In an op-ed in the Washington Post Korean history prof Andrei Lankov makes a saddening claim to the effect that nothing short of war will cause the Kim regime to give up its nuclear weapons program:
The Trump administration, which seems to rank North Korea high among its foreign policy problems, is choosing the hard line, but with a twist: Trump hopes to cajole China into joining him in a really tough sanctions regime. The issue was discussed during the Trump-Xi Jinping summit in April: The administration has apparently indicated its willingness to reconsider some of the United States’ anti-Chinese policies — including on difficult trade issues — if China “fully cooperates†in getting tough on North Korea.
The administration’s assumption is that Chinese sanctions would push North Korea to the brink of an economic disaster and thus prompt the leaders in Pyongyang to reconsider their nuclear ambitions. Given that China controls about 90 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade and also provides the country with vital aid, including shipments of subsidized fuel, the expectations seem reasonable.
The problem is, however, that Beijing has valid reasons not to be too harsh on Pyongyang. While Chinese leaders do not like North Korea’s nuclear program, they are afraid that truly comprehensive sanctions might, indeed, push North Korea to the brink of economic collapse, which would be followed by political disintegration. From their point of view, North Korea in a state of civil war would be a greater threat than the nuclear-armed but relatively stable North Korea that exists now. Even worse, a crisis in North Korea might result in a German-style reunification of the country under Seoul’s control — that is, the emergence of a united, democratic and nationalistic Korean state that would probably be an ally of the United States. This is not an outcome that would be welcomed in Beijing.
While I completely acknowledge Dr. Lankov’s authority on North Korea and even China, I think he’s got it wrong. The Chinese are making a completely rational calculation. As long as a collapse of the Kim regime would be worse for China’s ruling elite than the alternative, where the wheel meets the road they’re content to allow the regime to do whatever it cares to. They have no particular attachment to the Kims. The relationship is purely instrumental.
However, if the stakes were changed, their calculation would change, too. The problem here is us. As long as our present relationship with China such as it is is more important to us than preventing an attack on U. S. cities by North Korea or preventing North Korea becoming the nuclear weapons vendor of choice for every madman with money, the Kim regime will continue its headlong rush to develop ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads. There are any number of levers we could pull ranging from our present relatively phlegmatic stance to much more aggressive moves.
In other words while I think Dr. Lankov is correct in his conclusion I think he’s wrong about the mechanics. The question is not one for the North Koreans or Chinese. They’re responding rationally to the incentives before them. It’s up to us to change those incentives. I don’t think we will. I think we’d rather put Honolulu, San Francisco, or Seattle at risk.
First, China will not tolerate an American ally on the Yalu River, and it will go to war to prevent it. Russia will back them. Second, North Korea provides China with real benefits: it is a buffer state; its military would serve as auxiliaries in any war, greatly enhancing China’s power; and it diverts US and Japanese attention and resources.
A preemptive strike on North Korea’s missile and nuclear forces is off the table. It would be vetoed by both South Korea and Japan because they would suffer enormous losses in the ensuing war. Moreover, China and Russia have repeatedly called for a diplomatic solution, and they would enter the ensuing war on the North’s side. If a second Korean War did break out, the US would be driven off the peninsula, and Japan would likely become a neutral.
If the North is to be disarmed, they will have to be bribed. First, there would have to be international guarantees from China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the US that the North Korean regime would be protected in place. Second, a very large Marshall Plan for North Korean development would have to take place. $1T? And, likely, the US would have to withdraw all its forces (including THAAD) from the peninsula.
Yes, North Korea poses both positive and negative risks to China. I’ve made the same point myself. The Chinese aren’t mere hapless bystanders in North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program. They’re participants.
I have made comments along Bob’s view in the past. Rather then relitigating, I will make a suggestion on what’s perhaps doable.
Make it clear to the Chinese and Koreans that while nuclear weapons could be deferred for another day, ICBM’s will not and the US WILL start a conflict over it (without South Korean or Japan support if need be).
Basically offer them a choice of status quo or unleash the randomness of a conflict. The Kim family are survivors and they may calculate that nuclear weapons without ICBM’s gives them higher odds of doing that.
I agree with that. The Kim regime’s possession of ICBMs is an unacceptable threat and that should be made clear to the Chinese. The regime is not dependable and the likelihood of the weapons falling into even worse hands than theirs is too great.
“Basically offer them a choice of status quo or unleash the randomness of a conflict. ”
A dangerous gamble to make with other people’s lives.
I agree with you, Andy, its a dangerous gamble, especially if all we are offering is just a threat to start a conflict.
In the end, its the North Koreans, not the Chinese who we need to convince. A choice of status quo also means a credible offer to North Korea for verified termination of ICMB development – withdrawal of THAAD, a return to less military presence in South Korea. Also formalize what is informally true. A formal treaty which states the US won’t pursue regime change unless North Korea invades South Korea. Perhaps even get South Korea to drop “reunification”. Drop the UN sanctions from the ICBM’s.
Convincing China is in some ways a sideshow – the North Koreans developed nuclear weapons while a quarter of the country died from starvation – cutting off oil / money won’t stop the North Koreans if their government really wants ICBM’s.
SECDEF Mattis explains how close the US is to war with North Korea.