Our Proxy War

At Project Syndicate Michael Ignatieff makes a number of points I’ve been making here plus a few of his own:

The West has entered a proxy war, and in proxy wars, the proxy defines the objectives. When proxies do well, it is tempting to start envisaging more ambitious objectives, from forcing the opponent into a humiliating stalemate to effecting regime change. Yet this raises the risk of strategic hubris. We risk forgetting that Russians have long experience enduring economic hardship. They can absorb a great deal of economic punishment before rising against the regime. It is also hubristic to predict that Putin’s inner circle will rise up and dethrone him.

It is far too early to conclude that Putin is losing the war. He has already shifted to more destructive and effective tactics, with the hideous destruction of Mariupol and Kharkiv indicating what may be in store for Kyiv. Neither the West nor its proxy are in any position to announce regime change as the strategic goal, which would risk provoking Putin into pursuing an even more violent and dangerous escalation.

The West has been congratulating itself on the severity of the sanctions regime, but sanctions are weapons that hit both sides. Every Western leader knows that higher gasoline prices mean political trouble back home, especially in an election year. If the West cuts back further on Russian energy imports, or if the Russians turn off the tap themselves, a recession or even depression will loom.

We are, as he points out, walking “a fine line”. What outcome will the Ukrainians be willing to accept? What outcome will we be willing to accept?

Strategic planning requires that you plan for the worst rather than hoping for the best. I hope our political leaders understand that.

Update

In a similar vein at RealClearDefense Seth Cropsey writes:

Identifying a desirable end state requires precisely what the Biden administration has yet to do, identifying U.S. interests in Ukraine. NATO unity is not an end in itself. Nor is Ukraine a thriving liberal democracy. Zelensky’s election did signal a sea change in Ukrainian politics, demonstrating that civil society could assert itself against oligarchy and zombified nomenklatura. However, even absent the war, it would have taken decades of structural reforms and civil development for Ukraine to become a non-corrupt liberal democracy. Similarly, Ukraine would have been a target for Chinese investment, reducing American willingness to accept it into NATO. Ideological reasons, therefore, are insufficient to explain America’s engagement in the Ukraine question.

For the United States, the Ukraine question gains its relevance from power-political considerations. Ukraine is a large, populous country with a long Black Sea coastline. Putin’s decision for war had multiple drivers, including chauvinistic post-imperial nationalism, religious messianism, domestic pressure, poor intelligence, and fear of NATO. But it also stemmed from a concrete military concern, specifically Russia’s desire to secure the Black Sea, and its link to the Eastern Mediterranean. Crimea was a crucial acquisition in 2014. But until February, it was isolated and running low on water. By smashing a hole from Donbas to Crimea, Putin could ensure the Russian navy’s resupply, and allow it to project power more effectively against NATO’s vulnerable Black Sea or Mediterranean members.

Moreover, if Putin can take Odesa, a more ambitious goal, Russia then holds the entire northern Black Sea. A vulnerable Georgia would be a logical next target. Finishing the job against Tbilisi would give Russia control up to Turkey’s coastline, leaving only Romania and Bulgaria as Black Sea rivals. This could have been Putin’s objective from the war’s start. He has now shifted decisively to this objective, reducing the pace and intensity of northern operations, and focusing on Mariupol, the final city he must hold to take Ukraine’s Azov Sea coastal road, running from Rostov-on-Don to Melitopol, and onward to Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.

My concern at this point is less that Russia will win than that U. S. political leaders will be surprised when it wins.