At the New York Times John Measheimer urges a different policy on our part with respect to Ukraine:
The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as she has said Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not know how to bring the crisis to an end.
She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine can be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and incorporated into the West, and that Russian leaders must accept that outcome. They will not.
To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies should also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a goal that is clearly in everyone’s interest.
If any of that sounds familiar it might be because it’s very consistent with what I’ve been arguing here since the onset of the crisis. That and that I don’t understand why we’re supporting a neo-Nazi junta in Kiev in the chronically corrupt Ukraine.
I doubt that we can reverse course that way but it might be fun to outline a drastically different approach to foreign policy than we’ve used for the last several decades. First, identify a desired, stable end state. Then figure out the steps we’d need to take to get there. Finally, take the steps.
What’s the stable outcome in Ukraine? I think it’s the one the Mr. Mearsheimer has delineated but let’s not stop there. What’s the stable, desired end state in Iran? I don’t think we can have an acceptable not to mention stable end state in Iran that doesn’t involve replacing the theo-fascist regime in charge there with something that’s at least minimally more congenial. Do the talks move events in that direction or into the opposite direction?
How about DAESH? What’s the stable end state? And how can it be effected?
The only stable end-state occurs when everyone is dead. Life is messy, and as New people become part of the scene they add their own ambitions to the mix.
While I agree re: Ukraine, I think Iran is stable enough that we can have an acceptable relationship with it, without waiting/provoking establishment of regime change. It’s a relationship that has had fits and starts, usually derailed because of either publicity, untrustworthiness, or politics. But I believe this is a country (and government) that wants to reach some kind of accommodation with the US.
As for DAESH or whatever name it goes by next week, I do not know. Whether the movement is sincere regarding its motives or just an excuse to exercise in thuggery, I do not know. The maps are being rewritten daily as I write this, so I find it difficult to propose where to even begin on an end state. I guess a good start is creating (or just acknowledging) a buffer where it wont spread as a popular movement, and work from there. I find recommendations on a grand alliance (like Pat Lang’s suggestion of supporting Assad) and the hope to kill our way out of this mess silly, because it doesn’t acknowledge that there is a popular movement behind the violence.
There are reasonably stable end states other than the heat death of the universe.
I disagree with Chinese Jetpilot above’s assertion that we can arrive at a modus vivendi with the present Iranian regime (although Andy could comment on that more authoritatively). The regime is inherently apocalyptic in nature, they’ve shown a definite desire to expand their influence, they’ve been acting well outside anything that might reasonably be construed as their sphere of influence, e.g. the AMIA bombing in 1984, and there is a certain instability to any authoritarian regime.
I’m not sure I buy the implicit equivalence between a military treaty and a non-military treaty. Also, I can understand how the Soviets couldn’t treat a theoretical Austrian membership in a Western free-trade arrangement as neutral given that the ideological dispute of the Cold War centered on different economic theories. But for the Russians to preclude trade pacts with the EU says something about Russian intentions for Ukraine that are not neutral. Or why would Ukraine agree to this? A treaty formalizing this arrangement would just create justifications for Russian tanks to invade any time the Czar thought Ukrainians were not pursuing Russian interest, i.e. not being neutral.
The optimal end-state for the U.S. is an independent Ukraine that eschews the illiberal path of Russia and Hungary. That will probably still mean simmering regional conflict within Ukraine. The U.S. should send military supplies to Ukraine since Putin will simply meet whatever we supply and a degraded Ukraine is in his interest anyway. The second best outcome is Ukraine divides, in which case it might make sense to arm Western Ukraine.
The optimal outcome in Iran is that they don’t go nuclear (not just for it’s own sake, but because of other regional players doing the same) Otherwise, Iran is of little interest to U.S. other than reducing its penchant for creating instability in the region. It is fundamentally an anti-American regime, supported by anti-American (and anti-Sunni) grievances.
ISIL should not become a state, and I doubt it will be.
My point on Ukraine is that there is no stable solution in which Ukraine is hostile to Russia. It can be aligned with Russia or it can be neutral but it cannot be hostile. Russia won’t accept that and Russia is in a position to do something about it and has the will to do so.
