Why Now?

There’s a good article at Foreign Policy by Maria Snegovaya digging into a question that has been brought up in comments here—why did Russia invade Ukraine now:

First, the European Union is divided on Russia. While new EU members in Eastern Europe tend to support stronger action against Russia, the two leading EU powers, Germany and France, are conflicted on the Russia issue. France is distracted by its upcoming presidential elections in April 2022. French President Emmanuel Macron’s continuous insistence on the need for the European Union to pursue its own talks with the Kremlin separately from the United States (as possibly part of his electoral campaign) has raised fears of a deepening split in the West’s response to the Kremlin. Germany, which is anxious to become the European gas hub for Russian gas following the completion of Nord Stream 2, is prepared to make more concessions to the Kremlin, as shown by its recent refusal to give arms permits to Estonia so supplies can reach Ukraine.

Moreover, since April 2021, the Kremlin has undertaken several (likely intentional) steps that reduced Russian gas supplies to Europe and led to the EU’s current unprecedented increase in prices and gas shortages. Europe’s continuous dependency on Russian gas, with about 40 percent of gas imports coming from Russia, further limits its ability to counter Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Second, over the last year, the relative decline in the United States’ international standing has become more apparent, as portrayed by its chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal. According to the Kremlin’s public statements, it viewed this as a demonstration of waning U.S. international influence. The Biden administration’s Russia policy record has so far appeared fairly weak: It lifted sanctions on Nord Stream 2, issued largely symbolic sanctions in response to Russia’s poisoning of dissident Alexey Navalny, and has put continuous emphasis on China and attempted to “park Russia.” Even more importantly, the Kremlin has a window for action until the U.S. midterm elections. The situation might change afterward if Republicans take control of key foreign affairs committees in Congress and increase pressure on the administration over Russia.

Similarly to the EU, the Biden administration may currently be constrained in its ability to impose strong sanctions on Russia in response to a further escalation in Ukraine. Serious sectoral sanctions could risk another spike in oil and metal (copper, nickel, steel, palladium) prices, creating a risk of skyrocketing inflation in the United States or even stagflation. This further shortens Putin’s action window.

Third, while skyrocketing oil and gas prices are constraining the EU and United States, they are giving Putin more leeway. On the international stage, Russia tends to act as a typical petrostate that gets aggressive and ambitious once it accumulates substantive oil and gas revenues. The influx of large revenues allows it to prioritize military expenses instead of addressing social and infrastructure issues.

These considerations explain the timing of Putin’s proposed ultimatum to the West. This window of opportunity is likely to close as the U.S. midterms near. Yet currently, this combination of circumstances offers an ideal moment for Putin to use the EU and United States’ weaknesses to push for more concessions on Ukraine.

Clearly, this was written some time ago—the circumstances have changed somewhat but I think the points she raises still apply. Said another way we should take care to avoid strengthening Russia’s hand rather than weakening it.