Hirelings

I found Dana Milbanks plaint in his recent column amusing in a sad sort of way:

Obama ad man Mark Putnam has a dexterous sense of loyalty.

He is proud of his work on the president’s 2008 and 2012 campaigns. His Web site boasts that he wrote and produced Obama’s 30-minute infomercial in 2008, “the most-watched and highest-profile political ad in American history.” The site further notes that he “continued his work on the Obama Media Team” in 2012, “creating many nationally aired television ads.” There’s also a blurb from David Plouffe, former Obama campaign manager, calling Putnam “one of the best producers in our party.”

And now Putnam is repaying President Obama for the faith he placed in him, by working to defeat the signature foreign-policy achievement — and one of the top overall priorities — of Obama’s presidency.

Riddle me this. When you hire someone to do a job for you what that employee or consultant owe you? Is he

  1. Your slave
  2. Your acolyte
  3. Someone who owes you loyalty and the best work he can provide during the term of his employment and nothing otherwise.

I’d say “c”. If you’re going to rely on hired guns, it’s prudent to keep them on the payroll. They’ve got you not the other way around.

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Flawed Reasoning

James Taranto points out a critical flaw in President Obama’s defense of the deal he’s negotiated with Iran:

But there is an even more basic objection to Obama’s statement. Assume for the sake of argument that the “Iranian hard-liners” and the Republicans really do want an all-out military confrontation. Now, consider an example from history when such a result actually obtained. On Dec. 7, 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. On Dec. 8, Congress declared war on Japan. Would it make any sense to say that the Japanese and the U.S. Congress had made “common cause”?

Obama is equating mutual antagonism with its opposite, “common cause.” Again, Orwell put it more pithily: War is peace.

Will the president maintain his divisive and IMO counterproductive rhetoric now that the very Congressional leaders whose support the president needs for his agreement are opposing it, too? I’m guessing he will. He has shown a remarkable lack of ability to learn from experience.

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When Free Trade Isn’t

I am constantly amused by the contortions that people go into trying to explain how their protectionism is different from everybody else’s protectionism. the latest example is in this Wall Street Journal editorial, which opens with a critique of the protectionist tariffs that Canada and Mexico want while defending the protectionist patent protection that the United States wants:

Most of the remaining disputes stem from classic protectionist special pleading. Canada, the third-largest economy in the 12-nation talks, wants to keep dairy farmers shielded from competition with measures like 241% tariffs on milk imports. U.S. dairy farmers want similar protections if they can’t sell into Canada. This mercantilist domino effect, as economist Richard Katz puts it, could be a dealbreaker for New Zealand, the world’s largest dairy exporter, which co-founded the TPP largely to secure new markets for milk, cheese and eggs.

[…]

Also short-sighted: The U.S. still wants to protect domestic sugar growers from Australian competition, while Mexico wants to shield auto manufacturers from Japanese competition on grounds that Japanese firms source too heavily from non-TPP countries such as Thailand. Given TPP’s stakes, officials should be able to cut deals on both issues.

A more consequential trouble spot is patent protection for “biologic” pharmaceuticals—in other words, for the innovation crucial to U.S. prosperity. The U.S. position is that biologic protections should last a dozen years, after which foreign firms could make generic copies.

As I’ve pointed out any number of times before, a free trade agreement would insist on no tariffs on the part of any of the participating countries on anything, no subsidies for domestic companies for which foreign companies are not also eligible, and no patents, copyrights or other attempts at limiting entry into the market. When you’re dickering over how long the term of patents should be or how high the tariffs may be, you’re merely picking winners and losers.

The sad truth is that U. S. dominance in the pharmaceutical business:

Of the some 5,600 drugs in the pipeline among TPP nations, some 3,400 are being developed by U.S. companies. The other countries are ganging up in the name of cheaper drugs while undermining the incentives to make risky investments in the country where they matter. The result would be fewer cures for the world market and less U.S. growth.

is largely dependent on robust and extraordinary lengthy U. S. patents. Companies venue-shop and the U. S. is a good place in which to register your intellectual property for protection. Trying to paint that as natural advantage or free trade is absurd.

It seems to me that if our protections for, say, automobiles or consumer electronics were as committed as our commitment to defending the holders (not creators) of titles to intellectual property, the U. S. auto companies would have nothing to worry about and most U. S. consumer electronics would be produced here rather than in China as is the case now. Think of all of the jobs that could be created!

