already taken its cue from events on the other side of the Atlantic. On Monday, two days after the no-deal in the US Congress, the EU’s foreign ministers paid a surprise visit to Kyiv to express their unwavering support for Ukraine.

Why does he think that, if the U. S. curtails its support for Ukraine, Europe, i.e. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, will pick up the slack? His conclusion directly contradicts that:

If this seems foolish, let alone dangerous, we can find some solace in the fact that reality would appear to be standing in the way of this plan. There is, after all, simply no way for the EU to plug the gap — in military, financial or political terms — if Washington scales back its support. For those of us who yearn for peace, the EU’s dysfunction might be, for once, a silver lining.

Doesn’t experience tell us that Germany and France, in particular, are more likely to seek some sort of accommodation with Russia rather than picking up the slack should the U. S. end support for Ukraine?

My view continues to be that we should continue to support the Ukrainians but that we should audit Ukraine’s use of our support more closely and use whatever leverage our support provides to encourage the Ukrainians to settle for some armistice short of their stated strategic objectives. As to Ukraine’s objective of ensuring long-lasting security, I think that’s impossible and know of no realistic proposals for accomplishing it.