On the 70th anniversary of the bombing of Dresden, Spiegel Online interviews British historian Frederick Taylor. Here are a few snippets.
On the mythologization of the bombing by the Germans:
Dresden was undoubtedly a particularly fine city, a tourist center well known to Germans and foreigners alike as a place where the arts flourished amidst architecturally distinguished surroundings. This gave rise to the myth that it was of no military or industrial importance. The high civilian death toll — though current estimates of 25,000 are not as high as once thought — also plays a role. Hamburg could never be seen as being of no military importance. Dresden, plausibly — though not really accurately — could be.
On disruption of the German civil order as a main objective of the bombing:
Raids on Dresden and Chemnitz were delayed by bad weather. And ultimately, only the Dresden raid was successful — horribly so as the 25,000 or more casualties bear witness. This was, in fact, a clear-cut case where maximum destruction was the central aim of the attack. There can be no question that the presence of many refugees was factored into the Allies’ calculations. A Feb. 1, 1945 memorandum specifically noted the huge tide of refugees passing through the eastern German cities as a “plus point,” chillingly adding that attacking these cities would “result in establishing a state of chaos in some or all of these areas.”
On the strategic importance of Dresden:
Dresden was undeniably a beautiful city, a center of the arts and a symbol of all that was great about pre-Nazi German humanism. It was also quite strongly Nazi and a major industrial center. Its light industries, ranging from factories producing typewriters and cigarettes to furniture and candy, had overwhelmingly been converted to war use after 1939. Around 70,000 workers in the city are thought to have been involved in war-related work. Its regional railway directorate was heavily involved in the war effort on the eastern front and also in the transport of prisoners within the concentration camp system. The question therefore is not whether Dresden contained legitimate bombing targets, but whether the method and intensity of the February 1945 bombing was justifiable.
Let me preface my remarks with my view that a) the bombing of Dresden on February 13 through February 15 1945 was a war atrocity and b) was immoral. However, I think the blame for it can be laid squarely on the British.
The British high command made no secret of their support for as many German civilian casualties as possible. The Americans were the champions of precision bombing in the European theater; that interested the British significantly less as anyone who’s ever visited the sectors bombed by the British and the sectors bombed by the Americans during the war can attest. Both American and British bombers took part in the bombing but the declassified air logs of the American bomber makes it clear that they were going after legitimate military targets. Also, keep in mind that “precision bombing” seventy years ago meant something quite different than it does today.
Did Americans take part in deliberate targeting of civilian targets? Probably.
One more little item that I believe is too infrequently remarked on. The famous talks among Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill at Yalta took place from February 7 to February 11, 1945. Although the popular mythology of the war is that the three Allied leaders were discussing how to divvy up Europe to the best of my knowledge no transcripts of the talks have ever been made public. I strongly suspect that the air attacks that included the bombing of Dresden were a major topic of discussion and that Stalin made an impassioned plea to Roosevelt and Churchill to draw the Luftwaffe away from the Red Army’s forces which at that point were just 120 miles from Dresden.
The death toll may have been higher than might have been anticipated. Planned construction of air-raid shelters had not extended to Dresden, as they had closer to the channel. Only a private bunker for NAZI elites was constructed, as labor and material demands of the war side-tracked construction plans. Also, the bombing corresponded with a Soviet push, and anti-air artillery had been shifted to the East to focus on the Red Army, and German fighter planes were grounded at Dresden for lack of fuel.
I don’t know whether the Allies knew how vulnerable Dresden was. From German letters it appears that these types of raids and the regime’s inability to protect its people (though protecting its leaderships) severely eroded the regular German’s support.
The reason you firebomb Dresden, Tokyo, or London is to break the civilian population’s will to resist once you eventually control them. Had Germany been able to invade England, the English would have been war weary enough to welcome the surrender or capture.
If the Iraq takedown of Baghdad had taken two years instead of two weeks, the war weariness would have broken their will to resist.
Two years of the Iraqi insurgency was enough to break the American will to resist.
If General Sherman had been given a few more years to burn down the South, the US would be a vastly different place.
When invoking violence, the mistake most people make is trying to justify it by using just enough force to overcome the enemy, but the result is an unbroken enemy. The enemy must understand that any resistance will be matched with overwhelming and unjustified use of force. Then, the violence can cease, and the rebuilding can start.