The meat of the WSJ editorial is the fear that President Obama’s desperation to conclude a trade deal on any terms so long as it’s concluded on his watch might impel him to make concessions that shouldn’t be part of the agreement:

But the danger is that other countries are driving a hard biologics bargain to take advantage of the Obama Administration’s desire for a deal before it leaves office. The biologics standard in TPP will be the template for every future trade deal, and the U.S. should not casually erode American law in an industry so crucial to future growth and public health. Better to make concessions on sugar or another industry where the U.S. is protectionist rather than to capitulate on scientific discovery.

The biologics issue highlights why TPP is essential global growth: It would be the first major trade deal to liberalize trade in services and include protections against commercial intellectual-property theft and official expropriation of assets. Such protections are essential to modern industries, from biotech and software to movies and music, that are particular strengths of America’s innovative, knowledge-based economy.

It’s a reasonable enough fear given the pattern in Obama Administration negotiations. However, let’s be frank. Intellectual property laws are not a natural right; they’re a legal right. Other countries’ ignoring our intellectual property laws is no more theft than our enacting them and for exactly the same reasons.

As I’ve said before, my only concern about the TPP is that it be of net benefit to the U. S. generally and particularly to ordinary Americans. I’m parochial. I don’t much care if the agreement results in $285 billion in global economic growth or $285 trillion if it’s all in countries other than the United States. Just tell me how it helps us. Don’t lecture me about the benefits of free trade, particularly when you’re not willing to let trade be free.

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Why Schumer Will Vote “No”

I’ve heard New York Sen. Chuck Schumer speak in person. In an op-ed that’s more astute than I honestly would have given him credit for, he explains why he’s decided to vote against the agreement with the Iranians when it comes up before Congress:

In making my decision, I examined this deal in three parts: nuclear restrictions on Iran in the first ten years, nuclear restrictions on Iran after ten years, and non-nuclear components and consequences of a deal. In each case I have asked: are we better off with the agreement or without it?

In the first ten years of the deal, there are serious weaknesses in the agreement. First, inspections are not “anywhere, anytime”; the 24-day delay before we can inspect is troubling. While inspectors would likely be able to detect radioactive isotopes at a site after 24 days, that delay would enable Iran to escape detection of any illicit building and improving of possible military dimensions (PMD) — the tools that go into building a bomb but don’t emit radioactivity.

Furthermore, even when we detect radioactivity at a site where Iran is illicitly advancing its bomb-making capability, the 24-day delay would hinder our ability to determine precisely what was being done at that site.

Even more troubling is the fact that the U.S. cannot demand inspections unilaterally. By requiring the majority of the 8-member Joint Commission, and assuming that China, Russia, and Iran will not cooperate, inspections would require the votes of all three European members of the P5+1 as well as the EU representative. It is reasonable to fear that, once the Europeans become entangled in lucrative economic relations with Iran, they may well be inclined not to rock the boat by voting to allow inspections.

Additionally, the “snapback” provisions in the agreement seem cumbersome and difficult to use. While the U.S. could unilaterally cause snapback of all sanctions, there will be instances where it would be more appropriate to snapback some but not all of the sanctions, because the violation is significant but not severe. A partial snapback of multilateral sanctions could be difficult to obtain, because the U.S. would require the cooperation of other nations. If the U.S. insists on snapback of all the provisions, which it can do unilaterally, and the Europeans, Russians, or Chinese feel that is too severe a punishment, they may not comply.

Those who argue for the agreement say it is better to have an imperfect deal than to have nothing; that without the agreement, there would be no inspections, no snapback. When you consider only this portion of the deal — nuclear restrictions for the first ten years — that line of thinking is plausible, but even for this part of the agreement, the weaknesses mentioned above make this argument less compelling.

Second, we must evaluate how this deal would restrict Iran’s nuclear development after ten years.

Supporters argue that after ten years, a future President would be in no weaker a position than we are today to prevent Iran from racing to the bomb. That argument discounts the current sanctions regime. After fifteen years of relief from sanctions, Iran would be stronger financially and better able to advance a robust nuclear program. Even more importantly, the agreement would allow Iran, after ten to fifteen years, to be a nuclear threshold state with the blessing of the world community. Iran would have a green light to be as close, if not closer to possessing a nuclear weapon than it is today. And the ability to thwart Iran if it is intent on becoming a nuclear power would have less moral and economic force.

