The editors of the New York Times get around to asking the question I raised when Russia invaded Ukraine. After lauding the adoption of economic sanctions by the United States and European countries, they point to the historic limitations of economic sanctions:
Sanctions historically have not been particularly effective in changing regimes, and their record at changing dictators’ behavior is mixed at best.
Cuba, Venezuela and North Korea never bowed to American demands. Where there are success stories, they are modest: Crippling sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table over its nuclear program, but that regime never stopped asserting its right to enrich uranium. The bite of sanctions eventually contributed to the end of the white-majority regime in South Africa, but it was just one of many factors.
Or, to understand the limits of sanctions, Americans might consider our own national experience. When Arab nations imposed an oil embargo on the United States in the 1970s, it caused a lot of pain, but it did not cause the United States to stop supporting Israel.
and ask:
All the more reason that the United States should have a clear plan for how and under what circumstances it would be appropriate to roll back these latest sanctions. Right now, this has been left deliberately vague to allow the Ukrainians to directly negotiate with Russia. It is laudable to give deference to Ukrainians whose lives are on the line in this terrible war. But creating clear goals and communicating benchmarks for sanctions relief is an important factor in successful sanctions. Too often, sanctions are left in place for decades, without evaluation of whether or not they are achieving what they were put in place to do.
or, said another way, what is our objective? At Foreign Affairs Richard Haass asks the same question:
Curiously, Western aims in Ukraine have been far less clear. Almost all the debate over what to do has focused on means: on the quantity and quality of military aid to provide the country, on the wisdom of establishing a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace, on the extent of economic sanctions on Russia. Little has been said about what either side would have to concede in order to end the war. Also left unsaid is whether an end to the conflict would need to be formalized in a treaty signed by Russia and Ukraine or simply accepted as a reality.
Answering the question of how this war should end is vital as the struggle with Russia enters a critical moment, with a large battle looming.
I would genuinely like to know what our objectives are with respect to the Russia-Ukraine War. I think it’s obvious we would not be happy with a return to the status quo ante. Do the Western media do not represent the Western diplomatic position at all?
There is absolutely no mystery about US objectives v.v. Russia. They have not changed since the fall of the Soviet Union.
The goal is the destruction of the Russian Federation, including the disassembly of Russia into a large number of small statelets (think Baltics) that can be controlled by Washington and whose resources can be confiscated by Washington.
The US Ruling Class thought they were on the road to confiscating Russian resources and industry under Yeltsin. But Yeltsin, too drunk and sick to rule, was replaced by the nationalist Putin. Consequently, a new plan was needed. The Ukrainian coup d’état is just another way to get control over Russia.
Putin and the Russian elite understand this perfectly, at least now after having it beaten into their skulls. Originally Putin and ALL the other Russian elite wanted Russia to be part of NATO and the EU. The US could not permit that if it hoped to control the Russian land mass, resources, industry and people.
The Ukrainian war is an existential war for Russia, and for Europe, too. Europe is on the wrong side in this conflict, and is working against its own survival.
Because this is an existential war, we have entered the WW I/WW II zone. There is no limit to what Russia will do or attempt to do to win this war, including a Samson option that engulfs the whole world.
US Ruling Class had better sober up real quick, or American cities will burn.
Goals should be fairly limited. We should make Russia pay an economic price for what they are doing. It may not change what Putin is doing now but it could be a factor in his or his successor’s future decision making. We should also work towards making Europe not dependent upon Russian energy. Some isolation would also probably be good. Russia is kind of sucky, hence all of the really rich people try to spend a lot of time outside of Russia. Make that difficult for them so they think twice about supporting similar policies and autocrats.
Steve
The New Republic had an article on what should be the objective.
“Still, the quest for total victory in Ukraine is premised on the belief that defeat is the best deterrent. Having forged NATO unity and a surprising degree of economic sacrifice by the Europeans, Putin should be under no illusions that next time will be easier. The Ukraine war is one of those rare times when the morally right course—forcing Russia to retreat from all of Ukraine—is also the approach that appears to make the most strategic sense.”
Given Crimea is officially part of the Russian Federation it will be interesting what happens if/when Ukrainian troops enter Sevastopol.
By the way, if one looks at the map, one realizes it probably can’t end just at Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders. They are indefensible, Ukraine would need a huge buffer zone around it to be secure (kinda like what Russia wanted in Ukraine, but in reverse).
That sounds like Putin.
The primary objective is to avoid the Ida-Viru question: Will NATO go to war against Russia if it invades and occupies a small parcel of land with a Russian majority and oil resources about a hundred miles from St. Petersburg? Russia is only deterrable by costs calculations, so NATO and its allies should impose as many costs on Russia for the invasion as possible, costs in terms of killing/incapacitating Russian invaders, in contracting the Russian economy, and destroying Russian military equipment/capacities.
Also, need to avoid precipitating the question with risks of direct military engagement like no-fly-zones. Ukrainians need to be willing to fight and Europeans need to be willing to face probable recession this year as their economies are more entwined with Russia and will receive economic blowback.
I also think the NYTimes is not appreciating the unprecedented scale of the economic pain being inflicted on Russia. The study below projects Russian GDP will contract by -12.5% to -16.5% in 2022, comparable to the peak of the Russian crisis in the early 90s. That’s just from financial sanctions alone and does not include supply-side effects from technology bans and broken supply chains.
https://voxeu.org/article/macroeconomic-effects-2022-sanctions-russia
“NYTimes is not appreciating the unprecedented scale of the economic pain being inflicted on Russia”
On the other hand; Ukraine is projected to have lost 50% of GDP + suffered $600 billion in damage to infrastructure so far. Their government needs $7 billion/month from NATO to sustain itself, never mind supporting its population or to fight the war.
And going further, is the US ready for a recession? The US is less intertwined with Russia then the EU; but a recession in Europe, Japan combined with high inflation and supply chain disruption is a recipe for a hard landing. And this time, the Federal Government and the Federal Reserve won’t be able to shower the economy with stimulus or easy money.
Sometimes indirect involvement in a war to hurt a geopolitical rival can still be ruinous to a nations health… there’s even an example in American history.
Given what is going on in China is recession now avoidable anyway? Daughter is delaying moving to China by a month because of the issues there, especially difficulties obtaining food.
Steve