One thing I learned in a theory of negotiations class I took many years ago is that a lack of options is a position of strength. That’s what occurred to me when I read Stephen Walt’s comparison in Foreign Policy of Vladimir Putin’s and Barack Obama’s policies in the Middle East. Here’s the passage that caught my attention:
But Putin has also done one thing right: He has pursued simple objectives that were fairly easy to achieve and that played to Russia’s modest strengths. In Ukraine, he had one overriding goal: to prevent that country from moving closer to the EU, eventually becoming a full member, and then joining NATO. He wasn’t interested in trying to reincorporate all of Ukraine or turn it into a clone of Russia, and the “frozen conflict†that now exists there is sufficient to achieve his core goal. This essentially negative objective was not that hard to accomplish because Ukraine was corrupt, internally divided, and right next door to Russia. These features made it easy for Putin to use a modest degree of force and hard for anyone else to respond without starting a cycle of escalation they could not win.
Putin’s goals in Syria are equally simple, realistic, and aligned with Russia’s limited means. He wants to preserve the Assad regime as a meaningful political entity so that it remains an avenue of Russian influence and a part of any future political settlement. He’s not trying to conquer Syria, restore the Alawites to full control over the entire country, defeat the Islamic State, or eliminate all Iranian influence. And he’s certainly not pursuing some sort of quixotic dream of building democracy there. A limited deployment of Russian airpower and a handful of “volunteers†may suffice to keep Assad from being defeated, especially if the United States and others eventually adopt a more realistic approach to the conflict as well.
I don’t think Dr. Walt is giving President Putin enough credit and is giving President Obama far too much. Not only are Mr. Putin’s actions in Syria in Russia’s interests and within Russia’s abilities, they’re overwhelmingly popular in Russia. Putin is not only staking out a position for himself as the defender of Russian interests but as the hero of Orthodoxy—something that will bolster Russia’s and Putin’s reputation far beyond Russia or Syria.
Fortunately for the United States, U. S. foreign policy is an emergent phenomenon and extends far beyond the decisions of the president. The president is command in chief and orders the U. S. military into battle. Or doesn’t. And he directs the actions of the diplomats who work for the State Department. The president’s actions are constrained not only by his own ideological views but by political considerations. And he doesn’t direct the thousands of companies and other organizations and the millions of individuals that are creating U. S. foreign policy in their day to day actions in ways over which the president has very little control.