If Iran’s true intent is to get a nuclear weapon, under this agreement, it must simply exercise patience. After ten years, it can be very close to achieving that goal, and, unlike its current unsanctioned pursuit of a nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear program will be codified in an agreement signed by the United States and other nations. To me, after ten years, if Iran is the same nation as it is today, we will be worse off with this agreement than without it.

In addition, we must consider the non-nuclear elements of the agreement. This aspect of the deal gives me the most pause. For years, Iran has used military force and terrorism to expand its influence in the Middle East, actively supporting military or terrorist actions in Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza. That is why the U.S. has labeled Iran as one of only three nations in the world who are “state sponsors of terrorism.” Under this agreement, Iran would receive at least $50 billion dollars in the near future and would undoubtedly use some of that money to redouble its efforts to create even more trouble in the Middle East, and, perhaps, beyond.

To reduce the pain of sanctions, the Supreme Leader had to lean left and bend to the moderates in his country. It seems logical that to counterbalance, he will lean right and give the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and the hardliners resources so that they can pursue their number one goal: strengthening Iran’s armed forces and pursuing even more harmful military and terrorist actions.

Finally, the hardliners can use the freed-up funds to build an ICBM on their own as soon as sanctions are lifted (and then augment their ICBM capabilities in 8 years after the ban on importing ballistic weaponry is lifted), threatening the United States. Restrictions should have been put in place limiting how Iran could use its new resources.

In my opinion the astute parts are two. First, this:

Advocates on both sides have strong cases for their point of view that cannot simply be dismissed. This has made evaluating the agreement a difficult and deliberate endeavor, and after deep study, careful thought and considerable soul-searching, I have decided I must oppose the agreement and will vote yes on a motion of disapproval.

That is significantly more than President Obama or Sec. Kerry have been willing to do and my experience has been that for the most part advocates of the agreement have followed suit: being dismissive of reasonable counterarguments or opposing opinions, a very poor strategy for persuasion, especially since a majority of Americans disagree with them.

But this is the reasoning that impressed me:

Ultimately, in my view, whether one supports or opposes the resolution of disapproval depends on how one thinks Iran will behave under this agreement.

If one thinks Iran will moderate, that contact with the West and a decrease in economic and political isolation will soften Iran’s hardline positions, one should approve the agreement. After all, a moderate Iran is less likely to exploit holes in the inspection and sanctions regime, is less likely to seek to become a threshold nuclear power after ten years, and is more likely to use its newfound resources for domestic growth, not international adventurism.

But if one feels that Iranian leaders will not moderate and their unstated but very real goal is to get relief from the onerous sanctions, while still retaining their nuclear ambitions and their ability to increase belligerent activities in the Middle East and elsewhere, then one should conclude that it would be better not to approve this agreement.

first, because it acknowledges that assumptions are an important consideration in evaluating the agreement and second because it recognizes that we have serious problems with the Iranian regime itself, not just their nuclear development program, whatever its objectives.

If there is one thing we should have learned over the course of the last century it is that revolutionary generations do not moderate. It was true of the Soviets, it was true of the Chinese, it has been true of the Cubans, and I believe it is true of the Iranians. Time is likely to be our friend in negotiations with them.

It will be interesting to see the reactions to Sen. Schumer’s announcement and reasoning. I hope it will impel the president to engage with those with whom he disagrees rather than dismissing or deriding them. Sen. Schumer is not just some random Democrat—he’s a member of the Senate Democratic leadership and his views should be given due consideration by the president who is notionally the leader of that party. His announcement undoubtedly gives permission to some Senate Democrats who are struggling with their decisions to oppose the president’s hectoring on the matter.

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The People’s Questions

I don’t plan on watching the Republicans’ “debate” tonight. Even if I were a Republican I doubt that I could do it without snickering. However, over at Gallup Frank Newport has a good post on the questions that would be asked if the people of the United States were asking the questions. Based on polling data, here are the issues that the American people want to know about:

First question: How do you propose to fix the U.S. economy?

Second question: How do you propose to deal with the people’s record-low confidence in Congress and the elected representatives they send to Washington?

Third question: What do you propose to do about race relations in this country?

Fourth question: What do you propose to do about immigration and individuals living in this country illegally?

