The media and the blogosphere continue to be abuzz with news and rumors circulating around Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s impending meeting with President Obama, calling him on the carpet for derisive remarks about the civilian leadership in a Rolling Stones interview:
WASHINGTON — President Obama will confront the fate of his top commander in Afghanistan Wednesday after a firestorm over remarks the general and members of his staff made that were contemptuous of senior administration officials.
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has prepared a letter of resignation, though President Obama had not made up his mind whether to accept it when they meet Wednesday morning.
“I think it’s clear that the article in which he and his team appeared showed poor judgment,†Mr. Obama said after a cabinet meeting Tuesday. “But I also want to make sure I talk to him directly before I make final judgment.â€
Many are calling for his head. I don’t envy the situation in which President Obama finds himself.
By virtually everybody’s reckoning, if you have decided on a strategy of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, there is no better man to head up your operation than Stanley McChrystal. Comparisons are being made to Truman’s firing of MacArthur for insubordination during the Korean War. The comparison is not apt. Gen. MacArthur’s insubordination took the form of attempting to plan the strategic objective and general plan of the war, an act flying directly in the face of civilian control of the military. Gen. McChrystal’s insubordination doesn’t threaten civilian control of the military, at least not yet. All it threatens are the politicians in the White House’s views of themselves, Gen. McChrystal’s reputation, and his career.
When you have the best man for the job, firing him in favor of the second or third best man because he’s insufficiently deferential is a clear signal that politics trumps policy.
I don’t envy President Obama his situation. His choices are to swallow his policy or his pride. Throughout his presidency to date President Obama has repeatedly chosen to “double down”. He has chosen that in his policy in Afghanistan, in his economic policy approach, and in other domestic policy debates. We’re about to see if he has reached the limit of his willingness to double down.
Update
My thinking on this subject echoes Tom Barnett’s:
Fallon never said anything disrespectful of his superiors in front of me, nor did his staff. The admiral just fundamentally disagreed on the possibility of going to war with Iran and wasn’t shy about sharing that opinion in the press, which he did repeatedly prior to my piece (which he later said misrepresented his views while quoting him accurately–to the tune of over 1,500 words).
Here, McChrystal does just the opposite: never really disagreeing with his superiors while openly disrespecting them. I say “openly” because he and his staff did it repeatedly in front of a reporter they knew was there to report on what he saw and heard–just like I did.
Is that enough to get him fired? That’s Obama’s call. The fact that McChrystal is quoted both directly and in a secondary manner (through his staff) making truly derogatory remarks about so many principals (VP, NS adviser, our AMB in-country, Holbrooke) is problematic going forward, but firing the right guy for the right job when he agrees with your policy is likewise a hard choice for the president.
I think that Gen. McChrystal and his staff should be publicly reprimanded for their inappropriate comments. However, I don’t think that lèse majesté is enough of a reason to fire him if he’s doing the job he was hired to do. That would be a sign of weakness rather than of strength.
Everyone is replaceable, including McChrystal. If there’s one thing the military doesn’t have a shortage of, it’s General Officers. Some of them, maybe even many of them, are highly competent and could replace McChrystal. He’s not actually that important.
Personally, I think he has to go. This incident, while not a huge deal by itself, is part of a larger pattern by Gen. McChrystal and of a general officer corps that’s become increasingly political. So, in my estimation, this isn’t merely politics vs policy – it’s about the appropriate military role in setting and influencing policy.
Candidate Obama campaigned on a strategy of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan before being elected, appointing Gen. McChrystal to his present job, and, essentially, getting him to write the policy (if there were a threat to civilian control, that was it).
Of course Gen. McChrystal isn’t indispensable. That’s not the question. The question is whether he’s better than the available alternatives or not.
That’s why I characterize this as a no-win situation for the White House. Either their original decision to appoint McChrystal was an error or it doesn’t matter that much if he’s got a big mouth.
Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan has scarcely begun. I think it’s completely inappropriate but for goodness sake it’s got to be given time to work. Will firing McChrystal advance or retard that?
Based on time spent grousing has probably been the primary activity of armies since Sargon the Great’s time. Mass communications at today’s scale means that every grouse can be heard by millions.
First, I would like to second sentiments expressed by Ricks. I hope that this man, who has served with distinction, just reached a breaking point after too many years at war. It can happen to anyone. How else to explain his actions? Suppose I had written my CO suggesting that my plan for the next two weeks was to drink beer with a reporter and discuss my feelings about the POTUS and anyone else who came to mind? This was indiscrete and stupid. McChrystal did not get where he is by being stupid.
If this were an isolated incident, I could maybe see overlooking this incident. However, it is not. When I was in it was the norm to take potshots at any politician considered to be liberal. The volunteer army has attracted more troops from areas friendly to conservative thinking. Republicans have played this up by lionizing the troops. Whether we win, lose or draw in Afghanistan we will continue to exist. It will not make a huge difference. Hell, AQ can just go to another failed state. But, the principle of civilian control is a first order principle. Powers documented in her book how generals dragged their feet on carrying out Clinton’s policies. This needs to stop. Seriously, if you cannot work for a liberal say so and resign. The public will catch on if it is that big of a problem.
“That’s why I characterize this as a no-win situation for the White House. Either their original decision to appoint McChrystal was an error or it doesn’t matter that much if he’s got a big mouth.”
Wrong binary. The right person for the job can change. That is not always predictable. Heck, I had no idea how my first wife would respond to my being on call every third night in training (not well). The reason it is a no-win is we have to choose between mission and fundamental principles. If we keep him, what message do we send to junior officers? Feel free to publicly and indiscretely speak with contempt about the civilians in control of the military. Bad message.
