You may recall that a year or so ago when the Navy experienced a number of collisions or close calls with its ships that I posted several times on the subject. Per Defense News the Navy has done its evaluation and decided that 85% of junior officers were deficient in their ability to use the systems under their command or handle their vessels decisively and properly under conditions in which a collision might occur:
WASHINGTON — A three-month internal review conducted by senior U.S. surface fleet leaders found some or significant concerns with the ship handling skills of nearly 85 percent of its junior officers, and that many struggled to react decisively to extricate their ship from danger when there was an immediate risk of collision, according to an internal message obtained by Defense News.
Led by the Surface Warfare Officer School, officer of the deck competency checks were conducted on a random selection of OOD-qualified first-tour division officers (the newest officers in the fleet) in underway bridge navigation simulators fleet-wide between January and March. Of the 164 officers who were evaluated, only 27 passed with “no concerns.†Another 108 completed with “some concerns,†and 29 had “significant concerns,†according to the message, which was released by the Navy’s top surface warfare officer Vice Adm. Richard Brown.
Brown, who leads Naval Surface Force Pacific, termed the results “sobering.â€
They’re revising the training accordingly. Frankly, 85% is pretty terrible. I would think that you could achieve 85% deficient for a lot less money than we’re actually spending. More of those evaluated presented “significant concerns” than passed with no concerns. If that’s the case, there’s a problem with a lot more than junior officers.
Proper training is obviously not a priority.
Nearly 30 years ago, I served as a junior officer and navigator of a Spruance-class destroyer in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Simulator training is okay to get a basic understanding of how a bridge watch team works, but there is no substitute for live, on-the-bridge training with qualified guides such as senior division officers, department heads, and XOs and COs, as well as qualified senior enlisted QMs, SMs, and OSs, who also need to train their junior watchstanders. The Navy needs to recommit to providing opportunities for live underway watch team training and build them into fleet workup schedules. Training must include all watch teams understanding there is nothing wrong with timely calling the navigator or captain to the bridge, which did not happen in any of the recent collisions. Until then, we risk losing more lives and destroying additional valuable (and diminishing) capital ships.
Realistically accomplishing this objective will require not only a change in mindset, but also a commitment to rebuild the fleet to a number that allows adequate OJT of junior officer shiphandlers and underway watch team. China is building a real, blue water navy that it is using to threaten freedom of navigation and project power in the South China Sea and beyond. A strong, well-trained, and well-capitalized U.S. Navy surface fleet is the only effective counter to this growing threat.