Fifth question: What do you propose to do about jobs?

Sixth question: How do you propose to deal with declining moral, family and ethical values in this country?

Seventh question: How do you propose to deal with the federal budget deficit?

Eighth question: What do you propose to do about poverty?

Ninth question: How do you propose to deal with crime and violence?

Tenth question: How do you propose to improve the education our children receive?

Eleventh question: How do you propose to make healthcare more accessible and affordable?

While I think those are all good questions, those aren’t the questions I would ask. I think those are questions they should be asking the governors of their states.

Limiting myself to just four questions, the questions I’d ask are:

  1. Under what circumstances should the U. S. use force against another country?
  2. Under what circumstances should the U. S. enter into treaties with other countries?

and two questions I honestly never thought would need to be asked:

  1. How do you interpret Article II, Section 2, Clause 2

    [The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur…

    of the U. S. Constitution?

  2. What does Article II, Section 3, Clause 5

    he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed

    mean to you?

Updated

To pile absurdity on top of banality, NPR has asked the candidates what questions they would ask each other. It has been a common observation that the candidate who offers the most optimistic view of America and its future generally goes on to win the general election. Which candidate, depressingly, accomplishes that in the question asked?

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Redoubling Your Efforts When You Have Forgotten Your Aim

James Taranto’s post yesterday about John Kerry’s remarks on the incipient deal with Iran:

This morning Goldberg published an interview with Secretary of State John Kerry on Iran. Here is the most alarming bit:

Kerry warned that if Congress rejects the Iran deal, it will confirm the anti-U.S. suspicions harbored by the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and eliminate any chance of a peaceful solution to the nuclear conundrum:
“The ayatollah constantly believed that we are untrustworthy, that you can’t negotiate with us, that we will screw them,” Kerry said. “This”—a congressional rejection—“will be the ultimate screwing.” He went on to argue that “the United States Congress will prove the ayatollah’s suspicion, and there’s no way he’s ever coming back. He will not come back to negotiate. Out of dignity, out of a suspicion that you can’t trust America. America is not going to negotiate in good faith. It didn’t negotiate in good faith now, would be his point.”

Goldberg’s headline is “John Kerry on the Risk of Congress ‘Screwing’ the Ayatollah.” We write for a family newspaper, so we went with something a bit more delicate.

To put this as politely as possible—and believe us, we’re straining to do so—Kerry’s tender concern for the ayatollah’s “dignity” is perverse. It’s true that a degree of mutual trust is necessary for a negotiation to succeed, but Kerry ignores the “mutual” part. His analysis is one-sided, and on the wrong side. The main question for Congress—as it should have been for the administration—is whether America can trust Iran.

That reminded me a good deal of a remark made by an Illinois official in response to a question about a proposal to eliminate tolls on Illinois expressways. His response was that he thought it was a bad idea “because then we couldn’t use iPass” (iPass is Illinois’s automatic toll payment system).

I read Sec. Kerry’s remarks a bit more kindly than Mr. Taranto does. I think that the phenomenon of government officials becoming so absorbed in the process of what they’re doing that they forget what they’re supposed to be accomplishing.

To reiterate my own position, I’m not opposed to the deal with the Iranians so much as puzzled by the self-contradictory nature of the arguments its proponents are making. I’d like to be convinced that it’s in the U. S.’s best interests rather than browbeaten into accepting it which appears to be President Obama’s strategy, not a particularly effective strategy in persuading me of anything let alone U. S. senators who are notoriously thin-skinned and jealous of their prerogatives.

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Fitting the Policy to the Problem

To critics of the recovery Barry Ritholtz retorts that what we’ve experienced is just what one would expect in a “balance sheet” recovery:

First, the specifics: By just about every economic metric, this has been a mediocre, subpar recovery. For the first few years following the end of the recession in June 2009, employment increased slowly. Wages to this day have been little changed. Retail sales have been inconsistent; housing has seen soft sales numbers, while price increases have been a function of a lack of inventory caused by limited amounts of home equity and immobility as a consumer try to reduce debt. Gross domestic product growth has been weak and lacking in consistency.

The context is simple: When we discuss expansions, we typically are referring to the later half of a typical economic contraction-expansion cycle. That is what is typically referred to as a post-recession recovery.