DAESH doesn’t aspire to being a state. It aspires to being a caliphate and I don’t think that its actions can be understood without taking that seriously.
The only difficulty we must contend with on the Iranian side is Khomeinism, or the notion that a grand ayatollah can rule in the name of the hidden Imam. One of the unintended side-effects of Iraq War, Chapter II is that it freed Ayatollah al-Sistani to challenge this particular interpretation of shi’a religious thought, which traditionally is based on rational thought, i.e. anything that makes for good law makes for good religion. This was pushed back to some degree in the heat of the 1979 revolution but is now resurging in the region as religious scholars and students have become increasingly skeptical of Khomeinism, and as alternative voices from the outside have risen in prominence.
al-Sistani is actually a great ally. Unfortunately, he’s 85 years old and won’t be around forever. I don’t know who’s next in line.
Dave,
“The regime is inherently apocalyptic in nature…. desire to expand their influence….acting well outside anything that might reasonably be construed as their sphere of influence, e.g. the AMIA bombing in 1984”
I think its one thing to believe the apocalypse is coming and another to BELIEVE the apocalypse is coming. By the Iranian government’s actions to date, I think its far more the former than the latter. As for desiring to expand their influence (even beyond the region), I did not know when that wasn’t the norm in international politics. The United States has been involved in far more “bridge too far” situations than they have, I reckon. As for terrorism and support for such, I agree, but the one you specified happened over 30 years ago. It’s like the Iranians mentioning Mossadegh; IF we want this relationship to work, we both have to move on from transgressions that occurred in the past.
Our diplomacy has a tendency, from materials I’ve read, to treat issues separately while many of the “developing” countries tend to look at it as a whole. Maybe treating each issue separately is a more mature way of doing it, I don’t know, but I do know it hasn’t resulted in much progress for us. We talk to the Iranians, behind closed doors (or vice versa), to solicit support against Islamic State; they want to lay it all out on the table (nuclear talks, etc) while we typically say “well lets keep those discussions separate and talk only about Islamic State”. Same with the Russians. They don’t tend to compartmentalize their policy as we tend to do.
@Dave, I do not believe the Russians merely want a non-hostile Ukraine. Putin wants to direct its foreign policy, including economic arrangements. When an Anglo country assumes such power, it is called imperialism.
@Ben, the neo-cons were very aware of the prospect of encouraging a non-Khoemeni Shi’ism during the run-up to the Iraq War. I can recall responding to someone’s blog question about what the heck is the neo-con obsession with Shi’ism? (Answer was something to the effect of traditions of political quietism that resembled separation of church and state, of scholasticism, and of inter-mediation between the faithful and the religion. Khomeini borrowed a lot from Sunni traditions.
If you trust Russia enough to cede them (what is theirs for the past 1000 years) and you should, why do you not trust Russia to handle its ally Iran?
I mean we do not handle Israel, Israel handles us. Russia handles Iran.
Like Putin handles his oligarchs, whereas our oligarchs handle us.
Now, you obvously prefer a return to the Shah who did business with Israel against the will of the runaway majority of his people
whom the SAVAK took care of if they objected too strongly.
I would guess Iranians have long had enough of the American government, realizing it overthrew Mossadegh and bween doing dirty ever since.
The American people they are said to have a fondness for, undoubtedly because they humor them as haplessly ruled slaves who at least were gullible enough to give their government Iraq
when their agents outwitted those of Israel.
If the US is a Christian country, as many contend, then we are inherently apocalyptic. In practice, neither we nor the Iranians behave as if we are. But, if they really are and I am wrong, I don’t see how changing the regime matters that much as you are still going to end up with a Shia leader.
Steve
On Ukraine, Russia has long viewed the EU association agreement as a stalking horse for NATO membership and it’s not a baseless fear. It’s important to point out that the association agreement isn’t merely a free trade pact and it would make Ukrainian membership in Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union practically impossible. That alone is not acceptable to Russia, but NATO membership for Ukraine would be a massive strategic defeat for Russia and thus they will pay a high price to prevent that from happening.
