If you want to read something cheery, this article at Financial Times on the risk of miscalculation by one or more of the parties in the “North Korean crisis” by Gideon Rachman should do the trick:
The risk that Mr Kim is miscalculating, by potentially provoking an American attack, is raised by the unpredictability of Mr Trump. He has vowed that North Korea will not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons that can threaten the US. He has also repeatedly suggested that he is prepared to stage a pre-emptive military strike, at one point threatening Mr Kim with “fire and furyâ€. But the US president’s efforts to use brinkmanship to force North Korea to back down are undermined by doubts about the credibility of his threats. Steve Bannon, formerly the president’s chief strategist, has stated that the US cannot attack North Korea because of the risk of massive retaliation against South Korea that could kill millions.
Mr Trump’s reaction to the latest and most powerful North Korean nuclear test has increased the dangerous confusion about US policy. Rather than stressing American unity with South Korea, the president chose to criticise Seoul for its “appeasement†of Pyongyang. This, combined with the news that Mr Trump is actively considering scrapping the US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, risks encouraging North Korea to believe its nuclear provocations are working, by splitting the alliance between Seoul and Washington.
The president has also damaged US credibility, at a crucial moment, by tweeting that America is considering “stopping all trade with any country doing business with North Koreaâ€. Read literally, this would involve ending trade between the US and China, the two largest economies in the world; an action that would throw the global economy into chaos. Mr Trump’s threat underlines his naivety about both trade and international relations. It also suggests the president remains buffeted by competing instincts, with his instinctive protectionism potentially overriding his desire to combat the North Korean nuclear threat.
The confusing signals from the White House increase the dangers of miscalculation, not just in Pyongyang, but in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo. With the North Korean threat mounting, the normal reaction for South Korea would be to move in lockstep with its American protector. But if the government of Moon Jae-in concludes the biggest danger is not that North Korea will attack but that Mr Trump will stage a pre-emptive strike, then the South’s incentives change. At that point, it might become rational to break publicly with Washington.
The Chinese government faces a similarly complex set of calculations. Mr Trump has repeatedly tried to persuade Beijing to exert more economic pressure on North Korea, threatening that the US will take unilateral military action if China fails to force Mr Kim into line. China has sought to placate Mr Trump by toughening sanctions on Pyongyang. But the Chinese also have to consider how Mr Kim might react if he is forced into a corner. The risk that the North Korean leader will use nuclear weapons first will surely rise if he is faced with the prospect of the collapse of his own regime — and his own certain death.
I don’t really have a great deal to add other than to point out failing to act decisively in the event of an attack by North Korea on the U. S., its interests, or its allies would be a miscalculation as well.
