At Berlin Policy Journal Ulrich Speck has what strikes me as a somewhat agitated post on prospective changes in the world order subsequent to the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States:
Without American protection, Europe might not be able to uphold its own liberal order. The EU has built a unique system of cooperation and integration, but this has been achieved under the condition that most questions of strategy and hard power have been dominated by Washington. If the US umbrella vanishes and power and competition fully return to Europe, the EU might disintegrate into parts. A post-American Europe would probably be open to divide-and-rule strategies devised in Moscow and Beijing.
It’s difficult to predict just what path the Trump administration might choose. Regardless, European governments need to do two things: One is to invest in their own strength, including military power, and to continue to cooperate more on foreign policy matters. The other is to reach out early and in a focused way to the Trump administration in order to familiarize him with European views and interests. By becoming a strong, powerful partner to the US, Europe would increase the chances that the transatlantic partnership remains what it has been in the recent decades, namely the foundation of the liberal world order. It has made Europe free, safe, and rich.
and he points, somewhat disapprovingly, to Niall Ferguson’s blueprint for a new world order at American Interest:
As I reflected on Trump’s options in the immediate wake of the election, I ran the following thought-experiment. What if Trump, against all expectations, decided to seek better relations with both Moscow and Beijing? This would combine both his own Russophile leanings with Kissinger’s argument for a new policy of partnership with China. Such an arrangement would theoretically be achievable if Trump engaged only in kabuki theater with China over trade (which is what many influential Chinese expect him to do).19 It would also be consistent with the tough line on Islamic extremism that has been such a feature of Trump’s campaign, for on this issue the three great powers—each with their worrisome and growing Muslim minorities—share an interest. And it might be consistent with a re-ordering of the Middle East that re-imposes the ancien régime of kings and dictators in the Arab world and reinforces Israel, all at the expense of Iran, which has no historic reason to expect Russian fidelity, much less Chinese.
As a corollary, the three powers might agree on the demotion of Europe from great power status, taking advantage not only of Brexit but the increasingly fragmented and introspective character of EU politics. One possible way to do this would be for Trump to propose replacing “little†NAFTA with “big†NAFTA—the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, which would bring the United Kingdom directly into a post-EU Anglo-Atlantic sphere, while at the same time delivering on Trump’s anti-Mexican (though not anti-Canadian) election pledge. At the same time, Trump could credibly apply pressure on other NATO members to increase their currently risible defense budgets. Finally, he and Putin could work together to help continental populists such as Marine Le Pen to win the elections of 2017. As Roosevelt put it in 1906: “France ought to be with us and England—in our zone and our combination. It is the sound arrangement economically and politically.â€
One striking feature of such a strategy is that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would ultimately all be either populist or authoritarian controlled, assuming Le Pen can somehow be helped across the line against the French pacte républicain. Thus might the institutions of Wilsonian collective security end up serving the interests of the great powers as never before: the ultimate revenge of Realpolitik.
Self-evidently, the rest of the world would be the losers of such a great power condominium. Japan and Germany would be the biggest losers, just as they were the biggest beneficiaries of the postwar international architecture designed simultaneously to disarm, constrain, and enrich them—although Kissinger would doubtless urge the new Administration to adopt a Bismarckian approach to Japan, maintaining the U.S. commitment to its defense despite the new partnership with China, while encouraging Germany to remain European rather than nationalist in its outlook.
Although I’ve been pressing for a Great Powers/Sphere of Influence strategy for years, I think there are some shortcomings in what Dr. Ferguson is proposing. To explain why I’ll need to go over some ground I’ve covered before.
The United Nations was formed just about 70 years ago and for much of that it has been dysfunctional. The General Assembly is, as Jeanne Kirkpatrick characterized it 30 years ago, a Third World debating society. The Security Council is formed from the ghosts of the World War II
Allies. The idea of giving the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China veto power over any resolution might have made some sense for about twenty minutes in 1945 but is nonsensical now. I chalk it up to Alger Hiss’s role in drafting the Charter.
The United Kingdom, France, and China are not our clients and Russia never was. UNSC structure is a formula for irrelevance.
Rather than thinking of the Great Powers as static, we might want to adopt a more dynamic model. What conditions make a country a Great Power? Iran is a great regional power. So are Brazil, South Africa, and India.
Europe has been willingly infantilized for the last 70 years. They like it that way. It maximizes influence and minimizes accountability.
Back when NATO was formed it was said that its purpose was to keep the U. S. in, the Germans down, and the Russians out. It has failed in all but the first of those objectives. Is keeping the U. S. involved in the affairs of Europe still in our national interest? Or is it a formula for turning American soldiers into Germany’s janissaries as it pursues its century-long project of Germanizing Europe?
Just that times have changed, Europe, increasingly Islamic, by choice, will never be the American allie of the past. America now must, and can stand alone, until real allies drift our way.
Russia, Britain, and France are the only countries that were on our side in both world wars.
I should add that Germany and Turkey were our enemies in both world wars.
China was also our ally in both world wars. They declared war on the Central Powers in 1917.
Quite a number of other countries were our allies in both wars (at least as much as France was in WWII) including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, and several South American countries, esp. Brazil. Although most Americans aren’t aware of it we built and used air bases in Brazil to patrol the south Atlantic during the war.
And Brazil sent combat troops and fighters for the Italian front while Turkey was a neutral power but declared war on Germany in order to join the UN.
What makes a great power? Would say ability to win friends and influence people by a web of geography, trade, diplomacy and if need be, military action. Which we can subdivide by their ability into world, hemispheric and regional powers, the United States, UK, Turkey, respectively for example. Turning this into a new international debate and tea drinking org will require accepting a true one world government is as likely as the Grand Mufti enjoying a BLT.
I think it’s simpler than that. I think a great power has the ability to project power.
Somehow, Schuler failed to link to this in his post. An egregious omission.