At Project Syndicate Nouriel Roubini is horrified at the prospect of an American foreign policy that is focused on benefiting Americans:
When the US pursued similar policies in the 1920s and 1930s, it helped sow the seeds of World War II. Protectionism – starting with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which affected thousands of imported goods – triggered retaliatory trade and currency wars that worsened the Great Depression. More important, American isolationism – based on a false belief that the US was safely protected by two oceans – allowed Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to wage aggressive war and threaten the entire world. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US was finally forced to take its head out of the sand.
Today, too, a US turn to isolationism and the pursuit of strictly US national interests may eventually lead to a global conflict. Even without the prospect of American disengagement from Europe, the European Union and the eurozone already appear to be disintegrating, particularly in the wake of the United Kingdom’s June Brexit vote and Italy’s failed referendum on constitutional reforms in December. Moreover, in 2017, extreme anti-Europe left- or right-wing populist parties could come to power in France and Italy, and possibly in other parts of Europe.
Without active US engagement in Europe, an aggressively revanchist Russia will step in. Russia is already challenging the US and the EU in Ukraine, Syria, the Baltics, and the Balkans, and it may capitalize on the EU’s looming collapse by reasserting its influence in the former Soviet bloc countries, and supporting pro-Russia movements within Europe. If Europe gradually loses its US security umbrella, no one stands to benefit more than Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Perhaps there’s a general outcry here in the States for a truly isolationist foreign policy but I don’t see it. What I do see is a demand for a better return on investment for ordinary Americans from our policies.
We import more than any other country in the world, particularly in relation to our exports, we accept more foreign workers than any other country even with real wages largely flat and labor force participation declining, we spend more on our military, and, unlike many other countries, a lot of that spending is directed towards projecting power beyond our borders.
We’ve spent the last couple of decades in various disastrous military adventures. We have benefited very little from any of them and, arguably, we’ve been hurt by them more than we’ve benefited.
IMO describing that as isolationism is a stretch. It would require a shift greater than anything I can imagine for us to become really isolationist. I don’t see a call to return to the 1930s. I don’t even see a call to return to the 1960s. I see a call to return to the 1990s. That might be nostalgia but it’s not isolationism.
In the Age of Trump, there will be tweets, and there will be hyperbole. There will be so much of both it will make your head spin, literally.
Will we or won’t we fight for Estonia? Will we or won’t we honor our NATO commitments? No one knows. For the first time in 70 years no one knows whether the US will stand up to Russia and defend Europe.
Personally, if I was Estonian I’d be making sure I had a boat all gassed up and supplied. I do not believe Trump is capable of standing up to Putin. I think Putin has a firm grip on Trump’s tiny balls.
The question is not ‘isolationism’ per se; the question is whether the United States is capable of independent action in the face of Russian aggression against NATO. ‘Policy’ is an empty word when foreign policy is determined by random 3 AM tweets.
I wish that question had been asked before admitting Estonia to NATO. From my point of view it’s just one of many disastrous foreign policy decisions made by George W. Bush.
I don’t want to be placed in a position of attacking President Obama or defending Trump. Suffice it to say that I think the problem you’ve identified goes back farther than Novemer 8, 2016.
I agree with the observations regarding drastic swings of isolationism on the part of the incoming US foreign policy. What I believe is interventions abroad will be more cautiously dispensed, differentiated by our own national security/global vulnerability and needs rather than yielding to the spontaneous temptations of nation building adventurism.
As for the tweets Trump sends out ….they are, IMO, losing some of their sensational affect, except to the still-flummoxed press and those who still find Trump indigestible as POTUS. Otherwise, many of his social media tidbits are seen by many as swatches of trial balloons measuring both public and political responses, as well as being a personal vehicle bypassing MSM’s misinterpretation or bias, by directly conducting a candid, sometimes wry, conversation with the public.
Michael, your crystal ball comments about the friendliness of Putin and Trump lacks anything substantial, except for innuendos about murky ties to Russia, email tampering that has yet to be sorted out or proven, and the benign salutations being exchanged between two world figures before Trump has assumed office. All these negative assumptions, as to how Trump will really wheel and deal with Putin, won’t reveal themselves until he is officially the spokesperson and leader for the U.S.
Yes, Trump could be as you seem to think, putty in Putin’s hands. Or, he could be a congenial strong man, standing solidly for the interests of the U.S. No one knows for sure…yet.
Remember, that we knew as little about Obama too, before he took office. However, with the infamous reset event, taking the missile defense out of Eastern Europe, later followed by turning the cheek upon the invasion of Crimea, Ukraine, and shrinking from following through on Syria, it became all too obvious as to whom was seen as the strong and weak man in the Russian/U.S. equation.
