Assessing the Status

George Friedman assesses the status of the war between Russia and Ukraine. Following the Wagner Group’s march towards Moscow, whatever the heck that was:

Two things became unlikely: that Russia would destroy the Ukrainian army and occupy Ukraine, and that Ukraine’s army would drive Russia out of Ukraine. The only logical step is a negotiated settlement. The question is what that settlement might consist of. The only logical settlement – on the surface, at least – is a division of Ukraine. One option might be that Donbas, full of ethnic Russians and on Russia’s border, is ceded to Moscow. But Ukraine cannot cede more – or even this – because it reasonably doesn’t trust the Russians not to base a force there and attack again in the future. The Russians will have a great deal of trouble accepting this. They have lost much in the war, and returning with only Donbas would be an insult to the dead and devastating to Putin. Ukraine must have a militarily defensible boundary and a shallow concession. Russia must validate the claim that it is a great power and can settle for far more than Ukraine can concede. Each side must make a powerful move to convince the other that a bad compromise is better than defeat.

Not everyone sees it that way. For example, Peter Juul sees the U. S. war aims as:

1. Complete Russian withdrawal from Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory—including Crimea and territories seized by Russia since 2014. Russia renounces any and all claims to Ukrainian territory within its internationally recognized borders as part of an agreement formally ending hostilities.
2. As part of an agreement formally ending hostilities, Russia formally and explicitly recognizes and reaffirms Ukraine’s freedom to choose its own alliances and geopolitical alignments—explicitly including potential Ukrainian membership in NATO and the European Union.
3. A de-militarized zone is created along the Ukrainian-Russian border, overseen by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The precise parameters of this zone should be cleared with Kyiv before the publication of any American war aims document.
4. The full, immediate, and unconditional release and return of all Ukrainians now held by or deported to Russia, including prisoners of war, civilians, and the more than 700,000 Ukrainian children Russia has abducted from Ukraine.
5. The United Nations, European Union, or some other credible multinational organization establishes a special war crimes tribunal for Ukraine to investigate and try Russian war criminals.
6. Russia ceases its threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of all OSCE member nations—in particular Baltic and Eastern European states—in accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.
7. Removal of all Russian nuclear weapons from Belarus. Russia refrains from implicit and explicit threats of nuclear weapons use and nuclear war. Nuclear arms control talks including but not limited to Russia and the United States recommence at the earliest possible date.
8. The United States, the European Union, and Turkey guarantee the free flow of Ukrainian grain and other agricultural products via the Black Sea. Russia formally pledges not to interfere with Ukrainian agricultural exports.
9. The reduction and removal of certain sanctions against Russia, not including those on military equipment, goods, and technology or on Russian energy exports.
10. A certain portion of Russian frozen financial assets will be seized or surrendered to help pay for reconstruction of Ukraine. The exact details of this point should be negotiated with relevant European allies and cleared with Kyiv.

Since the U. S. does not have the ability to supply the Ukrainians I have no idea how the United States would achieve those goals short of direct intervention of U. S. forces in the war, something President Biden has categorically rejected.

Mr. Friedman goes on to describe how he sees Russia’s actions but I think his explanation is far too complicated and he’s ignoring something. The simplest possible explanation of Russia’s actions is that John Mearsheimer was right: Russia plans to “wreck Ukraine”. Putin doesn’t want to occupy it, at least not all of it, but to wreck it.

Update

Another precinct heard from. Here’s Dominick Sansone at The National Interest:

The issue at the center of the disagreement is that the respondents do not believe that such an end can be reached unless it proceeds from total Ukrainian victory and the destruction of the current Russian regime. The reason for this is presented as a matter of fact: Russia can simply no longer be treated as a real nation-state. As articulated by Stent, any negotiation with Moscow is impossible because they are liars, and an armistice will inevitably be a “temporary solution while Russia regroups and plans its next attack.” Such a conclusion obviously leads the international community to an impasse in which the only way out is through.

I have no idea how the outcome (the end of Russia) can be accomplished. He concludes:

Unfortunately, this seems to be the mindset of not only those experts and diplomats responding to Charap’s sensible argument, but the Western foreign policy establishment more broadly.