However, that huge outlier is a clue that we are using the wrong data set. The post-World War II recession recoveries are the wrong frame of reference; the proper one is the much more severe set of credit-crisis collapses and recoveries.

Economists Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff figured this out before the scale of the crisis even was apparent. In January 2008 they published a paper titled “Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison.” They warned that the U.S. subprime mortgage issue was turning into a full-blown credit crisis, not just a typical recession. I discussed this extensively in February 2008.

The economic researchers were astute enough to not use other recession-recovery cycles as their comparison when discussing the pace of growth in the U.S. economy after what they said would be a collapse caused by subprime mortgages. Instead, they suggested looking at five previous financial crises — Japan (1992), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991), Norway (1987) and Spain (1977).

IMO the greatest problem with his analysis is that he doesn’t take it far enough. However much fiscal stimulus Japan has deployed (Japanese public debt is now well over twice GDP), twenty years on Japan still hasn’t recovered from its financial crisis. Neither has Spain.

Sweden, Finland, and Norway did recover but all nationalized at least some of their banks in one form or another, something we have demurred from doing.

Additionally, the fiscal stimulus we’ve applied has been under the assumption that what was happening was an ordinary cyclic downturn. The sort of stimulus that was applied, first by the Bush Administration and then by the Obama Administration is very unlikely to do much good. Then what has happened to all of that stimulus? Mr. Ritholtz hit that nail directly on the head in a post from six years ago that he labelled as “humor”: it was sent to China. We import too much from China for conventional “pump-priming” stimulus to be particularly useful.

Mr. Ritholtz can’t have it both ways. Either we had a “balance sheet” recession and the policies during and since the recession have been at worst counterproductive or at best ineffectual or the policies have been right and we’ve had the weakest recovery since the end of World War II. Take your pick.

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O, Canada!

Canada is teetering on the brink of a recession and the first step might be a long one:

The latest economic data from Canada shows that it is inching toward recession, after its economy posted its fifth straight month of contraction.

Statistics Canada revealed on July 31 that the Canadian economy shrank by 0.2% on an annualized basis in May, perhaps pushing the country over the edge into recessionary territory for the first half of 2015.

“There is no sugar-coating this one,” Douglas Porter, BMO chief economist, wrote in a client note. “It’s a sour result.”

There are a lot of reasons being given for Canada’s economic problems including a housing “bubble” in Toronto and Vancouver and associated overbuilding but I think that the linked article has things almost exactly the wrong way around. As it turns out Canada wasn’t immune after all to the recession that started in the U. S. in 2007-2008 and spread around the world. It’s only oil prices that have kept Canada’s economy afloat and now that oil prices have fallen and look as though they’ll remain low for some time, there’s nothing preventing the Canadian economy from falling.

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Plastic, Please

Despite the City of Chicago’s ban on plastic shopping bags which went into force on August 1, my beloved Happy Foods is too small to fall within the ban and we’ll continue to receive plastic bags for the foreseeable future.

At least in our case the ban is foolishness. We reuse our plastic bags, in some cases multiple times. If we no longer receive plastic shopping bags, we’ll need to start buying plastic bags. How is that good for the environment? I’d think it was exactly the opposite.

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Is Elena Kagan a Sadist?

Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan has granted Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan’s (if you think that surname is a coincidence guess again) request for more time to file a writ of certiorari to appeal the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision on the public pension case to the Supreme Court of the United States:

In an action that’s going to set some tongues wagging, the U.S. Supreme Court has cleared the way for a possible appeal of an Illinois Supreme Court decision in May that rejected a state pension reform law.

The action came yesterday when the court granted a request from Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan to extend from Aug. 6 until Sept. 10 the deadline for asking the court to take up the matter, a legal step known as filing a writ of certiorari.

The request for more time was granted by Justice Elena Kagan, who reviews such requests from Illinois and other states in the federal 7th Circuit. Kagan did not indicate why she approved the application.

What possible basis would the SCOTUS have for overturning the decision? Being “routine” doesn’t seem to me to be enough justification. Shouldn’t some actual basis for an appeal be a necessity? Gen. Madigan hasn’t even filed for cert yet, she’s just wants more time to do it. Why? If this is just a “Hail Mary” on Gen. Madigan’s part, why delay matters? It just makes the final reckoning that much more difficult and costly. Has “we really, really want it” become legal grounds? Or does the SCOTUS now think that carrying water for Illinois’s feckless legislators is their job?

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