Responses to Graeme Woods’s Article

There’s a vibrant dialogue going on in the blogosphere about the Atlantic article I linked to yesterday. The views being expressed cover a whole range of reactions from “he’s wrong” to “he’s right but” to “he’s right and”. On the rejection end of the spectrum is this article from Raw Story:

In September, Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), held a press conference in Washington and, flanked by other Muslim figures, announced that 120 Muslim scholars had produced an 18-page open letter, written in Arabic, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

An English translation of the document is a tough slog. As Awad said at the time, “This letter is not meant for a liberal audience.” He even admitted that mainstream Muslims might find it difficult to read.

The letter is an extended exegesis, heavily salted with quotes from the Koran and the Hadith, arguing point by point about the nature of jihad, the slaughtering of innocents, the taking of slaves, and other not-so-savory elements of the distant past — and in the past they should remain, the text argues. It makes the case not only that ISIS was wrong to commit horrific acts of violence in modern times, but that it was interpreting Islamic law incorrectly to justify such acts.

[…]

I was curious, however, what Nihad Awad might make of Wood’s article, since he had gone to so much trouble last year to argue the exact opposite.

[…]

When I reached Awad yesterday, he hadn’t seen the article yet. When I described it over the phone, he reacted immediately by saying, “This is an outrageous statement, an ignorant statement.”

He then asked for some time to read the article in its entirety, and then we spoke again later last night.

“This piece is misleading because it’s full of factual mistakes,” Awad said. “Mistakes are all over it.”

He blamed Graeme Wood for trying to grasp things he wasn’t qualified to understand.

I’m in no position to affirm or deny Mr. Awad’s remarks but consider them carefully. Note that he doesn’t say that the article is wrong. What he’s doing is something very lawyerly that might be thought of as “mau-mauing in detail”. He’s attacking the entire article on the basis of individual factual or textual errors that may or may not refute the article’s thesis and, in true post-modernist style, denying Mr. Woods’s authenticity. In terms of classic rhetoric that’s an argumentum ad hominem which does not refute the veracity of the article.

Next in the apologetics spectrum is this post at The Moderate Voice from front page poster “Prairie Weather”:

Take a look — even if it’s just a quick glance –at Graeme Wood’s article on “What Isis really wants.” Not so much difference between Isis and Christian fundamentalists there within.

[…]

I think we helped to create ISIS. We would almost certainly be responsible for making things worse, not better, if we were to rush in there and start sawing on their necks. We’d surely be setting up a situation in which a new generation of young Muslims, radicalized, would aim their wrath and resentment at our grandchildren. Already they know more about us than we know about them.

This is all about bigotry and racism on both sides. Let’s not kid ourselves about that.

tu quoque fallacy. It says nothing about the true or falsehood of Mr. Graeme’s article. It’s irrelevant.

And with respect to the Lord’s Army I have no problem in saying they’re not Christians. In my tradition it takes more than saying that you’re a Christian to be a Christian. To be a Christian you must imitate Christ and whatever Jesus of Nazareth did he certainly didn’t lead an army that committed atrocities.

Although Juan Cole doesn’t mention Mr. Woods’s article or link to it he certainly must have it in mind in his most recent post in which he denies seven “myths” about Islam. Dr. Cole’s post is worth reading but, ultimately, I think that his political views overwhelm his thesis. His thesis is that DAESH is a criminal gang, its power and influence are “smoke and mirrors”, and it will soon collapse. He does provide some good advice for the administration, however:

Politicians should just stop promising to extirpate the group. Brands can’t be destroyed, and Daesh is just a brand for the most part.

IMO DAESH is a bit more than a brand; it’s a network organization and a pretty effective one that we’re just not prepared to cope with.

Also, I’m troubled by Dr. Cole’s reliance on proportions as an important consideration:

Actually, the numbers are quite small proportionally. British PM David Cameron ominously warned that 400 British Muslim youth had gone off to fight in Syria. But there are like 3.7 million Muslims in the UK now! So .01 percent of the community volunteered.

I’m troubled by it for two reasons. First, .01 of the 1.6 billion Muslims is 160,000 people. That’s a lot of people whatever their proportion might be. Second, in the present age of super-empowerment 160,000 people can wreak a lot of havoc. It’s not comforting, it’s dismaying.

