In an op-ed in the Washington Post Robert Samuelson bids a mournful farewell to the Pax Americana:
With hindsight we may see 2006 as the end of Pax Americana. Ever since World War II, the United States has used its military and economic superiority to promote a stable world order that has, on the whole, kept the peace and spread prosperity. But the United States increasingly lacks both the power and the will to play this role. It isn’t just Iraq, though Iraq has been profoundly destabilizing and demoralizing. Many other factors erode U.S. power: China’s rise; probable nuclear proliferation; shrinking support for open trade; higher spending for Social Security and Medicare that squeezes the military; the weakness of traditional U.S. allies — Europe and Japan.
In some of the commentary there’s been a little quibbling about Samuelson’s terminology. May I offer a way of thinking about the interrelationships of “strength†(the term that Samuelson uses), will, and power? It’s a little equation I’ve written about before:
Power = Capability X Interest X Will
By power we’re talking about hard power, the ability to compel others to do what you want. A “push†force. Capability is what Samuelson is referring to as “strength†and, clearly, America’s capability both in military and economic terms is as strong or stronger than ever. Interest means the stake that one has in the outcome. Will, obviously, is the determination—motivated by the interest—to achieve an outcome.
Capability, strength, has both interest and will as multipliers. If either interest or will fade to zero in any given operation, then regardless of capability we won’t have the power to achieve the outcome (you can’t think of it as “the desired outcome†because, if will fades to zero, you don’t desire it).
I can’t be quite as lugubrious as either Samuelson or some of those who’ve posted on the ebbing of U. S. power in this particular sense because there are other means to see that things come out the way we might want. What I mean by this is Joseph Nye’s “soft powerâ€â€”influencing behavior by cultural or ideological means. Having people want what you want. A “pull†force.
My recommendation is that we should stick to our knitting and do what we do best: grow, prosper, build things, create things, and be happy. I’m not much concerned about the rise of China or India or that leftist populist crackpots like Hugo Chavez are gaining in power in Latin America. I’m confident that American soft power, bolstered by judicious and sparing use of hard power when it’s necessary, will ensure that the outcome will be good for us and for the world.
I’m not saying that we should be complacent—far from it. I’m saying that we should devote more of our efforts to spreading prosperity and, as people realize that liberal democratic societies are a more effective means for realizing that prosperity, they’ll long for that and want to adopt those means themselves.
May such a Pax Americana last a thousand years!
The British at the zenith of their Empire couldn’t imagine it falling or even why other people wouldn’t want a Pax Brittanica, either. Ditto the Romans.
At the end of the end, hegemonic exceptionalism is always a variant of the White Man’s Burden – no matter what color the Imperials are. Roman Burden, British Burden, American Burden – it’s all the same parochial nationalism, masquerading as good intentions but essentially all about staying top of the heap and using every force to do so.
To illustrate the truth of this, consider carefully the following. How many Americans would be happy contemplating a world where (say) India became, in full, a liberal democratic society but also became the world’s pre-eminent superpower, replacing the U.S.?
I’ve said before now that I’ve no objection to America being the world’s cop if the cop is honest, impartial and utterly un-selfserving. But that’s never going to happen in the real world. Trouble is, a corrupt cop is worse than no cop at all in most circumstances. In the real world, then, soft power at least mitigates the effects of a selfish cop when domestic self-interest is dressed up as benefic foreign policy and inflicted on us foreigners.
Regards, C
Perhaps I’m an oddball but I’d have no objection to a world in which a liberal, democratic India were the world’s pre-eminent superpower so long as Americans were happy and prosperous. Or a liberal, democratic Brazil or a liberal, democratic China. I might add that I think that a liberal, democratic Indian superpower is more likely than a liberal, democratic Chinese one. Or a Chinese superpower of any variety for that matter—IMO most of those who talk about “a Chinese century†know little about China.
