Today is the deadline for Iran to accede to the UN Security Council demand that it cease its program of nuclear enrichment:
TEHRAN, Iran – U.S. and European officials appeared ready to push for low-level sanctions against Iran like travel bans Thursday as country’s president made clear he would not compromise on the day of a U.N. deadline.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not directly address the deadline but maintained Iran’s right to nuclear technology in a speech to a cheering crowd of thousands in Orumiyeh in northwestern Iran.
“The Iranian nation will not succumb to bullying, invasion and the violation of its rights,” Ahmadinejad told a crowd of thousands.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi shrugged off the possibility of sanctions, telling state-run television that Iran “will find a way to avoid pressure eventually,”
Will the UNSC veto-wielding Russians and Chinese go along?
The hope is to start with relatively low-level punishments in a bid to attract Russian and Chinese support, the officials have signaled.
More extreme would be a freeze on Iranian assets or a broader trade ban — although opposition to that by Russia, China and perhaps others would be strong, particularly since it could cut off badly needed oil exports from Iran.
Russia and China seem likely, in any case, to resist U.S.-led efforts for a quick response, which likely means sanctions do not loom immediately.
The Russians have said that they’re interested in further negotiations. The history of negotiating with the present Iranian regime does not provide hope:
In every case the Islamic Republic has interpreted the readiness of an adversary to talk as a sign of weakness and, as a result, has hardened its position.
One might wonder why. Is it because Iran’s leaders are out of touch with reality or have not mastered the art of diplomacy? The answer is no.
Two facts might help explain Iran’s behaviour.
The first is that the Khomeinist regime is the last of the revolutionary regimes with universal messianic pretensions.
The second fact that might explain the behaviour of the Khomeinists, is related to the rivalries among them from the start.
Thus, no Khomeinist leader can be seen making the slightest concessions to an outsider, let alone a coalition of “infidel” powers, without risking political death.
The essence of negotiating is that each party much be willing to give up something it wants in exchange for something it wants more, continued negotiations, or even merely as relationship-building.
The Iranians have shown no inclination to give up what they want for any reason whatever. Their most recent attempt at relationship-building can only be characterized as bizarre. It strongly appears that, at least at this point, further negotiations would only be temporizing. Negotiations may be at an end.
Hello,
You said:
“each party much be willing to give up something it wants in exchange for something it wants more”
Agreed. What is it that US is willing to give up?
I can’t speak for what the Administration is doing but what’s on the table is a package of development aid and that certainly qualifies.
If I were king I’d be offering increased diplomatic contact, the possibility of re-opening trade, and less military aid to Israel. Reduced U. S. naval presence in the region would be nice, too, but since the naval presence largely grew as a response to Iranian interference with shipping in the Gulf during the 1980’s that will take a lot of confidence-building.
I’ve mentioned before that finding the appropriate carrots was a challenge we needed to face.
Thank you Dave,
I can’t speak for what the Iranian Administration is doing either, but, handing out a “package of development aid” you mentioned, does not seem to be “giving up something [that US wants]”. I would rather call it a mutually benefical trade agreement: financially beneficial for U.S. and technologically/financially beneficial for Iran. Apparantly, not only the U.S. does not “give up” anything with what it offers, but also it finds new markets that have long been out of reach for its industries. (Your argument would have made a little bit more sense if the package was given as a free package.)
The other if-you-were-a-king type of offers do look like giving up something; however, “the [Americans] have shown no inclination to give up what they want for any reason whatever. ” (this is your exact statement, with “Iraninas” replaced with “Americans”).
Do you think my argument makes sense?
regards,
Amir
PS. I really respect your opinion and this is one of the reasons that I find this place a really good place to discuss my thoughts. (another reason is that, in here, I am not labeled as a pro-mullah person). I do thank you for your taking your time and responding to my comments.
I appreciate that, Amir, and I’ve enjoyed our dialogues.
Well, the development aid package is something. If it consists of grants rather than loans or is just another way of saying “trade liberalization” it has value and, consequently, is a bona fide offer worth something in return. I haven’t seen the actual proposal but what I’ve heard strikes me as somewhat stingy.
I don’t agree that each side has to “give up” something in order to suceed, except to “give up” certain positions or policies. In that regard, the US has a lot to offer Iran. Iran can still have the goal it says it wants – nuclear energy – even if it compromises on the pathway to get that energy.
Hello again Dave,
This is a link to the full text of the offered package.
Yes, the offers are surely something. I am neither qualified nor able to evaluate how much of benefit (in terms of $ or strategic power) the offers will bring about for Iran, But, this can only be evaluated IF the offer is something that can be counted on. These are the words that catch my eyes the most:
“possible removal of restrictions …”, “possible …”, …
“Support for …”
And more importantly, it does not specify a timetable/schedule (Except on the part that Iran should suspend its enrichment before negotiations start [it means immediately]).
This is the deal: Whenever Iran suspends its program (I am talking about a program that has not been proven to be in violation of NPT obligations), the US/EU will negotiate a deal to discuss supporting some possible incentives that may not happen in the next 10 or 20 years.
(Despite the above-mentioned shortcomings, there are many good features to the package and I should not undermine it).
What I am trying to say is that a nagotiation is not necessarily doomed to fail if both parties make a little bit of concessions. The US/EU want Iran to make the concessions now, but they are not ready to do their part.
It is absolutely understandable that whoever has more power, has the upper hand in setting preconditions. However, then, the less-powerful should not be blamed for making the negotiation temporizing.
cheers,
Amir,
Those possibilities would be part of the negotiation. The US is laying the framework for an agreement. In order to get to the table to hash out specific options, the EU3 is insisting on a suspension of enrichment as a good faith measure. This is what Iran rejected today. A suspension is a temporary measure – it doesn’t mean that Iran has to give up it’s nuclear program before negotiations can proceed. The US wants Iran to suspend it’s program while negotiations toward a larger agreement are worked on. I think that’s reasonable.
The problem, of course, is that Iran did suspend their nuclear development program and then resumed again. That was laid out very clearly in one of President Ahmadinejad’s statements.
I’m afraid that part of the problem is that neither side really appreciates the other’s strategic position. Iran is the major power in the region. That will be true with or without nuclear weapons. And the U. S. will have vital strategic interests in the region. Or, more accurately, when the U. S. ceases to have vital strategic interests in the region the real troubles will have begun.