Channeling “Bluto†Blutarsky Joshua Muravchik thinks that the situation in Iran absolutely requires a really futile and stupid gesture be done on somebody’s part:
The only way to forestall these frightening developments is by the use of force. Not by invading Iran as we did Iraq, but by an air campaign against Tehran’s nuclear facilities. We have considerable information about these facilities; by some estimates they comprise about 1,500 targets. If we hit a large fraction of them in a bombing campaign that might last from a few days to a couple of weeks, we would inflict severe damage. This would not end Iran’s weapons program, but it would certainly delay it.
What should be the timing of such an attack? If we did it next year, that would give time for U.N. diplomacy to further reveal its bankruptcy yet would come before Iran will have a bomb in hand (and also before our own presidential campaign). In time, if Tehran persisted, we might have to do it again.
The gesture would be futile: as Mr. Muravchik notes the most we can expect from such a move would be to delay Iran’s development program. Would it? We don’t know. I don’t know of anyone who believes that we can end Iran’s nuclear development program with a bombing program short of genocide.
But it would also be stupid. We don’t know whether Iran actually has a nuclear weapons development program (I think the preponderance of the evidence suggests it does), we don’t know how far along such a program might be, nor do we know where it is. Our human intelligence within Iran is quite poor.
The likely consequences of such a campaign would be to kill an enormous number of Iranians, bolster Iranian support for the regime (a rally-round effect), make the Iranians hate us all the more, convince nearly everybody who might be on the prospective target list that they should have nuclear weapons of their own and develop them as quietly as possible, confirm to much of the world that we’re war-mad, and reduce our already-dwindling international support. In exchange we might get a delay in the Iranian program and, presumably, tighter security and greater hardening of targets, and all the motivation in the world to use nuclear weapons against us should they obtain them.
Note
As originally published this post erroneously attributed the column to Jules Crittenden. A slip of the keyboard which has been corrected. In this post Mr. Crittenden advocates a policy with respect to Iran which appears to be very close to my own.
BTW, what do you think the U. S. will bring to the table if, as the Iraq Study Group will apparently recommend, we negotiate with Iran to help stabilize Iraq? It must be something they genuinely want else why would they do anything? Presumably, we will agree to accept their nuclear development program.
There are a series of questions that have to be answered in developing a strategy, but only one (in this case) to develop our goal: Can we live with a nuclear-armed Iran?
If the answer is yes, then there is no need for action. While there are a few people pushing this answer, I cannot figure out what they base that on, unless it is hope and ignorance. I personally, looking at the consequences of terrorists with nuclear weapons, the consequences of nuclear war between Israel and Iran (including the likely destruction of both), the amount of additional pressure Iran would put on Iraq if they were less fearful of our response, and other likely or possible moves by a nuclear-armed Iran, have decided that there is no way we can live with a nuclear-armed Iran.
I’m curious as to your answer. And if the answer is that we cannot live with a nuclear Iran, and you reject Crittenden’s idea, then what do you think we should do to prevent that?
Basically, although we don’t have them now I think we’re going to have to develop the means to live with a nuclear-armed Iraq.
I think that from a military standpoint there are only two effective alternatives: invade Iraq in force or exterminatory bombing. Anything else, as I suggest above, is an extremely poor gamble. I don’t think that either is politically acceptable under the present circumstances.
So, one does what one must and what’s politically possible.
What are those means? I don’t know. They certainly include a very robust deterrence program (we don’t have that now). Presumably, more formal acceptance of the Iranian regime. I think we need to recognize that Iran is the regional power. We need to get them to acknowledge that we have legitimate interests in the region, too.
Rhetoric aside, I think that’s the direction we’re heading in. If you do not will the means you cannot will the end.
Fair enough. So here are some of the questions that refine the goal of living with a nuclear-armed Iran.
Do we then care if Iran spreads its influence throughout the region to a much larger extent than they now are able to do?
Subquestion: Do we care if Iran spreads their direct political control, either by subversion of the Iraqi Shi’a militias to such a degree that southern Iraq becomes (de facto or de jure) part of Iran? What about other ways in which Iran could use its control, such as controlling the shipment of oil from the Persian Gulf? What about Iranian influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Do we care if Iran destroys Israel? What about if Iran were to seize Kuwaiti or Saudi (or both) oil fields, particularly if they had already absorbed southern Iraq? It should be noted, for those who are unaware, that all the oil fields around the top of the Gulf are in majority Shi’a areas.
Do we care if Iran steps up jihadi activity in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank? Do we care if this includes wars against Israel, with or without direct Iranian involvement, short of the use of nuclear weapons? What about short of the use of chemical and biological weapons?
Do we care if Iran steps up jihadi activity in Europe, in a sort of mob-world takeover of the Sunni groups currently running that activity? What about Iran taking over al Qaeda itself, in whole or in part?
Do we care if Iran, again in an attempt to monopolize the jihad market, steps up activities in the US and Canada, via its Hizb’allah subsidiary? In this case, these activities would likely not, for some time, be open terrorism so much as recruitment, lawfare, and attempts to increase anti-semitism and reduce resistance to political Islam.
I think it’s fairly obvious that we care if Iran gives nuclear weapons to terrorists, because of the possible outcomes, which include the loss of cities in the US, Europe, Israel, Japan, Australia, Korea or other places we care about. So, can we prevent that outcome? I think we can at least reduce the odds, by a very vigorous and bi-partisan (it would have to be nearly unanimous, in fact) policy of instant and overwhelming retaliation against Iran, N. Korea and any other suspected nuclear state that could have been involved (including perhaps Pakistan, though we would not voice that) if a nuclear weapon goes off in any of the places we care about, as defined above. However, it needs to be clear that what I am saying here is that we can lower the risk of nuclear terror attacks on the West, given a nuclear Iran, only if we are willing to countenance unthinking genocide as the response.