I don’t believe any significant doubt was raised about the US commitment prior to Trump. The firm assertion that we would act – enhanced by Obama moving US troops into the Balkans – would have raised the risk to intolerable levels for Putin. It’s one thing driving tanks into Ukraine, it’s a whole ‘nother story driving troops into the teeth of NATO air power. It would be tough holding Estonia in a land battle given the geography, but not much of a challenge for the US Navy to annihilate Putin’s fleets, or shut down Kaliningrad or block Russian oil exports. Putin is eminently manageable – unless of course the ‘P’ in POTUS stands for ‘Putin.’
There should have been. Failing to do so was a breach of fiduciary responsibility. Please give examples of either GWB or Obama “managing Putin”.
Sure, as long as you’re willing to destroy the world over it.
The American people apparently agree with me. In the latest Gallup poll, 46% believe Trump capable of handling an international crisis; at this same point in Obama’s pre-presidency that number was 73%. A 27 point gap? Literally no one but Trump voters has even the slightest faith in this creature. Nor should they.
Well, Dave, the threat to ‘destroy the world’ has been operative since the late 1940’s. It’s the basis of Pax Americana and 70 years without a major power war.
If Putin moves against Estonia/NATO he would be the one choosing to risk annihilation – a choice he’d not be stupid enough to make unless he had reason to believe we would betray our allies. Now he has reason to believe that – Trump threw NATO under the bus in between calling Rosie O’Donnell a fat pig. And just what will our word be worth if we abandon NATO? Our power would be halved in an instant. It would be the end of the United States as a status quo power committed to peace and freedom, an end to an extraordinary period of peace.
So, you don’t believe in MAD?
It’s amazing the degree to which the globalists and elite establishment are shitting their pants. Any deviation from the march to more globalism, with the US at the vanguard of course, is described in the worst possible light by Roubini and his ilk.
I do believe in MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction (the threat to blow up the world) has been operative (if not always explicit) in relationships between nuclear powers since forever. We said we’d do our best to stop the Soviets by conventional means, but if that failed. . . well, there’s a reason we wanted nukes positioned in Europe and have subs lurking around the North Pole.
Extending NATO to include the Balkans may have been overreach, but unless you buy the notion that the Balkans are a threat to Russia, which is nonsense, Putin has no basis other than national pride to cause trouble over it. Unlike his puppet, Putin is not stupid – not the genius the Trump people seem to imagine, but not a bloody idiot, either. No, a firm stand with NATO would deter Putin. As it deterred his Soviet predecessors.
Any notion the Trumpkins have about alliance with Russia as a counter to China is absurd on its face. NATO doesn’t threaten Russia, but China sure as hell does. There are a hell of a lot of Chinese sitting just below the great, big, empty, unpopulated, resource-rich place called Siberia. And unless Putin thinks we’re going to defend his border with China he can’t afford to make trouble there. He doesn’t have the money or the manpower to defend the China border, so whether he likes it or not he’s the tail on a Chinese dog and nothing we can do will change that calculus.
So, we throw NATO under the bus and Russia is still in bed with China. And that would benefit us how, exactly? Putin’s only roads to expansion are into the ME to which he is welcome in my opinion, or against the ‘Stans to which, again, I’d say ‘go for it, Pootie and good luck with that ball of crazy.’ Or against NATO. He needs foreign adventure because he can’t deliver anything else.
We should be making it crystal clear that no part of NATO is on the menu. Instead what we seem to be about to do is abandon our friends for no gain whatsoever and suffer major, lasting damage to the US.
Retreating to 1990’s level of intervention would still be a bit too aggressive. I don’t really see us doing that. We may or may not act less aggressively towards Russia, but I expect things to pick up towards Iran. I also think we can expect direct confrontation with China. Interesting that people worry about MAD with Russia, but not China. Trump supporters like Trump for, among other things, his tough talk. (Really, you just can’t talk tough enough when running in the GOP.)
Reagan, also came in with tough talk, but quickly backed off. Indeed he took a lot of criticism from his own party for negotiating with Russia. He ran away when we had troubles in Lebanon, though he did crush Grenada. Trump worries me a bit more as he may feel that he has to live up to the tough talk.
Steve
If it were the U. S. at the vanguard, I’d be happier about it but it isn’t. It’s the handful of Americans who attend the Davos conference who are at the vanguard and I have no confidence at all in them.
I’ve always found that tremendously amusing. People keep giving Reagan credit for having killed the Soviet Union but I think that’s a misconception. I think that what killed the Soviet Union was a combination of telecommunications, generational shift, and the obvious failure of the Soviet economic model.
