Why we shouldn’t nuke Fallujah

Following the events in Fallujah last week there’s been quite of bit of imprudent talk about what would constitute an appropriate response. Even people who I would have expected to know better have been making rather wild statements. The typical form that such statements take is “Nuke Fallujah”.

As well as I understand the rage behind such statements I absolutely do not agree with them, I don’t think we should even be talking this way, and I’d like to explain the reasons why.

In his seminal work On War Karl Von Clausewitz characterized the components of violent warfare as objectives, strategy, tactics, and logistics. Objectives are the diplomatic and political goals presumably formulated by the civilian leaders. A nation goes to war to achieve objectives. Strategy is the high-level plan formulated by the generals to achieve the objectives. Tactics are the low-level plan formulated by lower-level officers that implement that strategy. Logistics is the aspect of military science dealing with the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military matériel, facilities, and personnel.

A prudent general will formulate no strategy that does not further the objectives and authorize no tactic which does not further the formulated strategy.

If you haven’t read it go take a look at Steven Den Beste’s essential Strategic Overview.

The destruction of Fallujah per se does not further our strategy in the War on Terror. Fortunately, wiser and more experienced heads than I are in control and, based on what we’re seeing, they seem to be doing the right things.

Here’s what I suspect is going on:

1. Movement of the “bad guys” from Fallujah is being interdicted.
2. Attempts are being made to enlist the support of local religious, tribal, and other civilian leaders.
4. The population of Falluajah will be encouraged by loudspeaker and leaflets delivered by drop and by Iraqi security forces to stay put and not to resist the Marine forces that will arrive.
5. The Marines will infiltrate the city.
6. The “bad guys” will be apprehended.

I would also like to see a more general disarming of the population in Fallujah but I have no idea whether this is in the plans or not. At any rate, don’t expect a massed assault of the town. The Marines are very good at their jobs and, although we should expect casualties, very good things may come from what happens in Fallujah over the next few days.

The situation in Najaf is, in my opinion, much more serious and I may write about it later.

Wholesale destruction of Fallujah would have serious repercussions both within Iraq and beyond. It would call into question all of the claims we have made of our reasons for being there and, hence, threaten the strategy.

The second and equally important reason not to destroy Fallujah is that wanton slaughter is not what we are about as a nation. It would make our cause that much less worth fighting for. And it would weaken our morale, which we will dearly need in the long, long conflict ahead.

So these are the reasons not to “Nuke Fallujah”. In the words of Talleyrand, “It would be worse than a crime; it would be a mistake.”