In his column in the Washington Post summarizing how U. S. policy has failed in Syria, David Ignatius remarks:
In the annals of covert warfare, the CIA’s support for the Syrian opposition deserves a special, dark chapter. The effort began late — nearly two years into the war — after extremists had already begun to dominate the fight against President Bashar al-Assad. It was a hodgepodge of regional states and their pet fighters — nominally coordinated from operations centers in Jordan and Turkey but in reality controlled by more than 80 local militias whose commanders were often corrupt and proto-jihadists themselves.
The CIA and its partners were never willing to give the opposition the weapons — especially the shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles — that could have won the battle. The agency did provide anti-tank weapons that were potent enough that Assad was rocked in the summer of 2015, and analysts began to worry about “catastrophic success,†with the regime collapsing and jihadists filling a power vacuum in Damascus. Soon after that, Russia intervened.
The CIA’s biggest problem was that its allies couldn’t stop the dominance of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra. The “vetted†opposition groups might pretend otherwise, but they were fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, which rebranded itself this year as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. The extremists attracted the other opposition groups for a simple reason: Their fighters were the most willing to die for the cause.
U. S. policy in the conflict has been to oppose the Assad regime and support the rebels against him with money, equipment, training, and U. S. advisors.
What should U. S. policy with respect to Syria have been?
- Butt out.
- Publicly, butt out. Privately, discourage our allies in the region from helping the rebels and maintain negative reciprocity with the Russians.
- Support the Assad regime against the rebels.
- U. S. policy in the Syrian conflict has been perfect in every way.
- Do everything we’ve done plus establish a “no-fly” zone.
- Do more of everything we’ve done.
- Do more of everything we’ve done plus establish a “no-fly” zone.
- Full scale direct military intervention.
I am inclined to (B) with (A) my second preference and (C) a distant third. I believe that Mr. Ignatius’s preference was (G). Or maybe (H).
Everything short of ‘H’ was likely to bring us to something like where we are. I get really tired of people pretending that there was some easy answer here and we could have saved everyone if only. . .
Syria is to unintended consequences what the North Pole is to Christmas presents. If Putin wants Syria we can put a bow on it. Maybe it will work out for him, but I doubt it. I suppose one of the up-sides of Trump reducing our status in the world is that terrorists may be less excited about attacking us and may focus on Russia as the more important target.
After all our Fuck ups in the region, especially Libya, B and then A were the only correct options.
A mixture of A, B and C.
1. Arm the Kurds (the Kurds in Iraq have been much better allies than the Turks have been recently, and I am willing to extend that goodwill to the Kurds in Syria). This makes it much harder for ISIS to get north into Turkey (and, if the Turks want to make their border less porous, we can talk about modifying #1)
2. When we have an ISIS target that we can hit, do so. Why wouldn’t we take the opportunity?
3. Don’t support Assad, but don’t actually oppose him either.
Our possible outcomes in Syria are: Assad, ISIS or continued civil war. A weakened Assad in control is the least worst option, both for us and the people in Syria.
I think that’s a very fair criticism of Ignatius.
C
I- Do the minimum necessary to keep the interventionists minimally happy.
Steve
Maybe US policy has achieved what the US government intended. Syria’s pretty well wiped out as a future “leading state” in the Middle East, to the likely benefit of Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, etc. A couple hundred thousand militant Moslem jihaddis have gotten themselves wiped out while discrediting their cause. And in the aftermath, most people in the Middle East are going to end up disliking Russians as much as they do us.
It’s been a bit rough on ordinary Syrians, I agree, but aside from that what’s not to like?
mike shupp: I will admit to not having hard data to back this up*, but I don’t think those ordinary Syrians remain ordinary. They are radicalized pretty quickly when bombs begin falling on their homes, and they learn new hatreds than can never be unlearned.
So, that’s what’s not to like. We trade a few years of relative self-containment for a few decades of nut jobs wandering out of there and causing hell.
(*I suspect there is hard data on this, I just don’t happen to know it because I have my own preconceived notions. I would be delighted to learn that I am wrong and that people who grow up being shelled and having family members killed grow up to be well balanced people who embrace others with open arms…)
Gustopher — You’re probably right, but I think you’re using too much empathy to be a policy maker in the US government.
Other hand, you’ve picked the best reason yet why Trump and other “practical” conservatives are so determined on keeping Middle East refugees out of the US!