If you have access to it, I strongly recommend you read Henry Kissinger and George Shultz’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on the incipient deal with Iran and its likely consequences. I think it does so in a fair and balanced way without taking an editorial position. But for the copyright restrictions, I’d quote it in its entirety. Here are a few snippets to give you the flavor:
Mixing shrewd diplomacy with open defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has gradually turned the negotiation on its head. Iran’s centrifuges have multiplied from about 100 at the beginning of the negotiation to almost 20,000 today. The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal. In the process, the Iranian program has reached a point officially described as being within two to three months of building a nuclear weapon. Under the proposed agreement, for 10 years Iran will never be further than one year from a nuclear weapon and, after a decade, will be significantly closer.
[…]
Negotiating the final agreement will be extremely challenging. For one thing, no official text has yet been published. The so-called framework represents a unilateral American interpretation. Some of its clauses have been dismissed by the principal Iranian negotiator as “spin.†A joint EU-Iran statement differs in important respects, especially with regard to the lifting of sanctions and permitted research and development.
[…]
Under the new approach, Iran permanently gives up none of its equipment, facilities or fissile product to achieve the proposed constraints. It only places them under temporary restriction and safeguard—amounting in many cases to a seal at the door of a depot or periodic visits by inspectors to declared sites. The physical magnitude of the effort is daunting. Is the International Atomic Energy Agency technically, and in terms of human resources, up to so complex and vast an assignment?
[…]
The agreement’s primary enforcement mechanism, the threat of renewed sanctions, emphasizes a broad-based asymmetry, which provides Iran permanent relief from sanctions in exchange for temporary restraints on Iranian conduct. Undertaking the “snap-back†of sanctions is unlikely to be as clear or as automatic as the phrase implies. Iran is in a position to violate the agreement by executive decision. Restoring the most effective sanctions will require coordinated international action. In countries that had reluctantly joined in previous rounds, the demands of public and commercial opinion will militate against automatic or even prompt “snap-back.†If the follow-on process does not unambiguously define the term, an attempt to reimpose sanctions risks primarily isolating America, not Iran.
[…]
Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?
Previous thinking on nuclear strategy also assumed the existence of stable state actors. Among the original nuclear powers, geographic distances and the relatively large size of programs combined with moral revulsion to make surprise attack all but inconceivable. How will these doctrines translate into a region where sponsorship of nonstate proxies is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?
For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of Iran’s 3½ decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East. Having both served in government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce national identity, and a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.
But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposes congruent definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the U.S. are remotely near such an understanding.
[…]
Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate America from Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region initiated by the current administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case. The Middle East will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally assert itself out of Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance of power theory suggests the need to bolster the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.)
Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the projected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves.
That’s less than a quarter of the lengthy, intelligent, informed commentary. There is also praise for the president and Secretary of State from two former consequential Secretaries of State.
Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on complex new terms.
This sentence articulates a feeling I’ve had during this process and explains why this isn’t likely to be a good deal. I think most everyone agrees that American disengagement in the region would be in our interest (even hawks, I think, agitate for war because it would bring some finality.)
So they are arguing for an increased and permanent level of US involvement? Meh. They are sufficiently vague on alternatives to the deal that can be taken many ways, but knowing their history, ” Stability requires an active American role.” means very active involvement.
This sways from the obvious, the details matter, to the even more obvious, it won’t work if the IAEA isn’t up to it. (There seems to be an undercurrent in those opposing this, and with Dave, that we are going to drop all of the sanctions without waiting for Iran to fulfill any part of its deal. Not sure where this comes from.) I am bothered that they miss some other obvious points. They think it will be difficult to reintroduce sanctions. That could be true. They ignore the fact that it will also likely be difficult to maintain sanctions if this agreement is supported by the other partners in the deal and we oppose it.
Finally, they accuse Iran of military intervention in other countries, while ignoring the Gulf state’s creation of and support for numerous proxies, including IS. It was the US decision to invade Iraq under President Obama that destabilized things and made hegemony even remote possibility. The GCC has as much to do with the situation in Yemen as Iran, maybe more. And, IIRC, we started (with Kissinger involved) the first SALT treaty negotiations about a year (2 years?) after the USSR had invaded Czechoslovakia. Kissinger certainly recognized the value of a nuclear agreement with a true aggressor country that fought proxy wars, that killed millions of its own people and lied about its intentions when he was in office.
