The Daily Demarche has recently produced a couple of speculative pieces wondering what if the United States had not invade Iraq in 2003. You can read these pieces here and here. Marc Schulman of American Future has recently contributed his own speculation so I thought I’d join the fun and do some wild-eyed imagining myself.
Since I think that you can’t reasonably suppose that we would not have invaded Iraq without some reason I’m going to further assume that President Bush had decided to do exactly what some of his pro-War on Terror domestic critics have suggested: commit the forces to Afghanistan in 2001 that he’d committed to Iraq in 2003. I’m not much of a fiction writer but I think I’ll try and put this into something resembling narrative. Imagine a February 1, 2005 that will never happen now.
President Howard Dean looked out the window of the Oval House. It had been a terrible and momentous several years—one he’d never imagined when he’d been governor of Vermont.
Following the tragedy of September 11, 2001 President Bush had taken the advice of Secretary of State Colin Powell and assembled a large invasion force in anticipation of a massive attack on Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The remoteness and inaccessibility of Afghanistan meant that deals had been cut with General Musharraff in Pakistan, President Rahmonov in Tajikistan, and President Karimov in Uzbekistan. How could Bush have dealt with such thugs?
Large bases had been constructed in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and overflight rights secured from Pakistan while the necessary force levels were achieved. Neither the Russians, the Chinese, nor the Indians had been at all pleased with the enormous U. S. military presence on their very borders.
Afghanistan had been not a target-rich environment for the use of America’s air power. The burden had necessarily been borne by the Army. When the invasion began in the spring of 2002, the Afghans had responded to the invasion as they had to the British and Soviets before them—with unity and incredible ferocity. The contributions and volunteers that had poured in from all over the Muslim world to aid the valiant Afghans against the “Crusader invaders” had ensured that the Afghans had plenty of troops and munitions to continue the struggle.
Frequent incursions across the Pakistani border by both American forces in pursuit of Taliban forces had fueled unrest among Pakistani Islamic fundamentalists which Musharraff had been forced to put down severely. Following his assassination in 2003 the country had descended into chaos. When the major U. S. base in Uzbekistan had been destroyed with a Pakistani nuclear weapon transferred by Pakistani fundamentalists to the Taliban, more than 50,000 Americans had been killed.
Yes, it had been a horrific several years, mused President Dean. He’d been prudent to oppose the “Afghan quagmire” from the outset and, following the Uzbekistan disaster, he’d easily strode to victory on a platform of bringing the troops home. There were challenges ahead. Relations with Russia, China, and India were in tatters. The EU was infuriated at the level of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. A now-nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein, the proud recipient of nuclear technology from A. Q. Khan, had thrown the UN inspectors out and demanded the removal of sanctions. They’d been removed. He now had effective control of the passage of oil through the Gulf.
Challenges ahead, indeed. But with the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate and his long, long coattails moving his agenda forward should be no problem. At least there’d be universal health care.
If we had repeated the mistakes of the Brits and the Russians, it probably would have turned out the way you’ve described it. A question, though: would the French have been with us?
Let’s both keep an eye (no pun intended) for other responses to Dr. D and let each other know.
The two “British” punitive invasions of Afghanistan were actually by the East India Company and were to punish Afghans for attacks on the East India Company. Both invasions were before 1857.
What the East India Company and after them the British learned from their failed punitive efforts against the Afghan was that it was a big area and the Afghans loved to fight.
The East India Company and after them the British Raj were very concerned about Russia expanding south into Afghanistan, but the Russians stopped near what is now the northern border of Afghanistan after expanding south about 1,000 miles in 200 years. This Russian vs. British issue was called the Great Game. And there is a very interesting book by the same name, The Great Game about the history of the East India Company/British vs. Russians in this area.
Thanks for the clarification, Peter. I’ve heard about the book you mention but haven’t read it (yet).
Great exercise! Reading “The Glittering Eye” piece I was struck by the possible appearance of an entirely new form of literature, “reality based”, on just such exercises, and of course, dependent on this medium for timliness and development.
Remember the old “Analog” science fiction magazines? Didn’t it (or one of its contemporaries) offer a theme and have several respected Sci-Fi authors such as Heinlein, Azimov, etc. contribute their interpretations?
The Glittering Eye piece had me feel like I was reading a well-written novel as it was being written… (hmm, “NewMeidaLit”?)
(cross-posted comment at Daily Demarche)
pkok:
Not only do I remember Analog but my subscription to Analog is alive and well and I’ve got a copy of every issue ever printed sitting in my basement.
And thanks very much for the kind words.