I don’t know whether this Wall Street Journal column by Walter Russell Mead is equally a free flight of fancy, either. I don’t know what the Iranian mullahs are thinking. I doubt that Dr. Mead does, either.
His thesis is that Iran has been trying to halt the rapprochement between Israel and its neighbors going on for the last few years and has miscalculated:
We don’t yet know how closely Iran was involved in the planning and timing of last month’s attacks, but it’s clearer what the mullahs hoped the attacks would accomplish. At one level, Iran wanted to remind everyone how savage and powerful the country and its proxies have become. Terror serves Iranian state interests.
Beyond that, Tehran hoped to disrupt the emerging anti-Iran bloc in the Middle East. The idea was that Hamas’s dramatic attacks would electrify public opinion in the region against Israel, the U.S. and the Arab rulers willing to work with them. This, Tehran hoped, would drive a wedge between the Arabs and Israelis as Arab rulers sought to placate their angry publics by abandoning any plans to work closely with Israel.
So far, this plan has failed. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have all signaled that they intend, once the storm has passed, to go on working with Jerusalem for a safer, more stable Middle East. Worse from Iran’s point of view, the Arabs are committing to a revived form of Palestinian governance that can exclude Iran’s proxies from both the West Bank and Gaza.
I find it incredible that the Iranians should make such an error. The Iranians are Shi’ites; the Gulf Arabs are predominantly Sunni. The Sunni-Shi’a schism goes back to the earliest days of Islam.
Clearly, Hamas will accept money from anyone willing to fund their cause. That doesn’t mean they are becoming Shi’ites. It means they aren’t particularly scrupulous.
Iran has been trying to impose its will on its neighbors for three millennia (at least). Support of Hamas, Hezbollah, and other revolutionary groups are merely today’s version of that.
And Iran isn’t the only Middle Eastern country vying for influence within the greater world of Islam—for the Saud family retaining such influence is a matter of survival. They maintain that influence through control of the Muslim holy places. None of this is a secret from the rulers of Iran and I doubt they think they can unseat the Sauds from their present position. On the contrary I think their goal is more likely to maintain the tension.
If that’s Iran’s goal, it looks like they’re succeeding to me.
Still think it unlikely Iran had a lot of direct involvement in 10/7. I think that either our or Israle’s intel would have picked up on it. They probably did what they could to have Hamas armed but it was a target of opportunity with Israel not having troops in the area.
Steve
“it was a target of opportunity with Israel not having troops in the area.”
While this is definitely an area Israelis are looking at. The issue is harder then it looks.
For one, as I keep repeating. Hamas sent an estimated 3000 fighters (the Israelis military upwardly revised that figure recently). That’s a whole brigade which attacked along a 50km front.
The second was many of the communities attacked are less than a couple of kilometers from the border. With Gaza itself reaching almost to the border, there is very little space or time to conduct defensive operations. As a comparison, in Ukraine, soldiers are usually several kilometers behind the “contact” line. Only behind those kilometers is it expected that territory is firmly secure for one side.
Third is Hamas had good intelligence on Israelis weaknesses. Hamas knew the weaknesses of the border barrier, they knew the location and layouts of the military bases and civilian security forces, and made an aggressive and successful attack to disable those in the initial wave.
Also, a goal to kill soldiers and civilians without regard to the cost to your own soldiers instead of strategic military goals flips the usual advantage of defense on its head.
More troop won’t change a severe intelligence deficit; or that its hard to defend civilians so close to so many hostile forces.
If you are going to build that close to a terrorist organization dedicating to kill you then you have to have adequate numbers of troops available. It’s pretty clear now that troops had been pulled to the West Bank. There were no contingency pans made to get troops back so it took many hours to get troops into the area to respond. It’s pretty well reported now that Israel had even stopped eavesdropping on radio communications within Gaza. They had convinced themselves that the organization with the charter saying they want to kill Israel wasn’t going to try to kill people, at least not at any scale. (Urban warfare is tough. A bunch of guys on motorcycles and paraglider are sitting ducks if you have trained troops waiting for them. Given that it was the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, how could they have not been prepared?)
I think there is already pretty good evidence that this was because they were very focused on expanding into the West Bank. It is my assumption they also had no intel, neither did we, from Iranian sources about an attack. I think that suggests Iran really didnt have much direct influence on this attack. Wouldn’t you have expected more coordination with Hezbollah?
Steve
“If you are going to build that close to a terrorist organization”
Some realities. The width of Israel between Gaza and West Bank is 35km.
“There were no contingency pans made to get troops back so it took many hours to get troops into the area to respond”
From the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/27/hamas-attack-israel-october-7-hostages/) — “In a simultaneous wave of attacks on at least seven military posts across the border, Hamas sought to systematically disable key detection, communications and warning systems, using snipers and commercial drones armed with explosives…. and the militants took out communication networks so efficiently that the area became a blind spot for the military.”
The Israelis response was slow because Hamas successfully interrupted the Israelis OODA loop. Remember, the West Bank is only 35km from the Gaza Strip — troops stationed in the West Bank can get to the Gaza Strip in 30 mins. They took the better part of the day because OODA loop was broken.
The problem is 30 mins is still far too long when Hamas only needs to travel 1km to cause havoc.
Israel on defense is a hard problem. Israelis pre-1967 didn’t even think it was realistic. Their military doctrine was to go all out on offense and preemptively strike their opponents.
Would more troops help, yes. But have realistic expectations. Instead of 1400 people dead and 240 hostages, we’re talking 500 dead and 50 hostages.
Would Hamas have launched the attack if they could only kill 500 instead of 1400? Your guess is as good as mine.
Well there you have it. Its all Israels fault. Package it and have Uncle Joe sell it, steve.
7 sites? Seriously? The Israelis were depending upon their wall, really a fence in many places, and had automatic systems in place. They took out those, I agree. But as I have noted before I have climbed walls (and fences). It’s not that hard, they only serve to slow people down. What matters is the people you have stationed behind the walls. Those troops had been pulled to the West Bank to protect the settlement surge. If the troops had been there the guys on motorcycles would have been exposed targets.
Hamas may have destroyed some designated communication centers but every soldier has a cellphone. The attacks would have been known about within a couple of minutes. If there had been contingency plans, it’s what militaries do, there would have been a quick response even if the com centers at the fence and gates were down. People would have known what to do and transport would have been initiated.
Then there is the intel failure. The Israelis have admitted that they stopped eavesdropping on communication in Gaza. So increased activity was reported to Israeli leadership but they discounted it as an attempt to undercut the settlements. On the one week when they should have most expected an attack, the 50th anniversary of the last surprise Hamas attack, they neither had troops in place nor had contingency plans. Hamas was launching rockets back in May so it’s not like Hamas had suddenly given an indication they would never attack Israel.
So, Hamas is evil. Let’s hope they all get killed. It’s OK to kill a bunch of civilians going after them. But, it was an epic failure on the part of Israel and never should have happened.
” But have realistic expectations.” Israel has a trained, well funded military and a full range of modern military tech. Hamas has what amounts to militia, guys on motorcycles. Our expectations should be that Israel would have adequate troops in the area should Hamas attempt a breakthrough and there should be contingency plans if back up is needed. With those plans in place they wouldn’t be stymied by having one or two com centers offline. Hamas met no resistance crossing the fences. Since they haven’t really shown themselves to all be intent on mass suicide I think expectations should have been that few made it past the fence once they met resistance. Once out into the neighborhoods it breaks down to urban warfare and the Israeli advantage weakens.
Steve