Steve
This link will get you past the paywall.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304747004579228110944819396
What I have said (repeatedly) is what’s in the joint EU-Iran statement on the framework:
I also believe that the relationship between Iran’s declared nuclear development program and its actual development program is tangential but that’s a different point.
I interpret their saying that such an involvement is implicit in the effectuation of an agreement under the framework.
(There seems to be an undercurrent in those opposing this, and with Dave, that we are going to drop all of the sanctions without waiting for Iran to fulfill any part of its deal. Not sure where this comes from.)
This comes from Iran’s statements about their interpretation of the framework. Of course if that is what they insist on, we could walk away from the deal but if that really is their starting point then what is the point of pretending that this framework creates an opening for further negotiations?
So they are arguing for an increased and permanent level of US involvement?
I interpret their saying that such an involvement is implicit in the effectuation of an agreement under the framework.
That is certainly how I read the oped.
Kissinger certainly recognized the value of a nuclear agreement with a true aggressor country that fought proxy wars, that killed millions of its own people and lied about its intentions when he was in office.
This was addressed, partially.
We can argue about what constitutes a stable state actor, but some are more stable than others. (I would think Iran is about as stable as the USSR was in 1985. That’s a fun thought!)
In the ME there is a lot less distance between Iran and SA, and Iran and Israel, then there was between the heartlands of the USSR and the USA. So a surprise attack is much more of a threat. And the relatively small size of the countries involved makes a surprise attack potentially that much more devastating.
As for moral revulsion… Personally I think that if Israel feels their very existence is at risk, they may do anything. Their big fear would be that if they nuked anyone for any reason that the Europeans, if not the Americans, would obliterate Israel and probably kill a lot of the remaining Jews in Europe. (How’s that for limiting a “friend’s” scope of action?) As for Irani views on the matter, a few years back we had the number two cleric in that nation speculate that a nuclear war against Israel would be very winnable for the Muslim world, as a few nukes would destroy Israel but that the Muslim world could absorb much more punishment.
Given all that, there’s significant differences between dealing with the USSR under Brezhnev on the one hand, and dealing with Iran under the Ayatollahs and the Israelis on the other.
Incidentally, the stability of the USSR in 1985 makes for an interesting study in contingency planning. How prepared was anyone in the West for that?
In 1985 there wasn’t much reason to think that the USSR would continue on indefinitely. But in four years the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and in six the USSR itself dissolved. If you’re one of the deep planners in the government, how much thought and preperation do you put into such an unlikely scenario? Into the likelihood of Iran’s current governing structure being over-turned? (Into thinking about what would replace it?) Into planning for what happens if Israel disappears into a cloud of atomic dust, or if Israel strikes first unilaterally with their own nuclear force?
Obviously one has to plan for the most likely events, but sometimes the world just completely turns over in just a few months. Who thinks about the black swan* events?
*Personally I hate that image. I see black swans pretty much every time I take my daughter to the park at Lake Eola in downtown Orlando, which is about once a month. How rare are they if I know I can see them every day? How about a paisley swan instead?
This isn’t encouraging:
So big words and big thoughts are too tough for the Administration of The Smartest Man That Ever Lived, Or Ever Will Live?
Makes me wish I wasn’t an atheist, as this level of cupidity with that much power deserves a call for divine intercession….
The joint statement says sanctions will be dropped after Iran completes its commitments and it is confirmed by the IAEA. Still don’t know where the idea that sanctions will be dropped first.
As to the USSR argument, they had invaded Czechoslovakia multiple times, 1968 being the time most proximate to the SALT talks. They took over Afghanistan in 1979. What about Hungary in the 50s? As to proximity, East and West Germany were about what, 50 yards apart? The USSR was putting men into space, and recovering them. Iran films fake launched of missiles. As to moral revulsion. Sigh. Back to the mad mullahs argument. If you want to try to make the case that the Soviet Union was morally superior to Iran, go ahead.
Steve
It will take me a day or two to read to entire editorial (I need to get my research account reactivated and Steve’s link doesn’t provide the whole thing). Based on the quoted portions though, I would say that Schultz and Kissinger engage in quite a lot of hindsight bias, the vicious dispatch of strawmen, and a clear intent to abort any agreement that falls short of Iranian capitulation.
A few quick points:
– All you really have to do is go read the news, analysis and editorials about the arms control treaties Kissinger and Schultz were involved in and you’ll find that every argument used to abort those deals are being used now.
