How do you take an area about the size of Massachusetts, with two warring populations, and that has never been a state in all of its long history into a viable state? You can’t says Aidan Hehir at National Interest:
Yet, despite the hyperbole and the extraordinary scale of the state-building project, Kosovo currently suffers from a crippling array of problems, and bears the hallmarks of a failed state. This could be verified by consulting the Failed State Index but for the fact that—illustrative of its contemporary predicament—Kosovo is not considered a “recognized sovereign state.â€
As a consequence of the massive investment of economic and political capital, perpetuating an image of Kosovo as “multiethnic,†“democratic†and “peaceful†has become vital to liberal internationalism’s image. Preserving this image, however, has led to the imposition of a national identity which simply does not equate with the reality on the ground in Kosovo. More damagingly, the determination to artificially contrive a facade of peace and stability within Kosovo has led external actors to tolerate, and at times support, corruption and intimidation perpetrated by Kosovo’s powerful criminal network. Paradoxically, therefore, Kosovo’s people have been forced to endure profoundly illiberal practices orchestrated by the various “internationals†who micromanage the country so as to maintain its image as their success.
Read the whole thing.
At one time or another Kosovo has been run by the Serbians, the Turks, the Austrians, the Bulgarians, and the Romans. What’s the end game here? Kosovo doesn’t have the historic, ethnic, or economic conditions that would make it a viable state. Keep it as a UN protectorate into the indefinite future? Eject the Albanian population and restore Kosovo to Serbia? Eject the Serbian population and federate it with Albania?
The UN has spent 55 years or so stabilizing the Congo, so, stabilizing an area closer to home could easily extend for as long as needed. There’s white papers to be written, resumes to polish, pensions to be earned and there’s the delights the charming men with pistols in their belt can arrange for a small fee.
Not to mention children to abuse.
Compare the intervention in Kosovo to the intervention in Iraq. One has led to a long period of relative stability. The other, not so much.
I think you’re overestimating Kosovo’s stability. That having been said NATO continues to maintain a force of around 5,000 in Kosovo which has an area of about 10,000 square miles, about the size of Massachusetts. We have about the same number of troops in Iraq which is the size of California.
I opposed both the intervention in Kosovo and the invasion of Iraq. I didn’t see NATO or U. S. interest in Kosovo. If the EU had wanted to put troops there, more power to them.
Dave Schuler: I think you’re overestimating Kosovo’s stability.
Kosovo is much more stable than Iraq, by any reasonable measure.
Dave Schuler: That having been said NATO continues to maintain a force of around 5,000 in Kosovo
A bargain compared to Iraq.
It’s an absurd comparison and I can’t believe that you’re persisting in making it. To have the same impact NATO would need to maintain a force of 75,000 in Iraq.
Dave Schuler: It’s an absurd comparison and I can’t believe that you’re persisting in making it.
You’re the one who is suggesting that Kosovo is not stable. We provided an example of an unstable state for comparison.
Instead, you might compare Kosovo today with Kosovo before the intervention. This is not to minimize the current problems in Kosovo, which are substantial; and lacking a path forward, Kosovo could devolve back into violence; however, the longer the peace holds, the more people become vested in peace.
Dave Schuler: To have the same impact NATO would need to maintain a force of 75,000 in Iraq.
Actually, Iraq would have needed about 500,000 troops to initially impose order. The U.S. committed 150,000 based on the idea that democracy would somehow flourish without a plan for stabilization, which, of necessity, would have meant confronting the political frictions in Iraq. And that’s a principal reason why Kosovo and Iraq had such different outcomes.
The mark of stability is the ability to stand on one’s own. The 5,000 NATO troops who’ve been there for 20 years are not a sign of stability but instability.
The relative privation fallacy rears it’s head again!
Zachriel misses the point that Kosovo is not a coherent political entity as its stability is dependent on the presence of foreign forces. How long can that last? Is there any historic precedent for a nation in those borders? No, it’s a project doomed to fail as similar do-gooder projects are around the world will (or are) fail. See also, Bosnia and South Sudan.
A useful proxy for national stability are the State Department’s travel advice. In Kosovo, the areas bordering Serbia are no go zones for the State Department, while in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the State Department will not travel outside the capital. Remember the DRC has had 50 years of UN mentoring, security forces, etc.
Dave Schuler: The mark of stability is the ability to stand on one’s own.
Kosovo is relatively stable, due, in part, to the presence of international troops. Iraq is not stable at all, despite (and due to) the presence of international troops.
Andy: Is there any historic precedent for a nation in those borders?
Italy and Germany didn’t become a unified states until 1871. The Kurds and Palestinians have yet to become unified states. Nation states are a relatively new concept.
Aidan Hehir: Therefore, since 1999, international actors in Kosovo have been engaged in an inherently paradoxical project: so as to maintain the image of efficacious liberal internationalism, the keystones of liberal democracy have been sacrificed.
Hehir is correct to note festering issues in Kosovo. We merely pointed out that Kosovo is relatively stable, by far a better result than the Iraqi intervention. And *because Kosovo is relatively stable*, the West’s eye has wandered.