So far I have searched in vain for informed, unbiased comment on the prudence of the United States’s suspension of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, annnounced by Sec. of States Pompeo and remarked on by me yesterday. I will continue to look.
The best argument I have seen to date for remaining in the treaty has been that remaining in the treaty provides the United States with a legal basis for sanctions. That is untrue. No such sanctions are authorized in the treaty. It provides no legal basis. It might be argued that it provides a moral basis but I don’t think it does that any more than anything else offensive we might deem Russia to have done.
The full text of the treaty is here. I’m not an expert but my reading of the plain language of the treaty suggests to me that the Russians are not in compliance for reasons many others have mentioned. However, it also suggests that the Russians are right as well: our use of armed drones, something we have done for well over a decade, is a violation of the treaty as well.
It is a rule of thumb in negotiation theory that when the parties to a treaty are unequal in strength and the weaker of the two parties is in violation, the treaty should be reconsidered.
International treaties are means not ends. I believe that we should conform faithfully to the terms of treaties to which we are party. That’s why I believe that we should enter into treaties much more deliberately and sparingly than we do.
I am not yet persuaded that the Trump Administration has acted prudently in suspending the INF. I will continue to consider the matter. The question I would ask of readers is, when both parties disregard a treaty, what good is it? To whatever extent is a signal of intentions it has become a signal of the wrong intentions.
It’s been 15 years since I followed nuclear stuff with any fidelity. I don’t have a decent link to give you, but this one from Lawfare from last October is a good backgrounder.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-withdrawal-inf-treaty-facts-and-law
My own thoughts:
– I think it’s important to emphasize this treaty is and was all about Europe and European security. It is, after all, European cities that would be under threat from INF-class weapons. Europe, therefore has the “skin in the game” on this, while the US does not. This is an action, then, where the US makes the decision, but all the consequences and risks fall on Europe.
– For their part, the Europeans (except Poland which would love to have them and have publically said so) pre-announced last year that they wouldn’t allow the reintroduction of INF weapons regardless. Many have reiterated that in the past couple of days. So from Russia’s perspective – what’s to lose? Either way, Russia gets to rebuild an INF arsenal and there is unlikely to be any reciprocity from Europe. To me, the big question is why the Europeans are so reluctant to go to bat to save this treaty or come up with some alternative. They’ve had a lot of time to at least get something started.
– Russia’s claims about US violations are without merit. After all, Russia has armed drones too. Russia’s also mentioned US missie defenses, which are based on the AEGIS system – the ship-based system has the ability to launch cruise missiles, the shore-based system does not. And under the INF, Russia as the right to address their concerns about these two systems that they have not exercised. Additionally, Russia is not saying that it is violating the treaty and pursuing a new cruise missile because of supposed US violations – it’s denying completely that it’s violating the treaty and instead is saying it’s the US. This is classic Russian misinformation/deception.
– We’ve known about Russian violations for a decade. I’m not aware of all our responses, but I’m not sure what else there is that would convince the Russians to comply. During the Cold War a key element in convincing the Russians was our deployment of INF cruise and ballistic missiles to Europe. That gave us something to trade. That option certainly looks to be off the table now – what else is there that could compel/convince Russia to abide by the terms? I can’t think of anything.
– I think there is a good argument either way about the timing for the withdrawal as well as the efficacy of the US withdrawing altogether. It seems to me that more could be done to show and educate the world about Russia’s violations which would, at least, transfer more responsibility onto Russia. As it stands, the US is likely to take a lot of the blame which the Russians can use effectively on the international stage.
-Reading through some of the criticisms by the usual suspects, one thing is clear. The internationalists/globalists cannot deny Russia’s violations, but instead, they see this move as another unraveling string that ties America to Europe specifically and the global world order generally.
– I don’t think this will start a new arms race, despite protestations by some experts. For one thing, INF-class weapons do nothing for the United States unless they can be deployed to another country – and every country that I know of doesn’t want such a deployment except for Poland. Secondly, in an age of stealth and PGM technology, ground-based weapons, especially at fixed sites, are extremely vulnerable. Sea-based weapons (which are excluded from the INF) are a much more survivable platform and therefore a better deterrent (and the storage/security concerns are also much less.). They’re also a much better option in the Pacific against China rather than putting them on a tiny island like Guam.
So overall I think the demise of the INF is/was inevitable. The Russians don’t want it, the Europeans don’t want it enough to really fight for it, and the US cannot continue to support a treaty as long as those two factors remain in place.
But even though this move was projected ahead of time, there doesn’t seem to be any specific reason to do it now instead of waiting to see if any strategic advantage could still be extracted from the present situation. The timing, IMO, isn’t about the merits but the selection of John Bolton as NSA and pretty clearly he’s the driving force in the administration for withdrawal.
To me the big question is, if the European are as totally dependent on us as seems to be the case, why don’t they act like it? The only conclusion I can draw is that they genuinely believe that Russia is constrained by the rule of law, something that anyone at all familiar with Russian history or present will tell you is not the case.
Also, just because the other guy is out of compliance does not mean you’re not out of compliance, too. That’s just an excuse.
That’s the way I’m leaning, too. The question that dare not speak its name is was the Obama Administration derelict? It seems to me there’s a growing case it was.
I can’t say the Obama administration was derelict without coming up with some alternative action they could or should have taken. And I can’t come up with anything they could reasonably have done that would avoid where we are now.
Europe isn’t dependent on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence. The French maintain sufficient nuclear forces virtually immune to first strike.
Does not seem like that important of a treaty for us, and dont see much of a way to really enforce it if Russia doesn’t want to comply.
Steve