There’s an interesting discussion going on over at Winds of Change in which a proposal for ditching the present, obviously inadequate Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and replacing it was a convention for actively discouraging the development of nuclear weapons is being discussed.
Here’s the proposal:
- All participating nuclear powers provide samples of output of their reactors to all other powers. If any power is ever caught not doing so, through the national intelligence means of any other power, they are out of the agreement.
- All non-participating powers are in one equivalence class. They may come into compliance only by agreeing and conforming to the above, to the satisfaction of all the currently complying powers.
- Any conventionally or unconventionally delivered nuke having the signature of one of the participating powers makes that party culpable. (A powerful incentive to report any fissile materials losses and enlist everyone in cleaning them up.)
- Any conventionally or unconventionally delivered nuke having no known signature, or one known to originate from a noncompliant power by national intelligence means, means that all noncompliant powers are jointly culpable.
- The target of an attack may deal with the culpable party or parties by any means it feels necessary. Other compliant powers may assist in this, but none will oppose.
Commenter Daniel Markham rebuts. Commenter Mark Buehner counter-rebuts.
I think that Daniel Markham’s rebuttal is pretty convincing but I’d like to zero in on one of his points:
It’s not practical from an internal political standpoint. People just aren’t going to vote to support a policy that would essentially involve our first use of nukes against nations which could be innocent of any agression towards us. You’re not getting elected with this platform, and the late-night comedians would have a field day. There would be wailing and gnashing of teeth all over the place. In short, it’s political suicide. It’s like every bad exaggeration about conservatives all rolled up into one neat package.
That strikes to the heart not just of Tim’s proposal but of deterrence, generally, and, arguably, the successful prosecution of war.
The specific context of this discussion is the recent nuclear test in North Korea which, dud, fake, or legit, needs to be taken seriously and Iran’s presumed and allied nuclear weapons development program. Both of these countries have been at war with the United States for decades. The U. S. has, basically, ignored them and has only recently taken their threats seriously.
A policy of deterrence based on massive retaliation, the U. S. policy since World War II, has two underlying assumptions. First, you’ve got to have the material capacity for engaging in such a retaliation and, second, you’ve got to be willing to engage in such a retaliation. That sort of retaliation means that you’re going to kill a lot of people who had nothing to do with the initial attack.
If you’re not willing to do that, you’re abandoning deterrence as a policy. So, what will you replace it with?
I haven’t read through the entirety of the comments yet, but the whole proposal is based on a fundamental ignorance of nuclear technology. The biggest problem from a technical standpoint is that the proposal does nothing for uranium weapons which don’t require reactors to produce. Also, sampling of reactor fuel will not necessarily give a “fingerprint” to determine where plutonium from an exploded weapon came from. It all depends on how the plutonium was made in the reactor and how it is reprocessed. Sampling fuel on plutonium production reactors won’t tell you anything because the material does not come from the fuel itself. Finally, it does nothing for uranium and plutonium that have already been produced, to say nothing of existing nuclear weapons.
Politically, I don’t see how any nuclear country, especially those with nukes, would ever agree to this, especially considering the level of intrusiveness necessary to ensure compliance. Certainly the US, China and Russia would not.
Finally, I’ll quibble with US deterrence policy, which was, and is, more complex and nuanced than simple massive retaliation. The whole concept of MAD was a deterrence to a massive Soviet first strike, not necessarily a single or small attack. MAD was only part of our strategic strategy and evolved over time since WWII, really starting with the concept of “graduated deterrence” in the late 50’s. The most influential doctrine’s came from McNamara, which were “counterforce,” “damage limitation,” and “assured destruction” (which evolved in the MAD we know and love today).
We all know which power bloc in the world today is most likely to perpetrate a nuclear incident in the West, most likely in the USA. I think it is quite likely that, whatever statements have been made previously, the response would be instant and massive. (Unless Hilary’s in the White House by then, of course.)
How about making an explicit statement of this? “We lose a city, you lose Mecca”. Mecca is quite a small city, so the death toll would be quite small, and the response would be small by Western standards; but the other side wouldn’t see it that way.
Of course, it is necessary to follow through with the threat if and when the conditions are fulfilled.
Perhaps, in this way, the enemy would police itself. If they don’t? Well, we’re no worse off, and they don’t have anywhere to go worship a rock.