On the affirming side of the spectrum is James Joyner’s post at OTB:

Unlike al Qaeda or even the Soviet Union, whose leadership mostly manipulated religious or secular ideology to gain support for secular, political goals, Bagdadi and company are true believers. They literally can’t compromise. So, short of killing every last one of them—which is perhaps a futile exercise, given the nature of martyrdom, the best we can hope for is to help them fail at their own game while keeping the lightest footprint possible.

There’s the usual heated discussion going on in comments there. In comments Lounsbury remarks:

Rubbish. The sheer messianic lunacy of DAESH is widely alienating.

As usual his comments are well worth reading. At one point Lounsbury was a frequent commenter here and his blog, now dormant, is in my thrifty blogroll. If I’m not mistaken, he’s an Anglo-American financier living in Morocco, fluent in Arabic and pretty well informed on issues relating to the Middle East and North Africa and especially those affecting finance.

The best reaction piece I’ve read so far was by Adam Silverman and posted at Balloon Juice:

John asked me for my take on Graeme Woods’ article “What ISIS Really Wants.” Before I start I want to make it clear that my understanding of Islam is that of an informed outsider. I have been studying Islam, or portions of it, since I was an undergraduate and conducted fieldwork for the US Army in Iraq that dealt with both religious and tribal identity. I have published articles dealing with jihad and shahadat, as well as the tribal and religious identity and its effects on US operations in Iraq.** I was even fortunate enough to have a counterpart cultural advisor who was both Muslim and had an advanced degree in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence that I could rely on as a resource to verify if I was correct in my understanding and interpretation of his religion. As I liked to say when I would brief on these, and related subjects, everything I am telling you is true and verifiable, except where it isn’t because I’m an outsider trying to make sense of someone else’s religion.

Overall I think Woods’ article is quite good and I highly recommend you click over and read it before proceeding. It is thought provoking and makes a number of points explicit that have rarely ever been made implicit regarding ISIS. For example, the millennial and apocalyptic components to ISIS’s theology. Woods also has an excellent section dealing with ISIS’s refreshing and recontextualizing long dormant components of Islamic theology and dogma. I was also impressed that Woods took the time to make it clear that al Qaeda was a logistic, support, and training network much more than it was structured like a company. One of the biggest errors in understanding al Qaeda over the past decade came out of the attempts to understand al Qaeda as a corporation or conglomerate.

He goes on to expand on the concept, important among Sunni Muslims, of ijma, usually translated “consensus”, to make the point that you can’t really say that there’s one, monolithic Islamic theology but that dogma, doctrine, and practice all vary from community to community and that Mr. Woods’s neglect of that point is a deficiency in his article. What’s the “Muslim mainstream”? Does the very idea have any meaning? Where does DAESH fit into Muslim thought? Read the whole thing. It’s very enlightening.

10 comments… add one
  • Chinese Jetpilot Link

    I miss Lounsbury’s comments also, but I think he’s missing the point. Communism alienated many too (if you were among the classes that had to be liquidated), so its not whether the people of the region find DAESH/Islamic State alienating, its whether they’re willing to fight alongside their government’s against it. The message/vision of DAESH doesn’t need to be popular to a father of three running a bread shop. I don’t believe that’s their target audience.

  • ... Link

    The sheer messianic lunacy of DAESH is widely alienating.

    Widely alienating to whom*? Their growth over the last couple of years seems to show that it has a good deal of appeal to more than a few people, as does the appearance of groups & individuals claiming allegiance to the group not only in the usual places (Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt) but in some not so typical places (Paris, Copenhagen, Austria**).

    Saying that they’re “widely alienating” misses the point. The vast majority of people didn’t buy or even care for Michael Jackson’s Thriller album, for example. Enough did to make it the most popular album of all time.

    * Who? Whatever.

  • Their growth over the last couple of years seems to show that it has a good deal of appeal to more than a few people, as does the appearance of groups & individuals claiming allegiance to the group not only in the usual places (Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt) but in some not so typical places (Paris, Copenhagen, Austria**).

    That’s the point I’ve been trying to articulate. Dr. Cole may be right but it’s irrelevant. DAESH doesn’t need to appeal to 800 million people. It doesn’t need to be mainstream. Maybe it doesn’t even want to be mainstream.

    As I noted above, even using Dr. Cole’s guesstimate of .01% that’s enough people to raise hell. It’s why my assessment of its signficance is that it’s a nuisance for the U. S., a problem for Europe, and life-threatening for some of the regimes in MENA that are our notional allies.

