“One China”, Ambiguity, and U. S. Interest

In 1972 the U. S. entered into diplomatic relations with China for the first time since 1949 with a joint statement called the “Shanghai Communique”. Since that time the U. S. position regarding defense of Taiwan has been one of what is called “strategic ambiguity” regarding the question of U. S. action in the event of a mainland Chinese attack or invasion of Taiwan. That means we haven’t said we would defend Taiwan and we haven’t said we wouldn’t. It has been widely assumed that we would.

That ambiguity was removed yesterday by President Joe Biden during his visit to Japan. Or has it? Today President Biden is walking that back. From Morgan Chalfant at The Hill:

President Biden said Tuesday that the U.S. still abides by the policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan, a day after he made waves by saying in no uncertain terms that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.

“No,” Biden told reporters during an event in Japan when asked if the policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was “dead.”

“The policy has not changed at all,” Biden added. “I stated that when I made my statement yesterday.”

The relevant passage of the Shanghai Communique is the first two sentences of paragraph 12:

The US side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

That does not say that the U. S. agrees with or accepts the Chinese belief only that the Chinese believe it. It’s very artfully worded.

The editors of the Wall Street Journal laud the end of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan and want it brought into any Asian trade framework negotiated by the U. S.:

The press is saying President Biden blundered Monday in committing the U.S. to defend Taiwan, but after three similar statements in the last year maybe he means it. The arguably much bigger mistake is his decision not to include Taiwan in the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework that the Administration launched on Monday.

Asked by a reporter if the U.S. would defend Taiwan militarily against China, Mr. Biden answered with a blunt “yes.” He went on to say that, “We agree with the One China policy. We signed onto it and all the attendant agreements made from there. But the idea that it could be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not—it’s just not appropriate. It will dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine.”

Rather than launching into an examination of what the president meant, praising him, or criticizing him, I’ll just ask some questions:

  • Did the president remove at least some of the ambiguity from our position?
  • Did he intend to?
  • Why now?
  • Does the statement serve U. S. interests?
  • Should the U. S. officially accept or reject that Taiwan is a part of China?

My answers are yes, no, who knows?, no, and no.

1 comment… add one
  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    Mine are

    Yes
    Yes (when one does it 4 times in a year and each has made waves, it goes beyond clumsiness with words or age)
    Who knows?
    No (at least not now — at the current moment, stable working relations should be the priority)
    Not without a much bigger discussion involving Congress.

    This is one aspect that isn’t mentioned. Taiwan’s status and strategic ambiguity was codified into law with the Taiwan’s relation act. The White House shouldn’t freelance without consulting and partnering with Congress on it. Since the delicate balance that existed is what makes US / China relations possible, changing the balance should go through a considered and thoughtful process.

    I am no fan of the CCP, but what Biden is doing is risky.

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