You often see laments about a supposed “decline in American leadership,” especially from European commentators who want Washington to be more assertive, more engaged, or more willing to underwrite their preferred outcomes. But I think that misstates the real problem. What we are witnessing is not a leadership deficit on Washington’s part so much as a followership deficit among our NATO allies.
European governments have interests of their own, and those interests diverge increasingly from ours. That shouldn’t be surprising: Europe faces different threats, different demographics, different economic pressures, and different political constraints. Yet the commentary class continues to speak as though American leadership is a constant and allied alignment is the variable—when the opposite is equally, if not more, true.
The uncomfortable truth is that many allies won’t follow where we lead, often because they don’t want to go where we are going. Washington’s preferred strategy toward Russia, toward China, toward energy, and even toward industrial policy is not universally shared in Europe. In some cases, allies are hedging; in others, they are free-riding; in still others, they genuinely believe our approach is mistaken or misaligned with their domestic politics.
Complaints about “U.S. abdication” are therefore a way of shifting blame. They imply that if only America were more decisive, the alliance would function smoothly. But NATO is a coalition of sovereign states, not a chain of command. Leadership is only meaningful when others are willing to be led.
Seen that way, the so-called leadership crisis looks much more like a crisis of followership—one rooted in structural divergence, political fragmentation, and a reluctance to bear costs. The United States can set priorities, propose strategies, and shoulder burdens. But it cannot make others want to come along.