    Note, however, that my prescription is different from that of the administration. I don’t think that the U. S. should do anything. I don’t think we should be flying bombing missions because a) it’s expensive; b) it obviously hasn’t accomplished much; and c) to minimize downside risk. If the Europeans are really concerned (see my post about Italy), they should be rearming. If Saudi Arabia or Egypt is concerned, they should be organizing campaigns against DAESH. They don’t need our help and if they’re not worried enough about DAESH to do anything about it, why should we?

  • jan Link

    “As I noted above, even using Dr. Cole’s guesstimate of .01% that’s enough people to raise hell.”

    People have been noting that for some time — that a small percentage of a big number still can create significant problems and chaos, regionally as well as around the world.

    Having said that, I question your prescription, Dave, that the US should “do nothing.” Being an isolationist, or a non “busybody,” in staying away from problems across the world, guarantees only that for a given moment we are out of a contentious and expensive fray.

    However, if those problems cannot be contained to far off places, and they suddenly erupt here, perhaps they have done so because they have grown into a super problem here — one that is much more difficult and expensive to deal with belatedly.

  • I’m not an isolationist; I’m a non-interventionist. We’re not going to become the next Turks. We’re not going to occupy the Middle East for the next several centuries. We’re also not going to bomb the countries of the Middle East into slag heaps. That means that no military action we might take in the Middle East will be of much consequence other than to exacerbate an already bad situation. Our most favorable course of action is doing less rather than doing more.

  • TastyBits Link

    @jan

    Over the past 15 years, every military intervention has been a failure, and every one has made a bad situation worse. I find it astounding that anybody could assess the record and recommend more interventions to improve the situation.

    The only success is the Iraq surge, and all that did was to allow President Bush to leave office without it burning to the ground. The surge was nothing more than life support, and as soon as the feeding tube and respirator were removed, the success was going to die. Afghanistan will be the same.

    The military will need to return to the draft for the size needed to support the amount of intervention your goals entail, and their pay will need to be cut dramatically including retirement and benefits.

    You will also need to readjust your thinking about the men and women serving. They are expendable. They are means to an end, and their lives are another line in the cost calculation.

  • TastyBits Link

    When you use propositional or predicate logic, it is easy to deflect silly nonsense. You keep going back to your premise and conclusions. If you are using deductive logic, they are either right or wrong. If you understand algebra, it is fairly easy.

    In the The Moderate Voice link, the word racism indicates it is a fashion piece, and the writer is not serious. When a person cannot make an argument, they will use the racism angle. A more sophisticated writer would have insinuated it at least.

  • Andy Link

    “He goes on to expand on the concept, important among Sunni Muslims, of ijma, usually translated “consensus” to make the point that you can’t really say that there’s one, monolithic Islamic theology but that dogma, doctrine, and practice all vary from community to community and that Mr. Woods’s neglect of that point is a deficiency in his article. What’s the “Muslim mainstream”? Does the very idea have any meaning? Where does DAESH fit into Muslims thought?”

    I think that’s the point that most miss. There is no true dogma in Islam and no hierarchy to enforce one or consolidate most into a “mainstream.” In one sense, Islam is very democratic – a Muslim can choose to follow whatever Imam he/she wishes and there are many to choose from. Some are more prominent than others, but there’s no equivalent of the Catholic Hierarchy (which represents most Christians). Woods may miss that point, but so do most of his critics.

    As an aside, it’s kind of sad how so many, particularly a group of regulars at OTB, bend themselves backward to draw equivalence between DAESH and so-called radical Christian sects.

  • steve Link

    While I agree that the West fails to understand the possibility that we are dealing with true belief, it is unclear to me how many of these are true believers. I can buy that the leadership has true believers. However, when you read the bios of those going to join the fight, there are certainly a lot of losers, career criminals and thrill seekers joining up. I suspect that has also been true of other armies of “true believers”, but I don’t know what percentage you need to sustain a campaign.

    Steve

  • ... Link

    A more sophisticated writer would have insinuated it at least.

    LOL

    However, when you read the bios of those going to join the fight, there are certainly a lot of losers, career criminals and thrill seekers joining up.

    They’re the dispossessed. Hardly surprising that such people would look for a belief system to give their lives meaning. And there can’t be much promise for criminals & thrill seekers to go on suicide missions, which is what happened in Paris & Copenhagen.

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