Deterrence

There’s a good post on deterrence at RealClearDefense which takes a largely historical perspective:

Deterrence has most frequently been explored through the lens of the Cold War, when the promise of massive nuclear retaliation kept the world from plunging into global thermonuclear warfare. Yet the concept of deterrence encompasses a much broader range of human behaviors, and existed long before the advent of nuclear weapons or the countries that wield them.

In fact, the logic underlying deterrence has been around for centuries. During the Peloponnesian Wars in ancient Greece, for example, Sparta threatened to launch an invasion of Attica if Athens carried out an attack against Potidaea. The long peace between Rome and its rival Persia in the fifth century AD was not due to a lack of potential for conflict, but rather because certain strategic and economic conditions made successful deterrence possible.

Efforts to deter undesirable actions by others take place at all levels of government, in business, education, and our interactions with others. One can find examples in virtually every aspect of human interactions. For instance, drivers often see signs that read “Fines Doubled” near construction zones. If it were the desire of the highway patrol to collect the most fines possible, they would not warn drivers of the situation. By visibly raising the consequences of speeding in a dangerous area the authorities are deterring drivers from behaving in undesirable ways.

Yet as history has shown, deterrence often fails; adversaries attack and drivers run red lights. So what separates deterrence successes from these failures? The key is to establish the credibility of deterrent threats. That is to say, one must be able to instill a sincere belief in adversaries that the promise of counteraction will be carried out if they fail to comply with the threat.

Over the years I’ve written pretty extensively about deterrence here at The Glittering Eye. It has two components: they physical and the psychological. You’ve got to be strong enough that your threats meet the laugh test and you’ve got to be convincing enough that your opponents take the threats seriously. IMO we’ve overachieved in the first component and underachieved in the second. Our present military is the strongest the world has ever known and it’s quite capable of opposing any foreseeable enemy. I don’t believe it’s crumbling, on the verge of collapse, or suffering some other malady as alarmists would have you believe. It’s also battle-tested (unlike the militaries of our prospective foes), a factor that should not be under-estimated.

I have no doubt that President Obama would defend the United States if we were attacked. However, he’s reneged on enough threats that, at the very least, he’s sending a mixed message and in terms of deterrence ambiguity is not a strength.

IMO the best possible policy outcome for the United States is successful deterrence while the worst possible outcome is unsuccessful deterrence. Bolstering a system is a process of strengthening the weak points not the strong points. Verbum sapienti satis est.