Frankly, as much as those who I have seen publicly arguing for tolerating a nuclear Iran might talk about deterrence, I’m not sure they realize or would admit to the level of evil the failure of that deterrence would imply. And I think that the Iranians might just be willing to exploit that, thinking us incapable of acting that ruthlessly, and in that case the deterrence would not work at all, and that means that our options are reduced to unthinking genocide or surrender.
If we care about any or all of these, we need ways to prevent them, reduce the odds of them, or at least mitigate the bad outcomes should they come to pass. I do not see any way that we can simultaneously do three things: live with a nuclear-armed Iran, maintain any influence in the Persian Gulf region (possibly in the Middle East in its entirety), and avoid a massive, possibly genocidal, war, or indeed outright genocide.
The problem with this is, we have a limited time to choose. Once Iran has nuclear weapons, we foreclose all options of preventing or delaying Iran’s obtaining nuclear weapons. The consequences of that include our having no choice but to work out all of the answers to the questions above while under nuclear threat.
If what we choose to do is to allow Iran to go nuclear, and cede our influence in the region, that guarantees a genocidal war, perhaps two: Israel cannot accede to an unchecked nuclear Iran, and our withdrawal would compel Israel to strike first, and Israel’s only realistic first strike option against Iran is nuclear. If Israel somehow decides to wait, then there would be two genocidal wars: the Iranian destruction of Israel, and the Israeli retaliation which would destroy Iran. The only other possibility is that Iran doesn’t mean it when they say they want to destroy Israel, and Israel knows that Iran doesn’t mean it, and that situation will never change.
But if we choose to allow a nuclear Iran, and not give up our influence, particularly if we try to limit Iranian influence as well, we virtually guarantee a conventional war as large and difficult, or larger and more difficult, than we would face in attacking Iran before they get nuclear weapons, complete with the risk of nuclear war because the Iranian theocrats could not allow the US to roll back Iranian forces and influence and survive, and our conventional forces so overpower Iranian forces that their forces and influence would be rolled back. That’s a very powerful pressure on the Iranian leaders to escalate.
In the end, I cannot see how we can live with a nuclear-armed Iran and avoid a genocidal war, possibly first including the loss of an American city or two or ten.
I think you’ve stated some of the questions pretty clearly, Jeff. I think that the implications of acceptance of a nuclear-armed Iran are extremely serious and to my regret that’s the path we appear to be embarked on.
A couple of clarifications. Presumably, when you say “Iran” you mean “a Khomeinist Iran”. I, personally, have no particular objection to a liberal democratic nuclear-armed Iran (this point-of-view may be peculiar to me). The problem as I see it is the regime, not the country.
Second, I think that in many of your questions it’s more a matter of “which do we care for more?” than of “do we care?”.
As I understand it the Arab populations in Iraq, Kuwait, and KSA aren’t terribly Khomeinist. Ali Sistani, particularly, has condemned it. Are they moving in that direction? Probably and we are playing a role in making that happen. How do we stop it? I don’t know.
I think I’m pretty well aware of the implications of being serious about a policy of deterrence i.e. that we’d be committing to exterminating the Iranian people under particular circumstances. As I see it that would be better than doing so under the precautionary principle which, as I see it, bombing Iraq now would make inevitable.
On your first clarification, yes, I am using Iran as a shorthand for the regime. I have said for years that the US and Iran are natural allies once the theocrats are gone. We have common interests in the area as nations, but we cannot work together on those common interests so long as Iran is an enemy nation, and Iran will be an enemy nation so long as the theocrats are in charge. I suspect, actually, that had the Shah been able to remain in power in 1979, or to pass power on to a successor, that Iran could well have been on the way to free and representative government by now, given the examples of Taiwan and S. Korea.
On the “do we care” questions, my real question is “do we care enough to prevent it at a dear cost,” because preventing it will require war if the Iranians are determined. I see little evidence that a nuclear-armed Iran would not be determined on many or even most of these issues, and a nuclear-armed Iran would extract a dear price to stop actions they consider to be in their interests. Are we willing to trade New York or San Francisco to avoid killing half a million Iranians now? How about to avoid killing 10 million Iranians in a decade?
I am not trying to take a position here, because I don’t have an answer that I am comfortable with. Had you said that we cannot live with a nuclear Iran, I would instead be asking about the implications of that position. I deeply respect your opinions, and your answers are helping me to clarify my own thoughts.
In the end, I think what we are really talking about is the certainty of killing as many as 100,000 Iranians now, mostly civilian, and immiserating millions more, while taking a huge political hit; as against the possibility killing millions of Iranians later, after losing hundreds of thousands of our own citizens. Anyone who says that neither case is likely needs to provide some kind of reasoning as to how two diametrically opposed interests will not lead to conflict, and how if both sides have nuclear weapons and one side is willing to use them regardless of cost, how we can manage to avoid both surrender and a nuclear war. Because that is the other side the of choice: do we take the certainty of a limited war now, or the certainty of later choosing between a massive war and surrender?
One reasonably certain way of preventing a catastrophe on Western soil is very simple indeed.
Turn Tehran into a glowing, smoking hole. Now.
This would send all the messages necessary.