In an op-ed at the Wall Street Journal Michael Dempsey outlines five challenges that confront Iraq in the aftermath of driving DAESH out:
First, the Kurdish independence referendum, originally scheduled for Sept. 25, is threatening to spark a full-blown crisis even before ISIS is defeated on the battlefield. At issue is whether a large chunk of Iraq will eventually break away entirely or redefine its relationship with the central government. Complicating the issue is the inclusion in the vote of disputed territories, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, which is held by Kurdish forces but claimed by Baghdad.
On Monday Iraq’s Supreme Court ordered the referendum suspended until it can assess the vote’s legality. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres is also calling for a delay, as are Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and the Turkish and Iranian governments. Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani has previously hinted that he might delay the referendum until after national elections next April, but only at the price of concessions and assurances about the Kurds’ future status. Whether or not the referendum is held next week, it’s likely to be only the opening act in lengthy negotiations between the parties, and resolving the question in a way that doesn’t undermine Baghdad’s legitimacy and threaten Iraq’s neighbors is critically important.
Second, to ensure that ISIS remains marginalized, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi must accelerate long-delayed political reconciliation efforts, specifically by easing de-Baathification efforts and providing more local power and job opportunities to Sunni communities. This is a difficult task given the deep divisions over this issue within the Iraqi parliament, but Sunni isolation fueled ISIS’ rise, and progress must be made on this issue soon.
Third, Baghdad must exercise tight control over the thousands of Shiite militia fighters (many of whom participated in Tal Afar’s liberation) and limit their authority in traditional Sunni areas. Mr. Abadi must ensure that the Shiite militias are not allowed to determine unilaterally which populations are allowed to re-enter liberated areas, and that the bulk of reconstruction aid from Baghdad is not distributed only to Shiite communities. The Shiite militias are deeply distrusted by the Sunni populations of Nineveh and Anbar provinces, and they are a potential flashpoint in the delicate Shiite-Sunni relationship.
Fourth, as winter approaches, Baghdad must make progress in improving living conditions throughout the country. ISIS devastated infrastructure in the areas it controlled. The latest U.N. estimate is that some 11 million Iraqis require humanitarian assistance, with more than three million displaced across the country, more than one million living in temporary housing settlements, and more than 200,000 refugees abroad. The critical work of providing food and shelter to displaced Iraqis is a top priority.
The recent claim by Iraq’s minister of water resources that the Mosul Dam is no longer in danger is worrisome, especially if it reflects a willingness of the central government to gloss over difficult infrastructure-related challenges. The grouting work performed by an Italian firm to shore up the dam’s foundation was widely viewed as only a temporary solution, and most experts still believe there is the potential for a catastrophic dam breach.
Fifth, Mr. Abadi has to begin preparing for local and national elections. Despite a surge in his popularity following the Iraqi military’s victories against ISIS, he will likely face a significant re-election challenge from, among others, Hadi al-Amiri, a longstanding ally of Iran. Mr. Abadi has been a strong partner for the U.S. in the counter-ISIS campaign, and his re-election offers the best hope for continuing a positive working relationship between Washington and Baghdad, and for balancing Tehran’s growing influence in Iraq.
I think there’s something vitally important for us to keep in mind: it isn’t up to us. We shouldn’t decide Iraq’s fate, whether it continues to exist or under what structure. That must be left to the Iraqis. We should neither support nor impede the Iraqis’ decisions about their own fate.
Ah, more fantastical thinking from the WSJ. It would be a useful exercise to count the number of opeds written over the last 16 years that say basically the same thing in reference to a host of countries. The very definition of insanity.
We face pretty much the same challenges we faced when we were still there the first time, and just as much ability to influence the outcome. I expect us to waste another $100 billion, at least, some more lives and end up leaving with few real changes.
Steve
Dave,
What are your thoughts on Sanders’ foreign policy speech?
Sorry, link here:
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/sanders-speaks-on-foreign-policy/
As is the case with many political speeches, I thought the speech was overlong. I agreed with some of it (the need for less military activity, the military-industrial complex, his remarks on Saudi Arabia), disagreed with other parts (his fondness for the UN), and thought some of it was just vapid (his remarks on North Korea, his views on the goals of American foreign policy).
Perhaps his views will become more broadly adopted within Democratic circles but I doubt it. There is a broad political consensus (what Pat Lang calls “the Borg”) among elected officials of both political parties, the foreign service, and international relations academics. It supports overuse of force in support of “Friends”, e.g. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and opposing “Enemies”, e.g. Russia, pursuing global American hegemony. Its neoliberal economic arm has led to the deindustialization of the United States (and Europe), undermining the source of most of the U. S.’s influence in the world which is economic.