That’s a slightly different formulation from your prior statements along that line and it’s one I agree with completely. No matter how benign there are bound to be some for whom every mistake—no matter how minor or inadvertent—will be damning and plenty of people to point such mistakes out.
That is, BTW, why I think that Tom Barnett’s Core/Gap notion is fundamentally flawed. There’s no hope whatever that the members of the Core will accept our Leviathan operating in the Gap. Makes no difference what our intentions are or how we comport ourselves.
I’m all with you, Dave, but there is a problem right now with going Jeffersonian: the only possible outcome of that is Jacksonian, because the enemy won’t stay overseas, and Americans by and large, if presented the choice, would gladly see hundreds of millions of Muslims dead before we would give up our civil rights in order keep the terrorists out. The difficulty for those who wish to prevent either outcome (genocide or domestic tyranny) is that we haven’t been presented with a big enough example yet. September 11 was close, but only woke up about 1/3 of the people, it would seem. Something bigger will come, and America will react, if we don’t engage now.
In either case, whether we continue on and solve the problem now, or wait until we lose a city to solve the problem (much more violently), I suspect that after this is all over, we will draw ourselves inwards and head back towards our more traditional role of self-involved neutral. I don’t think an American empire is in the offing, short or long term.
Perhaps I’m an oddball but I’d have no objection to a world in which a liberal, democratic India were the world’s pre-eminent superpower so long as Americans were happy and prosperous. Or a liberal, democratic Brazil or a liberal, democratic China. I might add that I think that a liberal, democratic Indian superpower is more likely than a liberal, democratic Chinese one. Or a Chinese superpower of any variety for that matter—IMO most of those who talk about “a Chinese century†know little about China.Although I would not mind a world were the US were not the pre-eminent superpower so long as the superpower were democratic, liberal and prosperous, I for one would rather have an international order that would codify such a system so that no matter which country was the pre-eminent Superpower, we would be assured that they’d have to play by the Rule-sets already established. That is one of the reasons I like Barnett’s thesis, mainly the drive to codify Rulesets “we” find self-evident into the World Order so that when they day comes that a China, or India overtake us, these institutions, rulesets will ensure that they cannot change it just because they are in power.
nykrindc,
The problem with with “….an international order that would codify such a system so that no matter which country was the pre-eminent Superpower, we would be assured that they’d have to play by the Rule-sets already established” is that there must be a mechanism to enforce that rule-set – in other words, some kind of international executive power with the resources to keep everyone, including the big players, in line. That kind of executive power will never come as long as international organizations rely on nations to supply troops, money, legitimacy etc. As an example, imagine the United States where all the power lay in the US House of Representatives and California, NY, Texas, Florida and Rhode Island could unilaterally veto any decision. That’s pretty much what we have today with the UN where nothing can get done without almost complete consensus. The United States would not easily give up such veto power – France, China and probably Russia even moreso.
As for the larger question, I’m not really concerned about Pax Americana. I think perceptions have been skewed as a result of the war and the unpopularity (especially internationally) of the Bush administration. I can certainly see a future where American Power will be eclipsed, but that is still a ways off and much remains uncertain. However, one thing we should learn from history is that no one stays on top forever.
I, too, wouldn’t be broken-up by a powerful, but democratic, China or India. Despite their economic success, they still have a LONG way to go.
Dave,
There’s no hope whatever that the members of the Core will accept our Leviathan operating in the Gap. Makes no difference what our intentions are or how we comport ourselves.
You’re right. Those that miss that crucial point really are living the Divine Mandate dream. It is one of the crucial flaws of the Bush administration’s foreign policy too. They keep assuming that other nations have no national interest of their own, or should give up their own national interests when it conflicts with America’s because…well, America says so.
The only other nation I can think of that conducts its foreign policy with such deliberate disregard for other nations is France.
nykrindc,
Those rulesets – only replacing British Empire written rules with American Hegemon written rules – are exactly what Churchill envisioned when he thought about what the UN should be. The trouble is, the next set of superpowers invariably want the rulesets written their way and in their favor.
