I agree with the opening observation in David Ignatius’s most recent Washington Post column:
When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his all-out invasion of Ukraine on Thursday, he effectively ended the post-Cold War era. A new architecture for global relations must be built, and its shape will depend on whether Putin’s brutal campaign succeeds or fails.
but not with a great deal else. The reason I can’t agree with most of his other observations is contained within another passage with which I agree:
Putin’s attack awakened the ghosts of war that had haunted Europe for a century. The world watched in horror as a massive assault force attacked Ukraine from three sides with missiles, bombs, tanks and the electronic wizardry of cyberwarfare. Scores of nations condemned the invasion. But the gut-wrenching fact is that Ukraine is fighting Putin by itself.
Can anyone imagine a circumstance under which Ukraine would not be “fighting Putin by itself”? Can anyone imagine the U. S. entering directly into the conflict with its own troops that did not metastasize into nuclear war? That leaves the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Poland, and, perhaps, a few others. Can you imagine any of them using their own troops in Ukraine? I can’t.
And that’s why I think his conclusion is a fantasy:
If Putin loses his battle to subjugate Ukraine, the new order will have a solid and promising foundation.
It’s not actually a new new world order. It’s the old world order in which might makes right. The liberal world order has fallen off its wall and you can’t put it back together again. That is what should have been expected when major powers, whether global superpowers or regional ones like Russia, “go rogue” and do whatever they want whenever they want to. We need to acknowledge reality, think fondly of the liberal world order, identify our desired role in that old world order, and do what we need to do to assume it.
I think Russia is responsible for its aggression and they may well regret what they did. But I find the US policy towards the Ukraine remarkably reckless.
Why were decision makers in Washington encouraging Kyiv to flout Moscow’s red lines for years — knowing full well that if things got hot, Washington couldn’t get Ukraine to the point it could deter Russia and wasn’t going to put itself on the line to help?
Even if one believes Putin is a very bad actor, shouldn’t one be cautious and go after Putin only where he is unlikely to win or cause significant damage?
I recommend this video — by Professor John Mearsheimer (PS: I saw it before zero hedge posted it) from 2015 which analyzed the Ukraine crisis; how American policy was leading Ukraine on a “primrose path”, playing a “losing hand”, the “reverse midas touch”. Many of his points are sentiments that have been expressed in this blog.
He made some grim predictions about how events would turn out and sadly its mostly come true. Notice his worse case outcome for Ukraine is essentially the best case scenario speculated on the blog a couple of days ago.
Mearsheimer is a realist and he doesn’t believe the “rules based liberal international order” is sustainable in the long term. I disagree; the framework of the UN charter is perhaps the only stable one that can avoid a catastrophic war between major powers — the key is all the great powers need to follow the rules.
PS Mearsheimer also some choice opinions about policy makers in DC for the past 20 years. I mean what a comment that policy making had to get better because the margin for error was being eliminated.
You neglected to furnish a link to the video. Inside the anchor tags it’s just “video”.
Here is the link
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4
Thank you.
“Why were decision makers in Washington encouraging Kyiv to flout Moscow’s red lines for years — knowing full well that if things got hot, Washington couldn’t get Ukraine to the point it could deter Russia and wasn’t going to put itself on the line to help?”
Ding, ding ding! A very succinct summary. Thank you! I’ll watch the video over the weekend.