Speaking of puzzling policies and re-opening negotiations, at National Interest Doug Bandow wants the U. S. to reconsider our 60 year old policy of maintaining 29,000 American soldiers in South Korea on the U. S. taxpayers’ tab:
In the 1960s South Korea took off economically, soon passing the collectivist North. Democracy arrived in the ROK in 1989, when the South’s last military junta passed into history. With the end of the Cold War, Pyongyang lost its most important allies: both Moscow and Beijing recognized Seoul, and neither would back the DPRK in another aggressive war today.
The South possesses roughly twice the population and forty times the GDP of North Korea. South Korea is an industrial power. Seoul enjoys the international connections of a first rate state. Although the ROK’s military is smaller than that of the North, the South’s equipment and training are far superior. Only in quantity is Seoul’s armed forces inferior and there is no artifact of geography which prevents the ROK from doing more. Rather, South Korea has no reason to invest more on territorial defense when the world’s greatest military power is prepared to intervene on its behalf.
The critical question is one of cost-benefit analysis. We know what South Korea gets from the policy. We know what our side costs. We spend about $2 billion a year maintaining our bases in South Korea, of which the South Korean government pays about 40%. It’s not entirely clear whether we’re receiving $1.2 billion of benefit from the arrangement that we wouldn’t receive without forking out the dough.
I don’t have ready answers for these questions but I think reconsidering our policies is worthwhile. The world has changed quite a bit in 60 years. We seem to have gone ipsy swipsy from Lord Palmerston’s famous remark. We have no permanent interests, just permanent policies.
Rethinking our alliance relationships is something I’ve supported for a long time. It needs to be done carefully though – a South Korea without the support of the US is likely to develop nukes to counter the North. Allies, unsurprisingly, want some US “skin in the game” to add substance to our nuclear umbrella promise and that skin is US military forces.
The personalities, incentives, conditions, and weapons are all different than they were 50 years ago. I believe we should think long and hard whether our 29,000 troops in South Korea are a deterrent to nuclear war or actually make one more likely.
BTW, I think that our nuclear deterrent has been so mismanaged over the last 20 or so years that I’m surprised North Korea hasn’t used one of their nukes (or their nuke) on our forces stationed in South Korea.
I do think the number of troops could be reduced substantially.
One of the issues, though, is deterring our allies from developing nuclear weapons. Countries without great power protection are much more likely to try (See Iran and North Korea) and Japan and South Korea, the two obvious examples, have the technical capability to do so quickly. Given the regional history I’m reticent about a complete withdrawal – at least one that doesn’t take place gradually.