I’ve mentioned this before but it bears mentioning again. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia goes back to the 1950s and it was part of what was referred to as the “Twin Pillars” strategy. We had close relationships with two Middle Eastern countries: Iran and Saudi Arabia, one Shi’ite and one Sunni. The idea was that between them we could maintain a shaky balance in the Middle East. That was long before we had become Israel’s primary patron or were importing the volumes of oil from the Saudis that we later did. Keep in mind that the Soviets had already cultivated cozy relationships with the two largest Arab countries: Egypt and Iraq.
Of course the “Twin Pillars” strategy collapsed when the Shah was driven from power. Why then have we maintained the supine posture with respect to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that we have? I think it has to do with presidential politics and psychology. No amount of failure can cause a president to abandon a bad policy because no president wants to be criticized for it. It’s why we still have troops in Afghanistan, why we still rubberstamp so much of what the Germans want to do, and why we tolerate the demilitarization of our NATO allies.
It always goes back to what are the alternatives.
Anyone else from the House of Saud might be an improvement; but more likely to be corrupt and dependent on extremist clerics.
The downfall of the House of Saud is also fraught; there are no George Washington’s in the wings – more likely a civil war and a Iraq/Afghanistan outcome. The dissipeared journalist was a supporter of Muslim Brotherhood.
I think a prerequisite to any balancing strategy is Iran coming to some mode of understanding with either the Israelis or the Saudis.
That’s not to say I support MBS, I think his impulsiveness is likely to bring down the House of Saud then it is to sustain its rule.
I am saying it’s not easy to work on different policy approaches knowing the consequences.