“War consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.”
Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes
In his recent post Trepidation, Steven Den Beste reviews some of the shortcomings of what appears to be the U. S.’s progress in the war in Iraq and the War on Terror, generally:
“The biggest danger from the uprising by militant Sunnis in Falluja and al Sadr’s extremist Shiite militia was that it could embolden others and begin a general uprising. But that’s very much a matter of momentum and perception, and the initial decision to stabilize the situation and to execute a controlled pause of about a week before reacting was probably a good one. By the time our forces began efforts to destroy the insurrection, that particular danger was pretty much gone.
And this uprising had the potential to actually be a significant opportunity for us to eliminate the hard core of the opposition facing us, since that hard core had obligingly changed from “voicers of dissent” (which we must tolerate) into “armed insurgents” (which we would be free to crush).
Of course, there were other hazards. Heavy handed military operations in Najaf could have been viewed by Shiites as desecration of holy sites, for instance, and might well have set off a more general uprising.”
I think he’s pretty much on the money in his notes on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. But I don’t entirely agree with him on the situation in Iraq.
Our army is the Shi’ites’ army if only they have the wit to recognize it. As the majority in any foreseeable Iraqi federation they will have significantly more power than under Saddam. They’re champing at the bit and it’s obvious. But time is their friend. Their greatest fear should be that the Americans leave before a stable Iraqi government has been established. Pretty clearly we have not communicated this to them and we really need to do so. The revelations from Abu Ghraib prison do not help. Just as the Shi’ites have the most to gain in a stable and peaceful Iraq they have the most to lose in a chaotic Iraq in a permanent state of civil war or an Iraq run by Moqtada al Sadr.
I believe we’re doing the right thing in Najaf. Control the situation there at a distance. Prevent Moqtada al Sadr from gaining reinforcements or supplies from outside the city and from recruiting outside the city. Let Sistani and the other clerics and civil leaders there consolidate their positions and–with luck–mobilize the people against al Sadr. Sistani must know how much he has to lose in an Iraq run by al Sadr. Al Sadr is a greater problem for Sistani than he is for us.
The situation in Fallujah is quite different. In any foreseeable Iraqi federation the Sunni population will have less influence, less power, and a significantly smaller piece of the pie than they did under Saddam. And surely they must know this. Time is their enemy. Their rational response is resistance. That this resistance is at least in part assisted by foreigners—Syrians—makes it all the more important that it be decisively removed.
We really need to eliminate that resistance both for strategic and tactical reasons. I don’t think we can afford to let it disappear into the civilian population. Putting an Iraqi face on restoring order to Fallujah is a strategic necessity and tactically helpful. We must act in Fallujah and I sincerely believe and hope that that is what will happen.
“Take time to deliberate, but when the time for action arrives, stop thinking and go in. ”
Andrew Jackson
