In his Wall Street Journal column William Galston warns the the United States is about to “leave Europe on its own”:
Europe is beset by troubles, and the policies of the incoming Trump administration will deepen them.
During his first term, Donald Trump insisted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s European members pay more for their own defense. While 23 NATO nations are now in compliance with the target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense, they remain far short of what it would take to defend themselves without America’s security guarantee.
This is very interesting:
Europe wasn’t always this weak. In 1988, West Germany’s army had nearly half a million soldiers; today, Germany’s active-duty army numbers only about 180,000. The army in the 1980s was equipped with more than 2,000 battle-ready tanks; today, only a few hundred are operational. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, reunified Germany largely disarmed. So did countries throughout Western Europe. Governments gave priority to social programs over defense.
Consider the graph at the top of the page. In 2024 Germany’s defense spending rose to 2% of GDP for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But just barely. The Germans have been freeriding on the United States for a long time; they consider it a law of nature.
This, too, is an intersting observation:
In recent decades, Western European nations have made a series of bets that haven’t paid off. They assumed that they could remain economically competitive while government spending and regulatory burdens increased. They assumed that relations with Russia would remain manageable and that the flow of cheap Russian energy would continue. They assumed that they could absorb a record flow of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa without disrupting social stability. Above all, they assumed that the trans-Atlantic alliance would endure indefinitely and that the U.S. would never tire of bearing a disproportionate burden for Europe’s defense.
As these bets failed, Europe’s citizens became dissatisfied with the dominant parties of the center left and center right and turned to right-wing populist-nationalists. For different reasons, voters in the U.K. and U.S. did as well.
As I’ve said any number of times before, I have no insight in what Trump will or will not do. I suspect that despite threats he’ll continue to backstop Europe. Whether that’s the right thing to do or not I’ll leave to your judgment. I think that our interests in Asia are greater than our interests in Europe.
Dave Schuler: In 2024 Germany’s defense spending rose to 2% of GDP for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But just barely.
In 2014, NATO set a guideline that military spending should be 2% of GDP by 2024, in order to maintain a viable defense. Germany has met that guideline. NATO Europe as a whole is now spending 2% of GDP on the military.
As for the graph above, note that it doesn’t show the zero line or 2024, so it depicts a much larger proportional difference. The United States spends about 3% of GDP on the military, but that includes the Pacific theater. Notably, Ukraine bottled up the Russian advance in Europe. Meanwhile, Trump suggests military action to acquire the Panama Canal, as well as Greenland from NATO ally Denmark.
Dave Schuler: The Germans have been freeriding on the United States for a long time; they consider it a law of nature.
All NATO members, including the United States, substantially reduced their military spending after the collapse of the Soviet Union. You might argue, in light of Russian belligerence, that military spending should increase.
Two observations. First, the metric should be readiness rather than percentage of GDP. Perhaps what “NATO set” was a guideline for a level of spending which IF MET would allow a country to preserve readiness. Germany has spent below that percent for decades. At this point 2% of GDP is far too low to make up for decades of inadequate spending.
Which brings me to my second observation. A more likely for Germany’s behavior is that it’s not intended to increase their readiness to a sufficient level but performative, a measure intended to convince the U. S. to continue to subsidize German defense.
Dave Schuler: At this point 2% of GDP is far too low to make up for decades of inadequate spending.
Perhaps, but 2% of GDP by 2024 is what the United States and NATO had decided was sufficient. Arguing for additional increases in the light of Russian belligerence is reasonable, but that’s not what you have argued.
Dave Schuler: A more likely for Germany’s behavior is that it’s not intended to increase their readiness to a sufficient level but performative, a measure intended to convince the U. S. to continue to subsidize German defense.
If you mean meeting agreed guidelines, then sure. People and nations try to meet their commitments in order to build trust. That’s why it can be so disheartening when Trump suggests seizing Greenland and the Panama Canal by military means in violation of international law.
The United States spends about 3% of GDP on the military. However, some of that spending is to defend the Pacific theater. The United States is spending about 2% of GDP in the Atlantic theater.
If by “subsidize German defense” you mean countries are stronger in mutual defense and can better resist defeat in detail, then sure.
You are ignoring that Germany did not meet the guidelines for decades. As I’ve said any number of times before. If maintaining your house requires you to spend 2% of the house’s value per year on maintenance, not paying 2% for decades and then suddenly starting to pay that does not mean you have brought your house up to snuff.
Dave Schuler: You are ignoring that Germany did not meet the guidelines for decades.
The guideline set in 2014 was for 2% of GDP by 2024. Germany was more than 2% until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, at which point, all NATO countries decreased spending.