Dave,
“If it were the U. S. at the vanguard, I’d be happier about it but it isn’t. It’s the handful of Americans who attend the Davos conference who are at the vanguard and I have no confidence at all in them.”
Those handful of Americans represent the US in an official capacity, so what difference does it make? Plus, who is the muscle?
Michael,
“Extending NATO to include the Balkans may have been overreach, but unless you buy the notion that the Balkans are a threat to Russia, which is nonsense…”
I think you need to read more Russian history. The Balkans aren’t a direct threat to Russia, Western control of Russia’s historic sphere IS a direct threat in the Russian view. You should get your books translated to Russian and do a tour and ask them yourself – from their point of view the bulk of the 20th century was a story of Western invasions and threats. The the USSR fell, Russia was weak and the west, lead by the US, expanded and is now on Russia’s doorstep hinting at further expansion. To Russia, NATO is a de-facto anti-Russian alliance and states like the Baltics are de-facto US protectorates.
Those aren’t personal judgments, this is how Russians actually see the current situation. This is why Russia took Crimea because they feared Ukraine would be the next domino to fall into NATO’s orbit. Consider Russia’s history in relationship to Crimea in particular, and access to the Black Sea and Med in general. Given the circumstances, they were not about to leave that strategic asset to chance. Pretty much every western “expert” see this, wrongly, as a simplistic case of Russian aggression.
You say a firm stand will deter Putin. Deter him from what exactly? Deter him from opposing our plan for Ukraine, Georgia and who knows, maybe one day Belarus? Maybe we should, as some have suggested, permanently station ground forces in the Baltics – that will show Putin! Or maybe it would prove to Putin and the Russian people that another Western invasion is on the horizon….
I fear your brand of deterrence is the kind that precipitates war instead of preventing it.
Oh, and no one should interpret this comment in any way was supporting what people believe about Trump’s foreign policy. I don’t support Trump, never supported Trump, and didn’t vote for him.
Andy:
I know some Russian history. For example, I know that their suffering in WW2 was largely their own fault. The Soviets made a deal wth Hitler to carve up Poland. Then Stalin decided to decimate his own army in a paranoid rage. And he completely misread Hitler, doing nothing at all to prepare for war, so that he was caught flat-footed when his partner-in-crime attacked. Soviet military commanders were terrified of making an error lest they end up shoveling snow in Siberia or worse, and of course Stalin, like Hitler, loved to issue idiotic orders requiring armies to do stupid things.
I also know the Russians have lived off a 70 year-long lie about their role in that war, the cause of their suffering, and the way they finally achieved victory. Soviets weren’t just killed by Nazis, they were murdered by the NKVD – the NKVD that had helped train the Gestapo – and of course by the general incompetence of the Soviet economy.
What I do not understand is Americans acting as if Russia had a right to impose its will on anyone in the region. Poland suffered far more at the hands of the Nazis and the Soviets. Poland is the unsung hero of WW2 and it remains unsung because of Russian propaganda that had to conceal the dangerous truth that the USSR was not just a victim in WW2, but was in fact one of the primary causes of WW2. Finland, anyone?
Russia’s self-pity is epic, but false. Napoleon was 200 years ago. Hitler was 70 years ago, and the Russians began as his co-conspirators. The history of Russia is not of a nation constantly facing invasion, that’s propaganda. The history of Russia is of an expansionist empire, a brutal occupier, a promulgator of anti-semitism. Russia is the angry drunk who insists on crashing Europe’s parties. It is entitled to nothing but its own territory.
Why Americans should so far forget their own beliefs as to suggest that we should countenance Russian oppression of free people is beyond me. The Balkans are free and democratic. They threaten no one. It is in my opinion contemptible and weak-minded to buy into Russia’s deliberately-stoked, utterly dishonest paranoia, while shrugging off the rights of Estonians and eventually, Poles.
Michael,
Your characterization of Russia is not entirely inaccurate, but it is irrelevant to the point I tried to make. The world is filled with small countries that need protection from bigger bullies and there are a lot of bullies and countries that need protecting. Several of those bullies are our allies. Cornering a non-ally bully that has a lot of nukes is dangerous and talk is cheap.
I think one has to consider the risks of trying to right the world’s wrongs. America can’t do everything and really, if European security is only contingent on US military power and deterrence, then the whole enterprise is a house of cards. It’s not unreasonable to ask why American blood must be the tripwire to prevent another partition of Poland, nor is it clear that the US must be the buttress against aggression whether real or perceived. We’ve done that for quite a while but we obviously can’t do it forever.
Dave’s point that the American people probably don’t realize what they’ve signed onto is a good one. As the saying goes, don’t write a check that your ass can’t cash. How many more checks do you want to write Michael?