Arming Ukraine serves no purpose for the US IMO except to make the situation worse and potentially chart a course to a military confrontation with Russia. As far as stability goes, there may not be an answer. Long-term I think it would probably be best for Ukraine to let its eastern provinces go but that doesn’t seem likely.
On Iran, there are a few things to consider. First, one should separate the Islamic fervor of the post-Revolutionary period from more recent years. Secondly, the rhetoric from some of Iran’s elite is apocalyptic, but Iran’s actions since the 1980’s have been considered, deliberate and consistent with the actions of normal states defending their interests. Iran’s foreign policy has only been expansionary where its coreligionists are concerned – we may not agree with them or think their actions are justified, but supporting Shia movements around the world isn’t that surprising outside of the secular “West.” Third, Iran’s politics is very factional and some factions are much less anti-US than others. Iran’s younger generation stands in stark contrast to comparable youth in Arab countries – they are much more tolerant, less Anti-America and you don’t seem them flocking to warzones to sacrifice themselves for virgins in the afterlife or to bring out the hidden Imam. Look 20 years down the road when members of MENA youth bubbles will be running things. It seems to me Iran’s millennials are much more likely to be friendly to the US than those from Egypt, “Syria” Saudi Arabia or any number of Sunni Arab countries. IMO we should bide our time with Iran. Also, if we believe that ISIL/DAESH is really a big threat, then we should cooperate with Iran to oppose them and it seems we are to a limited extent, given the reports of Iranian operations against DAESH along the border provinces.
@Ken Hoop, I agree that Russian sees Ukraine as part of their imperial domain. Most fascists have historical maps and understandings of history that they seek to reverse. That’s the common thread btw/ Russia, Iran and ISIS. Understand the maps they have in their head and understand their motivations.
@steve, you’re the only commentor that professes to believe the bombing of Tokyo was Christian because the U.S. is a Christian nation.
@Andy, Ukraine: I agree that the economic treaty had broader aspects that should have been culled, but Putin isn’t really interested. Ukraine agreed to ratify the economic treaty subject to further negotiation on the items objected to by Putin, but that was an illusory compromise:
Putin’s objections are pretextual. He does not have any good-faith intention of negotiating any compromise that “neutralizes” the Ukraine issue. Ukraine is to be an instrumentality of Russian foreign policy through the Eurasian or an object lesson for neighboring states. The U.S. doesn’t have that strong of an interest in Ukraine’s fate, but it does have an interest in Russian stratagems. (Though I am far, far more inclined than Measheimer to believe some of this conflict is a result of Putin personally)
Whatever the U.S. does, I don’t want it to agree to another Yalta.
@Andy, Iran: The revolutionary fervor may have declined, but the structure of the government insures that the “elected” leaders will hold to revolutionary ideology. Nobody will hold office without appeasing the religious leadership, the religious leadership will not cede control, and I think the pragmatists tend to be more interested in domestic policy, giving the religious zealots control over things that matter to the U.S.
I’m not aware of such revolutionary councils moderating, as opposed to being eliminated by a subsequent revolution. (Arguably James Madison argued for something similar in a Council of Revision, which would review both federal and state laws before passed, but was too revolutionary for most Americans)
“Ukraine is to be an instrumentality of Russian foreign policy through the Eurasian or an object lesson for neighboring states.”
That’s true, but what are the options? Ukraine as a neutral state; Ukraine in the Russian sphere; Ukraine in the EU/NATO sphere, Ukraine split up.
A bigger question is the purpose of NATO in the post- Soviet era.
As for Iran, yes, the government structure is a potential problem, but that doesn’t preclude pragmatic alliances, or even a change in the structure of the Iranian government. The question for us is what US policy is mostly likely to bring about a more favorable Iranian government?
Countries run by dictators are not democracies yearning for freedom. They are a hodge podge of groups forced together by a strongman. When the strongman is removed chaos results. homogeneous nation-states are a creation of hundreds of years of fighting, migrations, and purges.
In order for these non-democratic countries to become democracies, one group will need purge the others. The last one standing will be that countries nation and set its culture. The other option is to sit on top of them for several generations until they develop a common culture. That common culture may be hatred for their oppressors, and a revolution may be the uniting event.
