The History of Health Care Insurance

Embedded within the review of Elizabeth Rosenthal’s book on the business of American health care and reforming it at the New York Review of Books there’s a handy summary of the history of health care insurance in the United States:

The American system was not always like this. Rosenthal gives a lucid and revealing history of American health care beginning with religious institutions ministering to the sick and dying in the nineteenth century. Absent effective treatments like antibiotics and anesthetics, therapy was not very costly, and recovery largely depended upon the body’s natural systems of resistance and repair. In the early 1900s, as clinical knowledge and treatment advanced, medications and surgeries were developed, and costs increased.

The question for hospitals at the time was how to cover expenses, not how to make money. The archetype for today’s insurance plans, developed at the Baylor University Medical Center in Dallas in the 1920s, was never intended to generate profit. It began when the hospital accumulated large numbers of unpaid bills for its services and decided to offer the local teachers’ union a deal: for six dollars a year, members “who subscribed were entitled to a twenty-one-day stay in the hospital, all costs included.” But there was a deductible: the insurance took effect only after a week of hospital costs pegged at $5 daily.

Baylor’s plan spread across the country and was given the name “Blue Cross.” The aim of this insurance was to protect patients from bankruptcy and to sustain hospitals and the charitable religious groups that supported them. Employer-based health insurance arose as a “quirk of history.” The federal government ruled in 1943 that no taxes would be levied on the money paid for employee health benefits. “When the National War Labor Board froze salaries during and after World War II,” Rosenthal writes, “companies facing severe labor shortages discovered that they could attract workers by offering health insurance.” After the war, in many other countries, a national health care system came to be regarded as a public good. But in the US, many viewed government-based health insurance as a form of socialism, and despite several attempts, proposals for such a system never could pass Congress.

As more Americans gained coverage, for-profit insurance companies sprang up to compete with the nonprofits Blue Cross and Blue Shield. The “Blues”—which coordinated their efforts starting in the 1940s and formally merged in 1982—accepted everyone, and all members paid the same rate no matter how old or how sick they were. (By the 1960s, more than fifty million Americans had hospital coverage from Blue Cross.) “Unencumbered by the Blues’ charitable mission,” Rosenthal writes, the private insurers “accepted only younger, healthier patients on whom they could make a profit.”

In the 1970s and 1980s, the rise of for-profit insurance companies like Aetna and Cigna made it difficult for the Blues to compete. In 1994, “hemorrhaging money,” Blue Cross and Blue Shield became for-profit as well. “This was the final nail in the coffin of old-fashioned noble-minded health insurance,” Rosenthal writes. The for-profit California Blues “gobbl[ed] up” their fellows in a dozen other states and, renamed WellPoint, emerged as the second-largest insurer in the country. Premiums rose rapidly. “WellPoint’s first priority appeared no longer to be its patient/members or even the companies and unions that used it as an insurer, but instead its shareholders and investors,” Rosenthal writes. This truth is often obscured; insurance companies market themselves in the media as caregivers, confusing the public, but they are not. The companies are fundamentally investment vehicles, maximizing profits to boost shareholder value.

Before the Blues turned into for-profit companies, they spent 95 percent of premiums on medical care. To increase profits, the Blues, along with other insurers, now spend as much as 20 percent of their premiums on marketing, lobbying, and administration.

There are several things worth pointing out in that history. At its inception health care insurance had all the features of an insurance program. Risks were defined on both sides of the transaction. There was a risk pool.

Note, too, that the transition from not-for-profit to for-profit took place as the menu of successful treatments rose. From 1920 to 1960 there were no open heart surgeries or transplants and joint replacement surgeries were rare. The start of the boom in for-profit health care insurance was coincident with the establishment of Medicare.

There are lot of other noteworthy tidbits in the piece but this one stood out for me:

Rosenthal points out that “total cash compensation for hospital CEOs grew an average of 24 percent from 2011 to 2012 alone.”

