Consolidating Power

I’ve been following this for some time but I don’t believe I’ve written about it. At The Diplomat a translated article by Don Tse outlines how Chinese President Xi has been consolidating his power and protecting his position by purging potential opponents in the People’s Liberation Army:

A study of official and unofficial information indicates that the Qian Shao story has a ring of authenticity to it. In September, I wrote that Fang may have plotted a failed coup against the Xi leadership after observing certain unusual personnel activity at the time. First, Xi replaced another five CMC members in quick succession after Fang was removed, a development which suggests that something major had happened to allow Xi to make key personnel appointments seemingly uncontested. Personnel changes of such magnitude are usually decided and carried out only after a period of negotiation between Xi and the various CCP factions and Party elders.

Next, Fang and Zhang were not among the delegates invited to the 19th Party Congress, an indication that they were almost certainly in trouble. Overseas news media also cited sources claiming that the generals were being investigated. Recent efforts by Chinese state media to link Zhang Yang and Fang Fenghui with Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou implies that the Zhang and Fang, like Guo and Xu, are also guilty of seeking to “wreck and split the Party” — official parlance for a coup attempt on the top leadership.

A failed coup attempt by Fang and Zhang would explain certain military developments since the 19th Party Congress. Contrary to the expectations of observers, Xi downsized the CMC from nine to seven members instead of increasing its membership to dilute its power and create additional checks and balances in the system. I earlier wrote that a smaller CMC would allow Xi to have greater control over the military and more time to reassess the loyalties of his senior generals while grooming a new leadership corp. Xi’s decision to downsize the top leadership body when it would be more intuitive and in line with his military reform to expand it makes sense if Fang and Zhang had been cultivating opposition to challenge the Xi leadership.

Then, in December, over 100 division-level officers from interior units were made to swap positions with their counterparts in the border regions, a possible precautionary measure by Xi to break up existing power networks and defamiliarize officers and their troops. As Xi frequently reshuffles military personnel, disgruntled senior officers will find it hard to form an effective anti-Xi coalition.

In sum, Fang Fenghui was very possibly purged because he and Zhang Yang challenged Xi’s authority to preserve their self-interests. The Fang and Zhang cases also show that Xi’s control over the military is far from absolute, and he may be in a more unstable position politically than observers tend to believe.

That last sentence is critical. President Xi has consolidated more power in his own hands than any Chinese leader since Mao. Is it a sign that he’s, well, more powerful than any Chinese leader since Mao? Or is it a sign that his power is shakier than we might think?