An article at Al Monitor by Nilsu Goren and Dalia Dassa Kaye, blandly described as “Middle East experts”, on how the United States can reach a modus vivendi with Erdogan’s Turkey reminds me of nothing so much as the old wisecrack about two wolves and a sheep arguing about what’s for dinner. I wish I knew more about their backgrounds and preconceptions. Just remember that everybody, repeat everybody has an axe to grind. Here’s a sample:
Turkey’s entanglement in regional conflicts, as well as Erdogan’s shift to a revisionist regional policy through military interventions in Syria and Libya, could make it difficult to frame the agenda with Turkey around ending regional wars. Turkey may find its own constraints with continuing its military operations and eventually focus attention back home, particularly given increasing economic challenges in the midst of the global economic downturn and the pandemic. Regardless, we do not foresee openings for significant improvement in bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States as long as the current political dynamics and deep disagreements leading to strong anti-American sentiments are in place.
Consequently, we might suggest an alternative approach focused on a regional rather than a bilateral agenda — specifically, a possible road map for US-Turkish cooperation focused on a regional security and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation agenda. This could be a critical issue for regional stability and an area with multiple looming crisis points in the months and years ahead. In principle, it may also be an area where there is common interest in preventing the further spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, despite continued Turkish-Iranian economic ties and Turkey’s political engagement with Iran through forums like the Astana process, Turkey continues to be wary of Iranian intentions and supports the Iran nuclear deal. Turkey opposes the capability of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons because of the threat this would pose to regional stability. Similarly, Turkey adamantly opposes the chemical attacks by Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime. This could provide a foundation for a cooperative regional agenda with the United States, working with international forums, despite the general friction in the bilateral relationship.
I think they’re taking a far too nostalgic view of Turkey. What, for example, makes them think that today’s Turkey is interested in “regional stability”? Quite to the contrary I think that Erdogan’s Turkey is not only Islamist but irredentist. I believe they’re thinking of Kemalist Turkey.
As dangerous as the areas adjacent to China in all directions are because of China’s obvious irredentist policies, so the Middle East is probably in its most volatile condition in a century. There are four different powers vying for influence, at least three of them irredentist and a different three with ambitions that extend far beyond the Middle East, namely the leadership of the Islamic world. They cannot all succeed.
I think we have very little in the way of interests in common with Erdogan’s Turkey, the Saudi Arabia of MBS, or Iran under the mullahs. Formulating a workable Middle East policy is daunting at the best of times and, well, these aren’t the best of times. I think we should start considering our interests in the Middle East much more narrowly and pragmatically than we have for the last half century. That will mean a lot less intervention there which is something I would think that most Americans and probably most people in the Middle East would support.
