In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal Samir Puri, who is not without “on the ground” expertise, outlines the contours of a prospective Russian “victory” in Ukraine:
Either Russia will “butcher and bolt†by withdrawing on terms at least partly favorable to some Russian objectives, or its forces will remain and bisect a greater portion of Ukraine.
“Butcher and bolt†is a 19th-century phrase for a punitive expedition that wreaks havoc on disobedient imperial subjects after which the aggressor withdraws. Russian forces have demolished cities and shattered many Ukrainians’ lives. The city of Mariupol, where local officials say 5,000 Ukrainians have died, has suffered the sort of devastation once meted out by Russia’s air force in Syria. The Ukrainians may seek reparations if there is discussion of withdrawing Russian forces, but the toll on the country already is huge.
Russian forces are more likely to try to remain in parts of Ukraine. Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukrainian military intelligence, said Russia wants to “create North, South Korea.†But South Korea retains huge U.S. military garrisons to deter future land grabs. A comparable scenario is unlikely here unless the U.S. sends major troop deployments to western Ukraine.
Divided Cyprus offers another analogy. Since Turkey invaded in 1974, Ankara has sustained the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus†and Turkish forces are based there despite low levels of diplomatic recognition. That didn’t stop the Republic of Cyprus from joining the European Union in 2004. The division has evolved into a feature on Europe’s political map.
Russia may try to secure a stretch of land from the Donbas to Crimea even if it faces insurgency later on. Ukraine will never willfully give up its territory, but barring an unforeseen escalation that brings other countries into the fight, a total Russian rout looks unlikely. Even if Ukraine dislodges Russian forces from the 2022 territorial gains, evicting Russia from the 2014 gains will be almost impossible.
This is a bleak prognosis for Ukraine, which is no stranger to division. Its lands were bisected by Austria-Hungary in the west and Russia in the east until both empires collapsed in World War I. Mr. Putin is bent on securing something from his military misadventure. Whether he can depends on his awareness of the shrinking reality of what Russia’s invasion force can achieve.
Bleak prognosis, indeed. The quotation marks around “victory” are not scare quotes but because that’s Mr. Puri’s concept of the “golden bridge” that President Putin may accept instead of his original stated objectives.
I’ve always thought an destroy and retreat without a negotiated resolution was the most likely outcome. There seems to be too much distrust on both sides for anything more. Puri’s article would have been better if mentioned several frozen conflicts that Russia is already involved in (Transnistria, Artsakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia). I don’t think Russia values international recognition of territorial disputes even though these have value to the non-criminal residents in frozen territories. Crimea’s non-governmental sector, particularly tourism, withered since Russian annexation.
But mainly creating facts on the ground, destroying a lot of things and then withdrawing to whatever defensible borders may exist would probably be a better outcome from Russia than anything that could probably be negotiated reliably.
That was pretty much Mearsheimer’s prediction.