Neither option is acceptable to most of today’s interventionists. Instead, they want to knock off the uniting force, and then complain about the natural outcome.
The US begins meddling in places that it has absolutely no understanding of the history or the present, and the US is feckless and self-absorbed. After Ukraine is sufficiently broken, the new iPhone will be released, and the US will have a new top priority. Most of the world does not change with each new Windows version.
Russia, Iran, and ISIS are regional problems, and to the extent they have any international reach, they can be dealt with by alternate means. If anything needs to be done with them it needs to be regional, and it needs to be initiated by the regional neighbors.
The bulk of the solution to ISIS is Assad. Stop with the nonsense. He is in charge of the country for a reason, and unless anybody wants another Libya, he is the only alternative to a failed state.
As to Israel and Iran, Israel cannot conduct a ground or air war against Iran, and even if they could, they would need to use their defensive munitions and equipment on an offensive war. For a country concerned about its defense, being defenseless is not a good position.
If Iran were trying to start the end of the world, they should begin by getting Mecca nuked and retaliate. This would work even better if they could pin it on Israel.
(I have not gotten into purges, but in the US, blue collar workers have been/are being purged in addition to manufacturing. They are not being put to the sword. Rather, they are being put to unemployment insurance, schooling, or disability. This is just a heads up. Get those arguments ready for the crazy man.)
@Andy, I don’t think the U.S. should have a terribly activist policy on either, or at most containment. I don’t want to send arms to Ukraine, nor do I want the U.S. to agree to maintaining a neutral Ukraine when it actually means Russian control. I don’t think the U.S. has in its power to change the government of Iran.
I’m beginning to think that’s a primary objective of U. S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Failed states everywhere. Except here, presumably, and sometimes I’m not so sure about here.
They are the cargo cult of foreign policy. They believe that it is the totems of democracy that make a democracy function, and as such, all you need to do is put them into place to have a functioning democracy.
This is fine for children imitating adults, but when the children are able to put these notions into practice, all hell breaks loose. Like children, they think they know everything. Adults are stupid.
“@steve, you’re the only commentor that professes to believe the bombing of Tokyo was Christian because the U.S. is a Christian nation.”
Not what I believe at all. What I believe is that a country where over 3/4 of the people identify as Christian (probably much higher during WWII), a country where a sizable minority, and again probably a majority in the 40s, view the US as a Christian country, dropped those bombs on Tokyo. Not clear if this is because they are Christian or in spite of it. The fact remains that Christians did the bombing.
I suspect I am one of the few people here who regularly attends church, and the even fewer people with deep ties to very conservative, evangelical roots. I don’t think most people outside of those circles know how important it was to evangelicals, the GOP base, that Bush was considered a true Christian. How important his conversion story was to them. How they thought God was a part of his decision making.
Query- How many other countries have prayer breakfasts?
Steve
Hmm. I attend church regularly. Not as regularly as I used to–I used to go to daily Mass but regularly.
Catholic doctrine is that dropping the bomb on Hiroshima or Nagasaki was immoral. Every pope since then and scores of Catholic theologians and moralists have explained why. At best the bombings make me queasy and at worst I condemn them. That lots of people who consider themselves Catholics continue to defend the acts just illustrates a point I’ve made repeatedly here: most Americans have no more moral education than you’d expect from a seven year old and their moral maturity remains at roughly that level.
I think they’re defending the bombings on the grounds of a) distance and b) Americanism, neither a justifiable reason in faith or morals.
My grandfather was drafted in 1943 at the age of 35 w) two children largely because West Central Illinois was full of German peace churches with recognized claims to pacifist exemptions. Steve has grown up and been exposed as a young adult to Christian fundamentalism, a movement barely more than a hundred years old and a minority religious position in all but six or seven states.
There is no Christian position on war. The Crusades were not premised on the equivalent of the sixth pillar of Islam, but an extension of Augustinian philosophy of Just War and outrage at the victimization of the vulnerable, the same sort of outrage that would send that heathen Lord Byron to Greece to die.
My grandfather was in Shanghai readying for the land invasion when Japan was being bombed. I have absolutely now discomfort at brutal efforts to save American lives. The war was just, our decision-makers had an obligation to bring the war to an end.