I was very disappointed by Andrew Korybko’s post at Asia Times, “How Trump can break China’s tightening grip on Central Asia”. In the piece, Mr. Korybko successfully made a case for why the U. S. should want to “break China’s tightening grip, etc.” but IMO fell short of explaining how that could be accomplished. Here’s the tactics he proposes:
Rescinding certain sanctions, extending waivers to European companies or declining to threaten secondary sanctions in response to violations – any or all of which could be part of a package deal with Russia on Ukraine – could bring greater economic clarity about Central Asia’s actual present trade.
That’s imperative to better understand the EU’s competitive advantages there vis-a-vis China, which could then be more effectively leveraged.
The second tough choice concerns the continued granting of sanctions waivers to India for its trade with Afghanistan (and presumably also Central Asia) via Iran’s Chabahar port.
That’s it.
I’m afraid Mr. Korybko needs to connect the dots for me. I don’t see a straightline connection between the means and the ends.
I do, however, see why the U. S. would not be particularly interested in taking the actions he proposes. Contrary to Mr. Korybko I think what is emerging is a multipolar, “spheres of influence” global order and not only is there not a great deal we can to to forestall it much of what we’ve done over the last decade or so has encouraged it. And Central Asia, as Mr. Korbyko documents sufficiently and as should be obvious from a glance at the map, is not in the U. S. sphere of influence.