– The authors criticize the process but it’s essentially the same one used in every other arms control negotiation including the ones they supervised. Final agreements were characterized by very long negotiations (SALT II took a decade!), interim agreements, framework agreements, concerns about the level of compliance and verification, accusations of trustworthiness, etc. None of what’s happening today with Iran is new.
– They complain that Iran doesn’t “permanently” give up anything. That’s because countries don’t agree to permanently give up capabilities unless they are universal agreements (NPT, Geneva Convention, etc.) and even most those have provisions for legal withdrawal from the agreement. It is folly to expect any country to agree to permanent limitations which only apply to them.
– The authors question whether sanctions would actually “snap back” in the case of violations. That would depend on the content of any final agreement along with the scope and nature of any violations, which are all unknown. But hey, complete ambiguity shouldn’t stop one from making a sweeping conclusion! About all that can be said is that THIS Congress would not hesitate to reimpose sanctions, but any future decisions would be subject to politics as all such things are. Regardless, I think the argument is disingenuous because it can be used to oppose the elimination of sanctions for any reason. Suppose Iran agrees to everything the EU and US demand. The same “worry†about the(in)ability to “snap back†sanctions will still exist. regardless of the content of any agreement. If that’s the case, then what is the purpose of sanctions…..
– I think they miss the point about counterbalancing, assuming I understand the context of their quotes. One purpose of limiting Iran’s program is to prevent counterbalancing actions by others in the region which has been a foundation of US policy for decades.
– The authors present the “stable actors†argument. Iran has had two leaders in the last 35 years. Its political system has been remarkably stable compared to every country in the region despite their isolation and bloody, existential war.
– They suggest a surprise attack was “all but inconceivable†by the “original†nuclear powers. Why, then, did the US maintain nuclear-armed bombers airborne alert for an entire decade? Inconceivable! Their clever rhetorical attempts to separate this negotiation from ones that came before do not bear scrutiny.
– We are told the ME can’t stabilize itself, implying that US must act as the stabilizing power (and in other fora the authors cautioned against what they perceive as premature US regional disengagement), yet then we are told that an agreement would deepen US involvement, which would somehow be a bad thing. Can’t have it both ways…
Anyway, most of the arguments presented are pointless because there isn’t a final agreement yet.
– All you really have to do is go read the news, analysis and editorials about the arms control treaties Kissinger and Schultz were involved in and you’ll find that every argument used to abort those deals are being used now.
I’d argue that this pushback is a necessary part of the process, and part of the concern now is that the people negotiating on our behalf don’t seem to be taking that seriously. They’re overhyping the degree to which we’ve reached a workable and verifiable agreement.
I didn’t read the whole op-ed as quite that advocatory, Andy. To me it was more making the point which should be obvious that an agreement, like any agreement, would have implications that were broader than the narrow terms of the agreement.
Andy, you keep bombers in the air constantly and boomers underwater at all times to minimize the possibility of a surprise attack. Are Iran, SA (assuming the nuke up), and Israel capable of that kind of constant readiness?
The point is that the margins, even for the USA & USSR (or Russia now), are slim, and anything that reduces those margins makes things worse.
And again, the size of the countries in question matters. The USA & USSR are/were vast, and the possibility of nailing EVERYTHING in a surprise attack, or even most things, is much smaller than if you have to attack a country a little smaller than New Jersey. And yes, Israel is the big problem here, as it is ridiculously vulnerable to nuclear attack. Saudi Arabia isn’t much better. Even though it’s a little bigger than Alaska & California combined, its population is rather concentrated into small areas, making it more vulnerable than it appears at first blush. (If I were the Saudi royals, I’d move the capital to Mecca. I doubt the Iranis would ever bomb Mecca.) I’d have to check, but Iran is probably ‘best’ situated. It’s a little smaller than Alaska in size, but I imagine its population is more spread out than SA. But even in Iran, are the facilities (production & likely launch sites) spread out enough to avoid the possibility of an Israeli first strike?
Again, margins are tight, and even the US and USSR almost fucked up a few times. Do you want tighter margins still?
…
All that said, I’m suspecting that this is similar to the North Korean situation back in the early 1990s. I doubt we can stop them from getting a bomb, short of blasting hell out of them, and that has other bad consequences. Whatever deal we make, or don’t make, is likely to fail if the Iranis really want the bomb. And as I’ve said before, I think they’ve got all kinds of motivation to get some bombs just because of the neighborhood they live in, regardless of the nature of the regime in charge.