I disagree with Timothy Stafford’s assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the “Iran deal” in his piece a the National Interest:
In a legally required letter to Speaker Paul Ryan on April 18, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson confirmed that Iran is in compliance with the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The next day, he told reporters that the deal represented a “failed approach†that will not prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. One might be tempted to attack such doublespeak as indicative of the administration’s general tendency to say one thing and do another. Yet on this count, Tillerson is correct. Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA, but the JCPOA isn’t working. Why?
In short, because compliance is not enough.
IMO the deal was intended to accomplish two things: it was intended to kick Iran’s nuclear weapons development program down the road for the term of the agreement and it was intended to provide President Obama with a foreign policy legacy. It has accomplished and is accomplishing both of those goals in the “poison pill” manner characteristic of President Obama’s domestic accomplishments.
In the case of the JCPOA the poison pill took the form of all of the benefits to Iran coming at the outset with any benefits to the U. S. coming later.
In other words IMO Mr. Stafford’s objection is to the plan. That ship has sailed.
Iran shipped out a bunch of plutonium and has the most invasive inspections program we have ever seen. Good enough for me.
Steve
The deal isn’t about nuclear weapons. It’s about trying to develop a balance of power in the Greater Middle East, which can’t happen with Iran frozen out.
“In short, because compliance is not enough.”
That is true for any country that has nuclear weapons-related agreements, which is almost every country.
All the treaties are kicking the can down the road because a country could withdraw at anytime or they could try to develop weapons in secret. Iran’s compliance program is currently more comprehensive and intrusive than any other country. That level of intrusiveness is necessary because of Iran’s history of deception. However, it is unreasonable to expect Iran to agree this heightened level of compliance forever while every other country is not. Even when the JPOA expires Iran will still be part of the additional protocol which many other countries have yet to agree to and some are actively resisting.
Considering the alternatives, I think this was a success.