What’s In It for Europe? (Updated)

The conflict in the Caucasus continues to escalate. The Russians are apparently looking to secure Abkhazia as well:

TBILISI, Georgia – Swarms of Russian jets launched new raids on Georgian territory Monday and Georgia faced the threat of a second front of fighting as Russia demanded that Georgia disarm troops near the breakaway province of Abkhazia.

While a senior Russian general insisted that Russia has no plans to press further into Georgian territory — its troops are now in two breakaway provinces — the order to disarm carried the threat that Russian-sponsored fighting would spread.

The new air forays into Georgia — even as Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili on signed a cease-fire pledge — appeared to show Russian determination to subdue the small, U.S.-backed country, which has been pressing for NATO membership. Russia fended off a wave of international calls to observe Georgia’s pleas for a truce, saying it must first be assured of Georgia’s retreat from South Ossetia.

In the comments to my post at OTB yesterday I was taken to task for criticizing European inaction in what I consider a primarily European matter. After all, aren’t the Europeans just responding to U. S. prodding on George? For example, in his post on the matter this morning James Joyner observed:

But here’s the rub: It is the position of the United States government that Georgia should be admitted to NATO. We begged, cajoled, and arm twisted our European allies to that end in Bucharest this past April, ultimately settling for a vague pledge that Georgia will be put on the path to membership soon.

Simply stated, that isn’t the way I remember things.

As I see it our European allies have been at least as interested in EUropeanizing Georgia as we are, maybe moreso. In October of 2007 France and Georgia entered into a military cooperation plan:

19/10/2006 16:09 TBILISI, October 19 (RIA Novosti) – Georgia and France have signed a military cooperation plan for 2007, a Georgian deputy defense minister said Thursday.

Georgian authorities opened a military college in August in the west of the country with the help of the French Defense Ministry, and French instructors have been training mountain warfare specialists there.

Under the agreement, signed by Mamuka Kudava, a Georgian deputy defense minister, and Franc Simone, head of a French Navy delegation, bilateral military cooperation will develop along three lines — French instructors will continue working at the Georgian military college, Georgian military staff will undergo training courses in France, and they will take French language courses.

France’s ties with Georgia are quite close:

Since its independence, we have maintained very friendly ties with Georgia and we enjoy high-level contacts with the Georgian government. Then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Renaud Muselier went to Tbilisi in October 2002 and February 2005. Then Minister Delegate for European Affairs Noëlle Lenoir also went to Tbilisi in January 2004.

During the first months after he took office, President Saakachvili made a working visit to Paris, during which he met with President Chirac. In 2005, Georgia’s ministers of justice and Euro-Atlantic integration went to France. On 7 March 2007, this latter met again with Minister Delegate for European Affairs Catherine Colonna. Foreign Affairs Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy met with his Georgian counterpart alongside the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Paris on 30 May 2006, and again on 7 November 2006, during a working visit made by Mr.Guela Bejouachvili to Paris.

In addition, France is involved in seeking to resolve conflicts: it is a member of the Group of Friends of the UN SG, tasked with seeking a resolution to the Abkhaz conflict, and it is participating in the OSCE mission in Georgia.

Parliamentary relations are especially dense: Senate President Christian Poncelet went to Georgia in July 1999 and October 2001 and received his counterpart, Mr.Zourab Jvania, in January 1999 and during his initiative to bring the three Presidents of the South Caucasian Parliaments together in December 1999. This was repeated on 4 November 2004. Georgian Parliament President Nino Bourdjanadzé visited France from 20 to 24 March 2006, and then, at the invitation of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, in December 2006. The friendship groups of the Senate and the National Assembly are also very active. A twinning has also been set up between the Kakheti region and the Yonne General Council.

Germany’s ties with Georgia are, if anything, closer. Georgia is Germany’s fifth largest trading partner [cf. second update below]. I presume that much of this trade is a consequence of Georgia’s two pipelines. Energy independence is as much a political hot topic in Germany as it is here but the term means mostly not being so terribly dependent on Russia. The path to greater energy independence for Germany lies through Georgia.

In February of 2007 German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said the following about NATO membership for Georgia:

“Of course, it is in the interest of NATO and NATO members that new NATO members do not bring their conflicts into the alliance along with them,” Steinmeier, whose country holds the rotating EU Presidency, said at a news conference in Tbilisi.

“On the other hand, it doesn’t mean we should view the lack of a resolution as an obstacle to accession,” he added. “If we [view it as an obstacle], then we will enable third parties to drag out the rapprochement process endlessly.”

My understanding of NATO and U. S. policy on the subject is that Georgia needs to resolve its differences with Russia over its two rebellious provinces before its membership will be considered and to the best of my ability to determine FM Steinmeier’s statement goes well beyond anything that U. S. officials have said on the subject.

There are other reasons that Western Europe should be concerned. If destabilizing Georgia is seen to be in Russia’s national interest, concerns about its intentions with respect to its former Baltic colonies are natural. That Russia has apparently engaged in cyberwar against Estonia is a case in point.

Within recent memory half of Germany was a Russian satellite.

These and simply that it’s in their backyard makes the situation of vital interest to Europe.

Update

I think that the foreign direct investment statistics for Georgia are quite revealing (USD 1,000’s):

Countries	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 Q1
Total	109,840	167,362	339,393	497,827	449,786	133,833
USA	23,281	82,271	72,132	77,550	15,033	5,964
UK	8,509	17,530	37,670	83,944	132,952	8,823
Russia	5,073	7,810	42,686	73,712	38,754	2,041
Turkey	8,456	8,848	17,275	28,569	21,817	20,400
Cyprus	19,245	1,063	676	22,330	47,537	8,499
Azerbaijan	0	0	29,698	66,008	66,940	6,526
Italy	6,976	9,864	15,896	28,728	22.838	1,933
Norway	0	2,994	11,262	34,466	23,626	2,268
France	17,434	6,287	16,709	20,940	14,383	1,301
Kazakhstan						11,775

Note that the Russian figures for 2004 are somewhat overstated because they include deals that later fell through.

Source: Georgian National Investment and Export Promotion Agency at the Ministry of Economic Development.

In 2007 FDI in Georgia exceeded the $1 billion mark. A substantial proportion of that was EU countries.

Update>

Thanks to b who pointed out at his or her own blog that I had misread the numbers on trade between Germany and Georgia. The numbers on foreign direct investment are solid, however, and the claims of a close relationship between France and Georgia are from a French foreign ministry site so I’ll take their word for it.

My larger point remains: Europe has substantial economic interests in Georgia.