Regards, C
Cernig,
You are correct, the new superpower wants to codify its own rulesets, however, they will be constrained by the very rulesets already in existence and the institutions which represent them. This is particularly true when the superpower on the wane takes the rising superpower under its wing just as the British did with the US. That’s Barnett’s whole argument on getting China at today’s prices, and the reason he keeps saying that our relationship with China will likely be as important, if not more important than our relationship with the UK.
Andy,
Your argument on the role of the UN captures what I mean by institutional checks exactly. The UN was not so much a security arrangement for the major powers, but also a security arrangement to protect them from each other. Hence, the US could not act against the Soviets or China, without Soviet or Chinese approval. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the UN essentially became a check on American power. That is why the Bush administration is so disliked, because it has been seen as undermining the very system put in place to prevent the rise of a belligerent and “irrational” superpower. That is also the point of Annan’s recent comments on the use of American power. He was not so much calling for the US to withdraw from the world but to strengthen the mechanisms the US itself built in place to safeguard the international system.
nykrindc:
I’m concerned that Tom doesn’t have any real insight into the way the Chinese leadership thinks. To get that you really need to read and speak Chinese and have some familiarity with the history.
Jeff:
As you know I have strongly Jeffersonian predispositions but I’m not really proposing a Jeffersonian solution (note, however, that I’ve been busily attacking Jeffersonian strategies at Winds of Change). I’m proposing that we make a really strong effort at economic development and economic liberalization in the region: sort of a Chinese solution. I think this is where our strengths are and we’ll get less trouble from the loyal opposition at home than we have with the democratization project.
Cernig:
That’s easy: China. I doubt that there’s any country on the globe less concerned with the interests of other nations than China. Their leadership, however, is relentlessly pragmatic and completely focused on China’s interests without their leadership having the distractions of having to face the electorate periodically.
Dave,
China has to at least keep an eye over its shoulder for other nations it might seriously piss off e.g U.S., India, Russia. It also has to at least make mouth noises on support for some UN human rights stuff.
The U.S.A. doesn’t do even that much anymore because it is the pre-eminent superpower (World Court, Landmine Ban, Woman’s Rights Accord, climate change, various nuke treaties, Small Arms Treaty, Nuremberg, Geneva Conventions – all ignored, bent, broken, gone back on or opposed by the U.S. against the vast majority of international opinion in the last six years).
The French don’t do what they don’t want to because…well, they’re French. Their culture insists they must continue to act as if they were a superpower rather than admit to themselves that they aren’t.
Regards, C
Dave:
It took me a while to figure out what’s missing from your equation: time. The passage of time, in particular the passage of “the moment,” the right time.
Capability X Interests X Will divided by Time.
Over time capability tends to erode unless it is renewed, interests change and can become dilute, and will sees mistakes and accumulating costs.
You want a successful war of choice? Win it fast: Mexican-American, and Spanish-American. There’s no point arguing for more patience, endless time lines: there’s always a tick tock, there always will be.
I don’t know Dave, I think that to a certain extent that is beside the point. Why? Because what Barnett is talking about is preparing the strategic environment for the rise of China. In other words, get buy in by giving the Chinese a stake in the International system in as many ways as we can thereby limiting or at least reducing the likelihood of another great power war. That is, Tom’s argument is a systemic argument, not an argument about China in particular…that is why the argument centers not on democratizing China but on allowing it to interconnect to the world as much as possible so that many of the rule sets we have in place can filter into China proper. This is already being seen in the banking sector, and is spreading to other areas.
I will grant you that because Barnett’s argument is ultimately deterministic, as in “Globalization, some people will get it, some people won’t, but it will spread regardless.” If you read TPNM carefully you’ll notice that his argument is not focused on keeping the US as the premier Superpower, but rather an argument based on the recognition that that will not always be the case, hence the focus on the establishment of global rulesets.