The First Casualty

The earliest attribution of the observation that the first casualty of war is truth is to Samuel Johnson and although the notion gained currency during the run-up to World War I, nowhere is that observation more true than in the case of our ongoing war in Afghanistan. At LobeLog Derek Davison provides a frank status report on our efforts in Afghanistan:

• terrorism is unabated
• the prospect of negotiations is more remote
• civilian casualties are slightly reduced but the proportion of civilian casualties produced by the U. S. has risen
• conditions may actually be worse than are being reported

For example, although it’s being widely said that the Afghan government controls just under half the country, it may be more like one third.

I disagree somewhat with his closing assessment:

Perhaps the issue isn’t that Americans don’t know what their military is doing in Afghanistan, it’s that, after more than 16 years at war, they simply don’t care.

Ten or so years ago I did a quantitative assessment of public opinion on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and came to the conclusion that there was a threshold below which Americans were not unconcerned but tolerated the status quo. That threshold was about two U. S. casualties per day.

U. S. casualties depend primarily on two variables: total troops deployed and operational tempo. Those two factors are positively correlated with our ability to control the situation in Afghanistan. I believe there’s a sweet spot but we’re well below it.

More than anything else we’ve got to identify our objectives in Afghanistan and what we can or can’t do. If it is politically impossible for us to leave Afghanistan, whether due to its domestic or geopolitical implications, which certainly seems to be the case, then we should look with gimlet eye at what we can achieve in Afghanistan and what it would take to achieve it.

I continue to believe, as I have believed since 2001, that invading Afghanistan was an error. However, we can’t unscramble the egg. Let’s consider ways and means in Afghanistan honestly. If we can never leave, say so. If we can leave once certain objectives are met, say what they are and what it will take to accomplish them. Then put those resources in place.

If we can leave Afghanistan, do so and don’t second guess the decision in the light of subsequent events.

The worst choice is what we’re doing: staying forever without doing what’s necessary to accomplish any meaningful objectives.