If anyone can outline a health care system in which hospital CEO pay can increase by 24% per annum year over year indefinitely, I’d be very interested in hearing about it. And with a suspicious mind like mine it’s hard to avoid noting that the health care exchanges under the Affordable Care Act opened for business the year after that enormous jump.

8 comments… add one
  • Guarneri Link

    I quickly scanned a NYTimes article. I don’t vouch for their numbers, but this is what they reported. Average hospital CEO salary was $386k per year (Note: we pay some CEOs those type of numbers) in 2014. There clearly was administrative bloat, with perhaps a dozen execs making near that amount. TOTAL administrative costs were cited as $606 per capita. Given hospital bills I’ve seen, and premiums, that doesn’t seem like a very fruitful area to attack the cost problem. I’d look at bloat just out of good management practice, but not to save the industry or the consumer. (One should note that the portion of pay from stock options and the like comes from the owners equity stake).

    The general flow of the history cited above would suggest that the evolution, and utilization, of technology is a big cost driver. I get shouted down anytime I point this out.

  • that the evolution, and utilization, of technology is a big cost driver

    Technology fits under the capital or consumables budget of a hospital. Since neither of those are growing faster than the non-health care rate of inflation, that doesn’t look like a good place to look for problems, either.

    If by “technology” you mean “payrolls”, then I agree with you.

    The reason that the tidbit about hospital CEO pay caught my eye was the year-on-year growth. Compounding will get you every time.

  • steve Link

    “At its inception health care insurance had all the features of an insurance program.”

    “The “Blues”—which coordinated their efforts starting in the 1940s and formally merged in 1982—accepted everyone, and all members paid the same rate no matter how old or how sick they were. ”

    I thought you claimed it had to be risk rated to be insurance. How can it be risk rated when everyone paid the same. If you are referring to the Baylor program, they also paid the same amount per person.

    “The general flow of the history cited above would suggest that the evolution, and utilization, of technology is a big cost driver. I get shouted down anytime I point this out.”

    Certainly hope I haven’t done that on a cranky day. Tech is a big par to the cost increases. However, a lot of it is not justified I believe.

    As to CEO salaries, they are highly variable. There are a lot of tiny hospitals. Those CEOs make a lot less. The people at the big chains make millions. I think a lot of them are overpaid, but that is true of a lot of managers. Rather than just the CEO, I would be looking at the number of managers and the work that they cause. It is an area for savings, but not as much as we could hope. (Although if we just simplify billing admin costs go down a lot.)

    Steve

  • steve Link

    “Technology fits under the capital or consumables budget of a hospital.”

    You do realize that a lot of Tech companies will give us their stuff for “free” if we just sign a contract to use the disposables that come with it?

    Steve

  • steve:

    I thought you claimed it had to be risk rated to be insurance. How can it be risk rated when everyone paid the same.

    You’re using the word “risk” differently than I do. When I say “risk” I mean money. The risk was just about the same for all of the insured because of the limited number of options and the cap on covered stays. $5 a day for 21 weeks.

  • steve:

    You do realize…

    If you’ve got a point, make it, steve, and support it with facts and figures. A good way to start would be “The technology budget of a hospital is reflected in X and here are the figures to support that.” You could also define what you mean by “technology”. By technology I mean machines, gadgets, pharmaceuticals, and the like. What do you mean?

  • steve Link

    Sure. There are lots of papers looking at this. By and large they set the percentage increase in health expenditures due to tech at 1/3 -2/3 of the total increase.

    https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8948/01-31-healthtestimony.pdf

    http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/1276.abstract

    For technology, I don’t see how you leave out the costs of personnel to run the technology. We have 2 robots. They were expensive, but they also take a lot of people to run.

    On capital expenditures, unless you have a good report otherwise, that generally includes buildings and computers, not really technology. (You need someone with access to the data and the expertise to sort out what is true technology spending.) Those went way down with the crash of 2008.

    Steve

  • It seems very strange to me that in health care, practically uniquely, technology would produce decreasing marginal productivity.

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