Assessing the Far East’s nuclear status

Marc Schulman of American Future has produced an excellent briefing on Japan, North Korea, and nuclear weapons. As my contribution to the discussion I’ll quote the outlook of Nuclear Threat Initiative:

There are different schools of thought on the motivations behind Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. Those who believe North Korea is a revisionist state argue that Pyongyang’s nuclear motivations constitute a serious external threat. This school of thought has ample evidence to support its claims: North Korea’s initiation of the Korean War, acts of terrorism, forward-deployed military forces, a constitution that states that the DPRK is the sole legitimate government for all of Korea, and Korean Workers’ Party bylaws calling for a “completion of the revolution in the south.” Many analysts also argue that Pyongyang’s record of exporting ballistic missiles indicates that North Korea would also be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or complete nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, some people believe North Korea is a state satisfied with the status quo and that it seeks peaceful coexistence with South Korea and the international community. Proponents of this school often argue that North Korea’s nuclear motivations are defensive in nature and designed to deter external threats to the DPRK. Evidence to support this argument includes the July 4 North-South Joint Communiqué of 1972; the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea of 1991 (the so-called “Basic Agreement”); the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1991; the summit meeting of 2000; the Agreed Framework with the United States; and reunification proposals that would recognize “two systems” for the north and south. However, critics argue that Pyongyang’s behavior is inconsistent and that this evidence is not credible.

Regardless of North Korean motivations toward South Korea and the United States, Pyongyang’s record of exporting ballistic missiles and missile production technology indicates that North Korea could also be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or even complete nuclear weapons.