I just read a very encouraging post about the protests in Iran by Iranian journalist Roohola Ramezani at Persuasion. Here’s a telling snippet, its conclusion:
Iranians want neither a better version of the Islamic Republic nor a utopian revolution. They want the extraordinary era of Iranian history to end. They want to return to being a normal nation state that prioritizes its borders over ideological “frontiers,” its citizens over “martyrs,” and its future over seventh-century grievances.
A fierce, secular realism is emerging. The protest movement is redefining Iranian identity not through the lens of a “Global South” struggle against the West, but as a struggle to rejoin the West’s political and economic orbit. It’s a movement that does not fit neatly into the categories of anti-imperialism or identity politics; but it is, nevertheless, perhaps the most authentic democratic project of our time.
My problem with it is that I don’t see an evidentiary basis for that level of specificity. Quite to the contrary another alternative is that Iranians are reacting to the incompetence of the mullahocracy. What Iranians want in aggregate or whether they have common goals other than escape from their present misery I have no idea.
I have little doubt that some Iranians want precisely what the author suggests. Whether that’s all Iranians, a majority, or just a few I have no idea and I see no indication that anyone has the data required to make that determination. Shared opposition to a regime does not, by itself, imply shared agreement on what should replace it. The historical record suggests that one faction will succeed in applying its own preferred solution and that faction will not necessarily be the most numerous or even the most popular one.
Here’s my question. How would we arrive at an empirically-based understanding of what Iranians want right now? That’s not a rhetorical question. I genuinely want to know because I think that policies should be based on facts not wishful thinking, however heartfelt.
I’ll trust claims about national political aims only when they’re supported by (1) survey evidence with methods described, plus (2) at least one independent corroborating stream. That could be behavioral indicators, slogan analysis, turnout or legitimacy signals, or multiple polling efforts. Otherwise, I will treat them as hopeful interpretation.
There has always been a core of people living in their urban areas that favored a more secular life and government. The religious fanatics live in rural areas. (Sounds familiar.) I think the rural fanatics are probably not bothered that much about killing the “liberals” who live in the cities. I think we only see a change in response from the government if they think that a large enough percentage of the middle of the roaders are committing to fight for change.
Steve
The popular power base of the mullahocracy has always been the rural and urban poor. The critical question is what they want beyond being able to eat (which is their immediate problem right now).
Another challenge is that most of Iran’s population wasn’t alive when the Shah governed. While his son may be a rallying point I’m skeptical he will prove a viable anchor for a new government.