At RealClearWorld David Benson writes about the implications of a trade war between China and the U. S.:
If Beijing attempts to accommodate American demands, it risks domestic unrest as its economy contracts. If China refuses to accommodate changes, then it risks a punitive American response, potentially producing a trade war it cannot afford. China cannot even threaten to cut off production access in the long term, as Washington could simply return to the TPP to fill that need.
The United States, for its part, is similarly positioned. Domestic pressure demands adjustment of the Sino-American trade relationship, but any attempts to put direct pressure on China risk blowing up that relationship, destabilizing China and imposing significant costs on the American consumer. Importantly, no change in global trade is guaranteed to return American manufacturing jobs, either.
Consider the following tabulation of WTO claims over the last ten years:
| Against | Number filed |
| China | 32 |
| United States | 28 |
| European Union | 21 |
| Brazil | 2 |
| Argentina | 7 |
| Morocco | 1 |
| Russian Federation | 6 |
| Thailand | 4 |
| Indonesia | 8 |
| Republic of Korea | 3 |
| Colombia | 3 |
| South Africa | 3 |
| India | 6 |
| Ukraine | 3 |
| Canada | 3 |
| Pakistan | 1 |
| Australia | 6 |
| Peru | 1 |
| Turkey | 1 |
| Moldova | 1 |
| Dominican Republic | 4 |
| Armenia | 1 |
| Philippines | 1 |
| Chile | 1 |
Many of these claims are actually counter-claims. The United States files a complaint against China; China files a counter-complaint against the United States.
If you were to weight the claims by GDP, some obvious offenders emerge (Argentina, Indonesia, Russia) but something else does, too. There’s already a trade war between the United States and China. We just aren’t fighting our side very effectively.
As has been oddly the case with our real, live, shootin’ wars, the complaint about trade wars mostly come when we try to win.