If we let let him go, it may very well jeopardize the current mission. Frankly, I thought Mattis would have been as good or better a choice. SF does not have a rep for playing nicely with others. Rodriguez has a good rep, but I know little about him. At any rate, McChrystal is the one who designed the current campaign and there is risk in changing at this point.
The whole thing saddens me immensely as I had hoped that the lessons learned from the writings of people like McMaster would have made this kind of event very unlikely.
(Good point on Truman/McCarthy. History is important.)
Steve
“If we let let him go, it may very well jeopardize the current mission.”
I find that an inexplicable concession. And if Obama believes that, I can only assume that he doesn’t care whether the current mission fails or succeeds.
When you have the best man for the job, firing him in favor of the second or third best man because he’s insufficiently deferential is a clear signal that politics trumps policy.
I’m not sure I agree. Under a counterinsurgency strategy, the general’s job in Afghanistan _is_ significantly political, and from what we keep seeing McChrystal has little talent for that side of it. And he’s the one who sold that strategy for Afghanistan in the first place.
Let’s look at what McChrystal has actually done as opposed to what people think of him. The Marjeh operation , the delay in the Kandahar operation, the overly-restrictive ROE, this incident where he and his staff also air a lot of dirty laundry and make it clear they can’t work with their civilian equivalents, his repeated political/media errors, etc. Although it’s still early, there’s precious little success and, in particular, reality did not meet stated expectations regarding Marjeh, so I don’t find the argument that he’s the best we’ve got persuasive. He’s a great commander, but this is the wrong job for him. I think we need an Eisenhower but McChrystal is a Patton.
It’s a “no-win” for the White House because the President will take political heat no matter his decision. Long-term though, it won’t matter if the President’s strategy is successful because that is what matters. This decision will be viewed through that lens. Whether or not McChrystal leads this effort isn’t going to be a huge factor there, particularly since there are so many problems at the policy level.
True, but COIN in Afghanistan is only being given a year. McChrystal and his supporters have already started to try to push that back, which is, again, stepping into dangerous territory. McChrystal accepting this job knowing the deadline and the political conditions imposed by the President. If those conditions are insufficient he’s required to give his opinion to the President, but he shouldn’t be advocating in any way in the public sphere. I can understand the frustration, because a year is not enough time, but he accepted those conditions. This is all assuming, of course, the goal and strategy is, in reality, what has been publicly stated. *
Firing McChrystal isn’t going to change any of that. The next Commander is going to want more time too if the COIN strategy is to continue. McChrystal, like it or not, now carries a lot of baggage. Given his poor relationship with Eikenberry and Holbrooke, if McChrystal isn’t fired, one or both of them will probably have to go instead. Of course, the fact that such fighting takes place at all is the result of no unity-of-command, which is a problem the President needs to address, but hasn’t.
* Personally, I think the President is trying to replicate the political effects of the “surge” in Iraq. While the surge did not really solve any of Iraq’s problems, it did create political space and the perception that things were on the right track which allowed Bush to draw down and plan to exit Iraq under honorable conditions. It was so effective that Obama didn’t need to keep his “one brigade a month” pledge that he campaigned on.
The goal in Afghanistan, I think, is similar – to create the political space to allow an honorable exit from Afghanistan that isn’t perceived as a “loss.” That’s the only strategic rationale I can see for implementing this COIN/surge in Afghanistan while declaring that forces will begin pulling out in a year. So the goal, I think, is to push the Taliban back on their heals, get some semblance of governance out of Karzai, declare victory and go home before the house of cards falls.
Given that Eikenberry has already been guilty of public insubordination and Holbrooke is, well, Holbrooke they all probably need to go.
That’s how I characterized “the surge”, too. Iraq isn’t Afghanistan and I think that a lot of people are going to be pretty surprised when “complete withdrawal from Iraq” ends up meaning leaving 50,000 troops there indefinitely.
The end state in Afghanistan under the McChrystal plan is:
1. Insurgency defeated to within GIRoA’s capacity.
That’s a swinging endpoint that depends either on the insurgency being reduced in capabilities or the Afghan armies capacities increasing.
2. Legitimate governance extends to local levels.
I don’t see this happening without a U.S. garrison maintained in Kandahar for some time.
3. Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people.
Ditto item 2.
4. GIRoA, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security.
The end state assumes long-term U.S. presence.
PD Shaw,
Not necessarily:
#1 I agree with.
#2 Governance doesn’t have to be national. Local governance systems exist – the central government could simply legitimize them.
#3 Not necessary. This is a myth sold by the “development” industry.
#4 Again, that assumes security comes solely through the ANA and/or ANP. Historically, locals handles their own security backed up by the “national” government.
In short there’s a lot of wiggle room provided that we can see things on Afghanistan’s terms and not our own.
That seems to jive with Cordesman’s recent argument for staying the course to achieve:
“the goal [of] effective governance and justice as perceived by Afghans, a stable society free of significant insurgent violence and threats, and a suitable condition for development by Afghans on Afghan terms.”
http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war
Afghanistan has been in civil war for over thirty years, if we can get Afghanistan back to where it was forty years ago, we can probably keep the country from being a terrorist base and a source of instability in Pakistan. If we want a more centralized end state, we would have to roll the clock back about a hundred years.
BTW/ Cordesman sees the biggest threat to an “Afghan Good Enough” is the perception of a hard deadline, since it undercuts what can and will be accomplished.
“BTW/ Cordesman sees the biggest threat to an “Afghan Good Enough†is the perception of a hard deadline”
The deadline has always been vague in reference to exactly what will happen in July,2011. I have interpreted it as meaning we would convert to a CT approach at that time if COIN was not making headway. Perhaps I interpret it that way because that is what I want, but I think it makes sense.
Steve