You might want to read this post at Sic Semper Tyrannis. The author has his ear to the ground with respect to our intelligence operations. It’s full of good points but here’s one that struck me:
President Obama’s problems go way beyond the Halls of Congress. He is facing three daunting problems with his Syria war scheme, according to one senior US intelligence officer. First, the case that Assad ordered the chemical weapons attack on Aug. 21 is, at best, circumstantial. A triangulation of intercepts by Israeli, German and US sigint agencies has been pitched to Congress as “proof” that Assad did it. But the case is flimsy and, ultimately, is all based on interpretations of conversations involving Syrian military commanders, Iranian diplomats and Hezbollah leaders. Clearly the American people are also unconvinced, as the opposition to any military action is polling well above 80 percent in most recent polls.
Read the whole thing.
It does bring another question to mind. In the history of warfare has anybody ever been able to control developments on the ground through air power alone? I don’t think so.
Distrust of this intercept intel has been there from the get go, and is only getting louder. Also, vague descriptions by Kerry, enumerating a kind of parity, between the size of moderate rebels fighting the government and those affiliated with Al Qaeda, is being disputed by those engaged on the ground. Just consider the stat that a third of the country (around 2 mil) have already fled and are refugees. These people,more than likely, were composed of secular moderates. The ones staying behind are either hard core, or after seeing the U.S. not come though on promised support, have turned more to the hard core fighters that have filtered in from other areas, including Libya.
I have been reading Lang all along. The feeling over there seems to be that this may be Mossad at work.
“In the history of warfare has anybody ever been able to control developments on the ground through air power alone?”
Kadafi stopped attacking US interests.
Steve
I am stunned that few people are questioning the intel. The US knew Iraq had WMD. The US knew where Iraq had the WMD. That turned out well, but this time it’s different.
Are the same people working on the Syrian WMD intel?
Our intel on Iraq rested heavily upon accounts from Iraqi citizens whom we believed. I dont think this is the case for Syria.
Steve
My understanding is that, in the particular case of the attack that took place on Aug. 21, our intel is derived from a single uncorroborated report.
IMO that’s another way of saying “grasping at straws”. The Russians’ position seems much stronger.
You consider the situation in Libya under control? Wow.
I find the first paragraph on the domestic politics disturbing and potentially explosive, and I’ll just assume the spooks know more about foreign intelligence.
It does bring another question to mind. In the history of warfare has anybody ever been able to control developments on the ground through air power alone? I don’t think so.
The air power talk brings to mind Billy Mitchell and the Air Crusades from the post-WWI era. Looks like our foreign policy now is just as disastrous as it was between the World Wars.
I posted this hear earlier, but thought it worth reposting:
So approximately 12 areas are alleged to have been attacked by chemical weapons /nerve gas in the middle of the night. Each of the areas has a population of between 20,000 and 55,000 people, and are essentially suburbs or neighborhoods of Damascus. The estimated number of people killed by this attack is between 355 and 1,700, TOTAL, for ALL 12 attacks/areas. This is an average of 30 to 142 people in each attack, or 0.1% to 0.6% of the population of that area/suburb/city/neighborhood. Not to denigrate the deaths of these people, nor to belittle the horros of chemical warfare, but what part of MASS, as in “weapons of MASS destruction†am I missing?
This makes me extremely nervous about predicating war (which no matter what Kerry says, it is what we would be doing) on that night of “chemical attacks.â€
I posted this earlier, but think it is worth revisiting here:
So approximately 12 areas are alleged to have been attacked by chemical weapons /nerve gas in the middle of the night. Each of the areas has a population of between 20,000 and 55,000 people, and are essentially suburbs or neighborhoods of Damascus. The estimated number of people killed by this attack is between 355 and 1,700, TOTAL, for ALL 12 attacks/areas. This is an average of 30 to 142 people in each attack, or 0.1% to 0.6% of the population of that area/suburb/city/neighborhood. Not to denigrate the deaths of these people, nor to belittle the horros of chemical warfare, but what part of MASS, as in “weapons of MASS destruction†am I missing?
This makes me extremely nervous about predicating going to war (which not matter what Kerry says, it is what we would be doing) on that night of “chemical attacks.â€
Lee,
I hadn’t seen that post, and didn’t realize the spottiness of the deaths spread out into 12 different areas. This supports the notion, IMO, that a more crude device could have been the delivery system, versus a missile, which, BTW there is still no evidence of missiles being used.
A couple of points here,
You need to take “Harper” with a big grain of salt. I’ve been reading his predictions and “inside info” on Lang’s blog for years now and his track record for accuracy is not very good. I’m frankly surprised Lang is still posting his stuff. That said, there are good points in the piece.
Secondly, people shouldn’t compare Iraq to Syria with regard to intelligence. They are fundamentally different situations. To use an analogy, in Iraq we were trying to determine if Saddam owned a knife. In Syria we are trying to determine who put a knife into a victim’s back. Those are very different kinds of questions. Syria is not a binary question – an incident unquestionable occured, the intelligence problem is discovering responsibility. If the evidence for the regime’s culpability is “circumstantial” then what is the evidence, if any, for alternatives? Just based on what I’ve read in open sources, the arguments and evidence for alternatives are very weak to nonexistent.
Additionally, it is rare to get evidence that rises to the level of “certainty.” Intelligence is almost always about probabilities.
Depends on what you mean by “control.” In most cases, no, but they can still influence. Service parochialism aside, it’s very rare for one domain of military power to be able to do anything “alone” which is why combined arms is so integral to modern warfare. And many times, as with Syria, military power is just one dimension and probably not the most important in terms of “controlling” developments on the ground, at least to the extent they can be controlled, which is very limited.
What are you referring to here. If it was Reagan’s operation against Libya then that is untrue. If it was Obama’s operation then, yes, he’s dead, but airpower didn’t kill him.
Finally, I’ll just post this OpEd from retired MG Robert Scales, which is remarkable in a number of ways:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-military-planners-dont-support-war-with-syria/2013/09/05/10a07114-15bb-11e3-be6e-dc6ae8a5b3a8_story.html
Scales confirms my suspicion that the shadow of Rwanda looms over this Administration, and that “responsibility to protect” (R2P) is the ideological framework.
I have a lot more intelligence questions than the one framed by the Russians about who was responsible for the attack. A policy of future deterrence requires more information about what chemicals weapons the regime has, what are their delivery systems, what are their safeguards from non-regime control, and who has authority to order their use? I would like to know more about how the attacks went down in order to try to understand how the regime is functioning and why its acting the way it has.
That was a candid, succinct opinion piece by Robert Scales. He is a military commentator for several news stations, and comes across as bluntly honest in his assessments. Consequently, I found these frank comments compelling:
Clarity — how refreshing.
A policy of future deterrence requires more information about what chemicals weapons the regime has, what are their delivery systems, what are their safeguards from non-regime control, and who has authority to order their use?
There are none, PD, if we topple the regime.