Interdiction As a Strategy

Something else you might find interesting is this post by Matthew Suarez at the site of the U. S. Naval Institute contrasting two different views of naval interdiction:

If a war should occur in the near future between the United States and China, the U.S. Navy should again explore the significance of trade interdiction as a strategy of war in the global economy. In a January 2020 Proceedings article, Daniel Ward proposed that Sir Julian Corbett’s 1911 work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, offers the best model for developing such a strategy, and suggested “the United States must disengage itself from the allure of Alfred Thayer Mahan” and, instead, embrace “Corbett’s concepts of blockade, ‘cruisers,’ and attacks on trade as more sensible options for containing and strangling China in a possible war.”1

However, in reading Mahan’s works carefully, particularly his later works, one sees that the effective interdiction of commerce underpins his entire theory of sea power. Battle by battlefleets is only a means to the ultimate end, which is to control the commons through blockade, i.e., effective trade interdiction. In developing this framework, Mahan acknowledged the growing importance of a globalized trade system to the application of sea power.

IMO the most effective form that 21st century interdiction of trade might take place is in the form of digital interdiction. We haven’t been taking that seriously enough, especially considering what poor digital citizens the Chinese are. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.