Let’s consider some potential outcomes (or lack thereof) in Ukraine:
- Ukraine wins outright between now and November 5, 2024 (ED)
- Ukraine loses outright between now and ED
- The war continues to drag on past ED
Here are my questions:
- Which is best politically for Joe Biden?
- Which is worst politically for Joe Biden?
- Which is best for the United States?
I don’t think there’s any question that Ukraine winning outright sooner rather than later is better for Ukraine while Ukraine losing outright sooner rather than later is best for Russia.
Would many people doubt that Ukraine winning outright before ED would be the best political outcome for Joe Biden?
Would Ukraine losing outright before ED be better or worse for Joe Biden politically than the war continuing to drag on?
I think that what’s in the best interest of the United States depends on what you think those interests are. If you think the U. S. interest in the war in Ukraine is degrading Russia, wouldn’t the war continuing to drag on be most in the U. S. interest?
I think C is the most likely at this point, but I’d add a D to account for some kind of ceasefire, pause before war continuation.
For your questions, I don’t think it matters much for 1 or 2. Americans don’t care about foreign policy much.
For #3, it depends on the goal, but I think the US should favor stability, which ideally would mean an end to the conflict that both sides agree to and permanent peace.
I think C is the most likely as well.
The reason I think that C could be tough for Biden is that he would continually be getting questions about spending billions on a war in Ukraine.
War is a negative sum game, but if its short enough it can approximate a zero sum game. The longer it goes on, the more likely every participant would be better off if the war never happened.
“If you think the U. S. interest in the war in Ukraine is degrading Russia, wouldn’t the war continuing to drag on be most in the U. S. interest?”
Only if its not degrading the US; US soldier aren’t dying, but a lot of “nest eggs” and “rainy day contingencies” are being used up. Also, if a nuclear exchange ever happens, having the war fester will be an important contributor.
Considering how slowly the Russians are advancing, “C†is the most likely outcome. Unless the war escalates into a major, nuclear European war, Russia will eventually impose some sort of settlement, part of which will be regime change in Kiev, one of Russia’s stated goals.
The risk of a general war due to some NATO stupidity, like F-16’s or Polish troops in Galicia, is so great that the best outcome for the US, NATO, and the idiot Poles is withdrawal of American support from the Kiev regime.
Of course, this would result in yet another embarrassment of the Saigon/Kabul kind, so the most likely course is for the US to stumble along doing various ineffective things in support of Kiev and thoroughly enraging the Russians. We can only hope thar God does take care of drunks and Americans.
My sense is that many of those who consider degrading Russia a key U. S. interest discount the possibility of a nuclear exchange.
This is really a continuation war from 2014. I think the most likely outcome is another ceasefire that satisfies no one and another continuation war after that, but that’s a low-confidence assessment given the uncertainties. At this point, I don’t think either side has the combat power for decisive gains. The upcoming Ukrainian offensive is the best chance they’ll get for a while.
As long as Ukraine doesn’t take Russian territory and doesn’t take Crimea back, I think the chances of a nuclear escalation are low. Estimating Russian red lines is difficult, but I would draw them at Russian territory, attempts at regime change, and Crimea.
C is most likely. It’s best for us if there is no war. I could see a cease fire of some sort but with Russia starting back up again in a couple years though more likely war just drags on for a while.
Steve
I think the probability of the war continuing past election day is so high, that the other outcomes would present novel fact situations that would be pretty unpredictable in their own right. I don’t think a long war is without cost to the U.S. and allies, so I don’t think “dragging on” is in the best interest of the U.S. unless it’s dragged on economically and without need for Russian cooperation on other matters.
Mearsheiner did a blogging heads show this week with Robert Wright that was interesting. After the invasion, I don’t think I saw any extended interviews with him; he was pretty vilified for a prediction about Russia. I think his views on China are more interesting: the U.S. should defend Taiwan, ally with Russia against China, China could form a military alliance with Mexico or Canada, and it’s in America’s interest to confine China to its region, create security issues for it in its region and prevent it from becoming a global power.
https://bloggingheads.tv/videos/66062
“ally with Russia against China”
A very unrealistic idea; Russians, even after Putin, aren’t going to forget the blood and hatred caused by the Ukraine War overnight. Its going to take a generation, a rough analogy is the amount of time it took the Korea War to Nixon going to China.
As for the rest, “create security issues for China” in its near abroad sounds great in theory but in practice could mean inciting and being sucked into a great power war; which then goes to my first comment; wars easily turn into negative sum games.